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The aim of this thesis is to draw on the work of Michel Foucault to focus on the field 
of curriculum theory - with particular reference to his theme of power/knowledge. 
Several curriculum theorists are indebted to Foucault's thought in developing their 
own work. The ways in which they use Foucault's work, however, do not accurately 
reflect his central project. Rather than critiquing curriculum theories themselves or 
developing my own, alternative theories from a Foucauldian perspective, however, 
my purpose here is to diagnose how curriculum is studied and how the field of 
curriculum theory governs itself, in the name of Foucault. To achieve this purpose, I 
develop three lines of inquiry. First, I review Foucault's reception in curriculum 
theory and educational policy analysis. I focus specifically on the perspectives of 
Cleo Cherryholmes, Henry A. Giroux, Thomas S. Popkewitz and Stephen J. Ball. 
Second, I seek a preliminary understanding of the notion of power/knowledge by 
directly referring to Foucault's work. Third, I attempt to refine my account of 
power/knowledge through reference to secondary literature on Foucault. Through 
exploration of power/knowledge along these three lines, I develop a critique, in light 
of both Foucault's own account and these secondary interpretations, of the way that 
Foucault's concept has been used in curriculum theory. This enables an examination 
of the limitations of their application of Foucault's notion of power/knowledge, 
seemingly constrained by a dominant understanding of curriculum as the medium 
through which to understand the oppressive social structure. Instead I seek to outline 
an idea of curriculum as a practice for inspiring self-transformation. At the end of this 
thesis, I raise two new issues, to illustrate the ways in which Foucault's notion of 
power/knowledge can be applied elsewhere in the study of curriculum. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand Foucault's notion of power/knowledge and 
to inquire into the ways this notion has been adopted in curriculum theory. The thesis 
is driven by the belief that there are problems with this take-up of Foucault's thought, 
regarding both the substance of interpretation and the ways in which such 
interpretations then settle into the role of received ideas. While my main purpose is to 
provide a criticism of certain ways in which the notion has been taken up, I also hope 
to show the potency of Foucault's ideas in this respect in relation to curriculum 
theory. 
Seven chapters are included in this thesis. Chapter One provides an outline of my 
topic and an indication of the way in which I shall approach it. Chapter Two is a brief 
survey of a number of leading curriculum theorists who have drawn on Foucault's 
concept of power/knowledge. In particular I consider the work of Cleo Cherryholmes, 
Henry A. Giroux, Stephen Ball and Thomas S. Popkewitz. This survey is undertaken 
in order to explore how these theorists adopt power/knowledge in their theories. After 
this, I turn, in Chapter Three, directly to Foucault in order to examine the main 
sources of this idea in his writing, specifically in Discipline and Punish, The History 
of Sexuality, Vol.], and in some of his remarkable essays and interviews. These 
materials offer a clear account of Foucault's position regarding the concept of 
power/knowledge. In order to gain a deepened understanding of the different 
interpretations of power/knowledge that have emerged in the mainstream 
philosophical literature, I examine, in Chapter Four, several secondary sources on 
Foucault. Chapter Five is the culmination of this thesis, and here I use the 
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understanding developed in Chapters Three and Four to criticize and evaluate the 
applications of the notion of power/knowledge that have been examined in Chapter 
Two. My critique is not directed towards the curriculum theories themselves, but 
towards the very limited way that Foucault's concept has been employed. This 
critique, which draws on a Foucauldian understanding of critical practices, is made in 
aid of a reoriented adoption of power/knowledge in thinking about curriculum. In 
Chapter Six, a Foucauldian account is offered in relation to two examples within 
curriculum theory in such a way as to demonstrate the relevance of a more robust and 
coherent interpretation of Foucault's thought. In the final chapter, Chapter Seven, I 
shall offer some concluding remarks about the thesis as a whole. These will serve as a 
kind of reflection on the study as a whole and an acknowledgement of its limitations. 
The present chapter includes two main sections. The first section starts with an 
introduction to the field of inquiry of this study, curriculum theory, through the 
discussion of poststructuralism. The increasing interest in poststructuralism affects 
the development of curriculum theory in this postmodern era. Within this context, I 
illustrate briefly the influence of Foucault's thought on curriculum theory, focusing 
especially on his idea of power/knowledge. In addition, I give an account of my 
personal encounter with Foucault's work to show the reason why I am pursuing this 
inquiry. The second section restates and expands on the aim of my study, explaining 
more fully the structure of each chapter, and the way the topic is pursued in this 
thesis. 
1.1 Field of inquiry 
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In Understanding Curriculum: An Introduction to the Study of Historical and 
Contemporary Curriculum Discourses (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman, 1995) 
William Pinar et al. claim that: "The era of curriculum development is past...that 
field is no longer preoccupied with development. As we shall see, the field is 
preoccupied with understanding" (pp. 5-6). Practical aspects of curriculum 
development—such as the establishment of curriculum objectives, the exercise of 
curriculum design, curriculum implementation and curriculum evaluation—are no 
longer, in their view, the main concepts of the day. Teachers and curriculum theorists 
are no longer seen as educational technicians. Rather than focusing on technical 
development in relation to the curriculum or the organization of the curriculum, the 
trend in the study of curriculum since the 1980s has been towards a preoccupation 
with understanding. 
What do the authors mean by "understanding"? They explain that they are concerned 
with the ways that learners come to relate to the world as a result of the curriculum 
they are given. For Pinar et al., compared to several decades ago, our world has 
become more complicated and this has an impact on the conception of curriculum. 
Many new conceptions have added to the ideas of what it means to study the 
curriculum, and to work for curriculum change. Pinar et al. claim that instead of 
something needing to be accomplished, curriculum is better understood in terms of 
forms of discourses, texts, words and ideas. Discourse, in their view, refers to 
particular discursive practices, or forms of articulation that follow certain rules. In 
this sense, then, to study the curriculum is to study "the language of the field" (p. 7), 
which is comprised of the language that reflects and determines what we mean by a 
school. Regarding the idea of curriculum theory, they claim that "theory exists to 
provoke thinking" (p. 8). This thinking has nothing to do with "how to", but with 
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"why". So, curriculum theory in their view is a matter that pushes us to think about 
questions concerned with "why" in the educational context, such as: why history, 
politics, gender, race have come together in a particular way to create the complex 
and problematic contexts found in schools. For Pinar et al., the conventional approach, 
that of curriculum development, fails to answer this kind of question. On the contrary, 
an understanding of curriculum theory can help us to reflect more profoundly on 
these specific issues arising from dramatic changes in our society. Following this idea, 
the aim of curriculum theory has nothing to do with being an instrument for the 
practice in our current schooling, but it changes our way of looking at curriculum 
through different perspectives of understanding. 
In one chapter of their book, Pinar et al. draw on poststructuralism as a perspective 
through which to understand what curriculum is. This chapter is entitled 
"Understanding curriculum as poststructuralist, deconstructed, postmodern text". 
They list several examples of curriculum study that use the approach of 
poststructuralism or deconstructivism and show how this philosophical movement has 
been one of the most prominent approaches in understanding curriculum. These 
examples serve to illustrate their idea of curriculum as a form of language or 
discourses to be understood. 
Patrick Slattery has also addressed the impact and prevalence of the poststructural 
movement on the development of curriculum theory in his book Curriculum 
development in the postmodern era: 
Two of the philosophies that are most challenging to understand, but also widely 
influential in curriculum studies, are poststructuralism and deconstructionism. 
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Understanding curriculum theory from the poststructural and deconstructed perspective 
involves enlarging our modes of cognition, engaging in methods of critique and 
analysis, and analyzing contemporary culture and history in order to challenge and 
subvert the central values, organizing metaphors, and discursive strategies of 
modernism. (Slattery, 1995, pp. 155-156) 
As both Pinar et al. (1995) and Slattery (1995) argue then, the philosophical 
perspective of poststructuralism plays a significant role in contemporary curriculum 
theory discourses. This perspective is helpful in exploring the multiple natures of 
curriculum theory and to challenge existing values in postmodern times. In the last 
few decades, more and more curriculum theorists have drawn on poststructuralist 
perspectives to consider curriculum issues and to extend the scope of curriculum 
study. This trend is evident in such areas as innovation of methodology, analysis of 
curriculum history, and critique of educational policy. Poststructuralism relates to the 
so-called linguistic turn of 20th century philosophy and pays close attention to the 
relation of language to thought (Standish, 2004, p. 490). Poststructuralism should not 
be thought of as a single approach, however, because it includes many different but 
related strands. As in the view of Michael Peters and Nicholas Burbules (2004), we 
cannot reduce it to a set of shared assumptions, a method, a theory, or even a school. 
It is best referred to as a movement of thought—a complex skein of thought 
embodying different forms of critical practice (Peters and Burbules, 2004, p. 18). 
Foucault, the philosopher I study in this thesis, is normally referred to as a 
poststructuralistl . His work ranges widely across history, philosophy, psychoanalysis, 
and linguistics, and it emphasises the constitution of subjects and subjective 
experience through discursive practices. But more than other poststructuralists, he is 
I Though Foucault is usually seen as a poststructuralist, he himself resisted this categorization. 
13 
concerned to go beyond the role of language into an explicit consideration of the 
nature of power/knowledge, and the constitution of the modern subject. For Usher 
and Edwards, this is possibly one of the reasons why his work has had a more 
remarkable impact on educational writing than other poststructuralist work (Usher & 
Edwards, 1996, p. 83). Foucault's thought generates fruitful discussions on 
educational issues, but in many interpretations in the field of education, Foucault's 
idea of power and knowledge are not elaborated very well. The reception of 
power/knowledge as such is usually governed by certain orthodox ways of thinking, 
and by the specific power/knowledge complex of the field of study itself. As stated at 
the outset, I believe that these adoptions of Foucault in curriculum theory, and in 
educational studies more widely, require a more profound understanding of 
Foucault's idea, in ways that I hope will become clear as my thesis progresses. If, as 
Pinar et al. and Slattery claim, Foucault's—as a poststructuralist—account can 
facilitate a different approach to understanding curriculum, I question whether 
understanding is the only reason to employ Foucault's conception. Or whether, 
beyond gaining specific knowledge from Foucault, his ideas may offer us another 
approach to thinking about the curriculum, which is different from the imposition of 
an "understanding". In contrast to current applications of Foucault's concept of 
power/knowledge, I would regard curriculum theory informed by Foucault as offering 
"a box of tools" for the action of practices, which I will elaborate in Chapter Five. 
More detailed discussion of the relationship between power and knowledge will be 
discussed in Chapters Three and Four. For purposes of clarity, however, I provide a 
brief introductory summary here. 
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Power/knowledge, the unifying theme of this thesis, is a term developed by Foucault. 
He puts power and knowledge together because, in his view, they are combined with 
each other and cannot be separated. Foucault refers to this indivisible relation 
between power and knowledge in one of his interviews: "knowledge and power are 
integrated with one another, and there is no point in dreaming of a time when 
knowledge will cease to depend on power" (Foucault, 1980a, p. 52). Foucault was 
concerned with understanding the dynamics of power and knowledge. He intends to 
criticize dominant reason by diagnosing the power/knowledge relations and their 
manifestations in institutions and throughout modern society. This interrelationship 
highlights the profoundly political nature of educational debate. These ideas enhance 
the possibility for us to consider the operation of power/knowledge in the production 
of truth in the content of the curriculum. According to Foucauldian perspectives of 
power/knowledge, for curriculum, the question that we pose is no longer "Whose 
knowledge is of most worth?", in Michael W. Apple's claim (1990, p. vii). Instead, 
the question that we may ask could be concerned with how the regime of truth is 
formed and why truth is taken to be true within the particular power/knowledge 
conditions of a particular context. 
My previous study is one of my motivations for engaging in a study of Foucault's 
notion of power/knowledge. My Master's dissertation (Wang, 2001) was based on an 
action research project, which related to curriculum implementation in the primary 
school I worked in, within the context of new curriculum reform in Taiwan. This 
experience inspired my interest in investigating not only curriculum practices, but 
also theoretical perspectives associated with these practices. After this, in my first 
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doctoral thesis, I chose to examine the new curriculum guidelines2 in Taiwan via the 
perspectives of critical pedagogy. My first encounter with Foucault and 
power/knowledge came during this period of study. By way of the interpretation of 
the theorists of critical pedagogy, I developed a very rough understanding of this 
notion. This study provided a good opportunity for me to further my inquiry into this 
Foucauldian concept. In this thesis, however, I shall explore it not only through the 
ideas of curriculum theorists but also by means of Foucault's own account and also 
some of the secondary literature related to his work, in order to reconsider its 
significance for curriculum theory. 
In brief, for this study, I shall provide an examination of curriculum theory that 
reveals the impact of Foucault's concept of power/knowledge. I shall then explore the 
meaning of this concept, and different interpretations of it, in order to critically 
diagnose3 both how the power/knowledge is used, and the truth that informs its use 
in contemporary curriculum theories. Because of the limits of time, it is not possible 
for me to deal with every prominent concept of Foucault's and to consider all his 
works. My inquiry and critique focus specifically only on the single concept of 
power/knowledge and on curriculum theories related to it. 
1.2 The aims of this study 
There are three lines of theoretical inquiry developed in this thesis. First, I shall try to 
review Foucault's reception in curriculum theory. The content that I will expound 
2 This curriculum guideline was put into practice since 2003 while I was a primary school teacher. It 
applies to students from year 1 to year 9. 
3 This verb diagnose has a specific meaning in Foucault's account. I provide an elaboration of the way 
this is interpreted by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1986) in Chapter Four. 
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derives from several curriculum theorists whose work predominantly uses Foucault's 
thought in curriculum theory or curriculum policy analysis, specifically the concept 
of power/knowledge. The theorists on whom I shall draw in Chapter 2 are Cleo 
Cherryholmes, Henry A. Giroux, Thomas S. Popkewitz and Stephen J. Ball. 
The first author, Cherryholmes was, to the best of my knowledge, the first to adopt 
poststructural perspectives, and more specifically Foucault's notion of 
power/knowledge, in order to create a new approach to curriculum theory. My 
investigation of his ideas is intended not only to understand how he uses Foucault, but 
also to reconsider the issues of curriculum that he raises in the light of Foucault's 
thought. Second, Giroux's approach is based in an American tradition of "Critical 
Pedagogy". He is indebted to Foucauldian power/knowledge for the development of 
his conception of the educational ideal of democratic schooling. I am interested in 
how he uses power/knowledge to develop his Utopia of education. Third, Popkewitz 
draws on Foucault's idea to develop his own thinking about the history of curriculum. 
This is a new approach in curriculum study, which motivates me to explore how he 
employs Foucauldian notions such as knowledge, power, governance and the subject 
in his analysis of what he calls "cultural history". Finally, Ball is another well-known 
theorist who uses the concept of discourse and power in the field of curriculum policy 
analysis. He undertakes an analysis of the UK's 1988 policies of curriculum reform in 
the light of Foucault's thinking. I will illustrate the perspective from which he 
analyses curriculum policy and discuss the specific examples that he provides. 
The second line of inquiry in this thesis which I will develop in Chapter Three, seeks 
a preliminary understanding of the theme of power/knowledge by directly referring to 
Foucault's work. My interest here is in seeing how Foucault addresses the 
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significance of power/knowledge in the context of the history of the prison and the 
history of sexuality by focussing on two of Foucault's works, Discipline and Punish: 
The birth of the prison (1991a) and The History of Sexuality Vol. 1(1990). Discipline 
and Punish: The birth of the prison is a work that has direct relevance to educational 
theory and practice, and, in particular, it shows the complex relations between power, 
knowledge and "docile bodies". As Peters and Burbules put it: 
The relevance to education and schooling of Foucault's genealogical studies is clearly 
illustrated in Discipline and Punish, including, for example, a long analysis of how the 
division of the school day into periods with clear schedules and transitions serves not 
only curricular and organizational purposes, but also teaches submission to a particular 
order that defines for the subject what can be done, where, and when. (Peters and 
Burbules, 2004, p. 63) 
The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 (1990) is another book in which the notion of 
power/knowledge is developed. In this work, Foucault moves his thinking from the 
modern individual as object to the modern individual as subject. His purpose is to 
define the regime of power-knowledge-pleasure that sustains the discourse on human 
sexuality in the Western world, and to bring out the "will to knowledge" that serves 
as both their support and their instrument (Foucault, 1990, pp. 11-12). Because of the 
limitations of my language, the editions of these two works that I refer to are English 
translations rather than the original French publications. 
In many respects, Foucault is the best commentator on himself. I consider that his 
interview, lectures and essays are another important resource for this research, and 
these also contribute to Chapter 3. Foucault refers to issues relating to 
power/knowledge in a number of interviews and lectures published in English. For 
example, Power/knowledge (Gordon ed., 1980) is closely linked to this theme and 
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argument. Several anthologies edited by Paul Rabinow and James D. Faubion also 
address discussion about power/knowledge, such as The Foucault reader: An 
introduction to Foucault's thought (Rabinow ed., 1984), Michel Foucault: Ethics, 
subjectivity and truth (Rabinow ed., 1997a), Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method 
and epistemology (Faubion ed., 1998), Michel Foucault: Power (Faubion ed., 2002), 
and Michel Foucault: Beyond structrualism and hermeneutics (Dreyfus and Rabinow 
eds., 1983). In addition, Language, counter-memory, practice (Bouchard ed., 1977), 
The politics of truth (Sylvere ed., 2007), and The Foucault effect (Burchell, Gordon 
and Miller eds., 1991) also include selected essays and interviews, which offer 
valuable reading for understanding the theme of power/knowledge. Owing to the 
limits of time, I cannot discuss every essay in these books, so I choose only those 
essays most closely linked to this notion. 
For the third line of enquiry, developed in Chapter Four, the secondary literature on 
Foucault is an important source for obtaining an explicit understanding of the concept. 
of power/knowledge. I shall select some representative works, outlined below, and 
then make comparisons over several key points. I first outline the interpretation by 
Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow whose book Michel Foucault: Beyond 
structuralism and hermeneutics (1983) is well-known in the English-speaking world. 
Their exegesis of Foucault is easy to read for novices and for an introductory study of 
Foucault. The second section connects with the elucidation of Foucault's concept by 
Barry Smart. Smart's writing sets off from a sociological point of view. He makes a 
comparison of the notion of power between Foucault and other thinkers, such as 
Marx or Weber. Several curriculum theorists employ Foucault's thought from a 
sociological perspective, however, Smart's work may contribute different ideas to 
this area. Third, Colin Gordon's interpretation will be discussed. Gordon provides a 
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global contextualisation and exegesis relating to Foucault's work. He writes in great 
detail about several main themes of Foucault's ideas and about the development of 
his thinking. This helps to provide a better understanding of Foucault in the light of 
his own historical and cultural context. Fourth, the interpretation of Jan Masschelein 
will be considered. Masschelein's work specifically refers to the implications of 
Foucault for educational theory and practice. He explores a different approach to 
Foucault from any other educationists, and through this I hope to gain different 
perspectives through which to consider education in terms of Foucault's ideas. Judith 
Butler's response to one of Foucault's lectures, "What is critique?", is the fifth 
position I will address. Her interpretation of "critique" highlights the main task of 
power/knowledge and makes manifest the link between power/knowledge and 
subjectivity. Sixth, Thomas. R. Flynn stresses the perspective of history in 
Foucauldian thought. Foucault's conception of history is an aspect that curriculum 
theorists often adopt. We can also see this in the examples of Cherryholmes and 
Popkewitz. I shall underline Flynn's interpretation of Foucault's idea of history and 
see how it can contribute to a different approach to curriculum theory. The last 
interpretation that I will elaborate is the unique reading of Foucault by Gilles 
Deleuze. His interpretation is far beyond the scope of exegesis, and it moves towards 
Deleuze's own thought. It is no longer Foucault's Foucault, but belongs to Deleuze's 
Foucault. For readers, understanding Deleuze's Foucault is more challenging and 
demanding, but his work offers more space for us to imagine what power/knowledge 
is. 
Chapter Five presents the convergence of the previous three lines of inquiry. It 
includes my evaluations of each of the curriculum theorists addressed in Chapter Two. 
The ideas of my arguments derive from the sources in Chapter Three and Chapter 
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Four. Some curriculum theorists indeed offer insightful thinking in terms of 
Foucault's ideas. Nevertheless, it is also not unusual to find improper applications of 
his notion of power/knowledge. Certain philosophical debts in the sphere of 
education or curriculum are claimed by Foucault's notion. Underneath the surface, 
however, certain "pre-designed" thinking regarding power/knowledge is embedded in 
their employment of the concept and this has nothing to do with Foucault. When Dan 
W. Butin reviewed three educational books that engage the writings of Foucault 
(Butin, 2006), he found that Foucault has been narrowly adopted in the dominant 
mode, in which it is seen to either liberate us from or entrap us within social 
structures and oppressive schooling practices. Foucault has been reworked for each 
author's purposes in ways that show little meaningful linkage between Foucault and 
education. Butin argues that Foucault "never wanted to free us or help us cope" (p. 
380). Such a binary of liberation/entrapment misses the ironic point4 that Foucault 
highlights and this binary is exactly what Foucault intended to work against. 
Unfortunately, it is not only in three books that Butin examines, but also in the work 
of several educational researchers who engage with Foucauldian thought, that we see 
attempts at revealing different accounts of power/knowledge within Foucault. 
I do not intend to act as the guardian of authentic Foucauldian thought and thereby to 
maintain an unchangeable orthodoxy. As a matter of fact universal truth and value are 
concepts that he campaigns against, and it is his campaign in this respect that informs 
my interest in curriculum theory. Though, on the one hand, my starting point is to 
evaluate the use of Foucault (and specifically his concept of power/knowledge) in 
curriculum theories, on the other hand, I also attempt to understand this same 
4 Foucault's notion of "the history of the present" shows an ironic stance towards our current situation. 
See the related interpretation of Dreyfus and Rabinow in Chapter Four. 
21 
mobilization of the idea of power/knowledge itself in terms of power/knowledge. My 
suspicion then is that the curriculum theorists in question have taken up the notion of 
power/knowledge as yet another tool in their theoretical armoury, and that in the 
process they understand it in terms of sovereign power; my belief is that this involves 
a misunderstanding of what Foucault intends in his use of the term, and that this may 
frustrate the shift in philosophical practice that he intends to bring about. I attempt to 
realize that shift in theoretical practice in two ways, and these constitute a move 
towards a kind of critical practices: first, through my examination of the curriculum 
theorists in question (and their use of power/knowledge), which constitutes the major 
part of this thesis; second, through the consideration of two concrete examples, in 
ways that are explained below. I believe this achieves a movement beyond 
understanding of philosophy found in the work of such curriculum theorists as 
William Pinar, which takes philosophical concepts as something to be applied to the 
curriculum, a means for better access to the understanding of curriculum practice; and 
I believe that, in consequence, I work with Foucault's thought in a more robust way. 
What we can valuably do in adopting Foucault is to provide more possibilities in 
thinking about education, rather than, as in Cris Mayo's critique of the use of 
Foucault by educational theorists, supporting the "claustrophic accounts of power" 
(Mayo, 2000, p. 103) in the name of Foucault. Hence, at the end of Chapter Five I 
borrow the notion of the tree and the rhizome from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
(2004/1987) to argue that power/knowledge should be considered in the rhizomatic 
way rather than the tree-like way that dominates in curriculum theory. Following this, 
in place of curriculum theory's dedication to free from the oppression of an unequal 
social structure, curriculum can be seen as a practice of self-transformation. 
5 This echoes the idea of Peters and Burbules (2004) regarding the thought of poststructuralism that I 
have shown earlier. 
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I am fully aware that part of my critique in Chapter Five is in tension with Foucault's 
idea of critique6. Therefore, in Chapter Six, in a more Foucauldian critical way, I try 
to offer my suggestions for relevant issues in curriculum theory in terms of the notion 
of power/knowledge. I then focus on two concrete examples: the first is globalization 
and the import of critical pedagogy, and the second is the question of what is 
"critical" in critical ethnography. 
This chapter has then briefly explained my purpose and approach in this thesis. As 
this should have made clear, I intend to build up my argument in stages. In Chapters 
Two, Three and Four, my main preoccupation will be descriptive rather than critical. 
I wish to provide a fair account of the views of the curriculum theorists in question, 
and thereafter to elaborate Foucault's position regarding power/knowledge, through 
his own writings and through the secondary philosophical literature. Inevitably, in 
these chapters, lines of criticism will emerge through the juxtaposition of contrasting 
points of view, but I reserve the main thrust of my own critique until Chapter Five, 
where the positions of the curriculum theorists are subjected to critical scrutiny in the 
light of my more direct examination of Foucault. The descriptive groundwork is 
necessary, I believe, if my critique is to gain the purchase that it needs. 
6 For Foucault, critique is an attitude of how not to be governed according to certain dominant truths, 
an approach I turn to in Chapter Six. The reason why my critique in Chapter Five is in tension with 
Foucault's account of this notion is that, somehow, I regard Foucault's work as a sovereign truth in 
order to judge the application of these curriculum theories. 
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Chapter 2 Foucault and power/knowledge in curriculum 
theory and policy analysis 
There have been several educational theorists employing the Foucauldian notion of 
power/knowledge in their analysis of curriculum theory or policy. Pinar et al. claimed 
that, apart from Cherryholmes' discursive analysis of traditional curriculum 
discourses, "as yet there has been little effort to map contemporary curriculum 
discourses employing a Foucauldian analysis" (1995, p. 514). Now, however, 
around ten years after the publication of their book, Foucault's thought has gained 
more influence on educational theory and it has generated fruitful discussions in this 
field. In this chapter, I shall address these discussions and show some examples of 
them. My purpose here is only to show the way that these curriculum theorists use 
Foucault's idea. My own response to and critique of them will be presented in 
Chapter Five. 
I have been partly motivated to write this thesis because of my belief that Foucault is 
commonly misinterpreted in educational research. His ideas about power/knowledge 
tend to be grafted onto prevailing ideas about the operation of power, along more or 
less neo-Marxist lines. It would be easy for me to take as my target some of the more 
extreme examples of such misappropriation or misinterpretation of his work. What 
will be more valuable, however, will be if I can identify weakness or problems of a 
similar kind in the work of leading curriculum theorists who have drawn on 
Foucault's work and who are themselves enormously influential. Hence, this is what I 
have tried to do. One consequence of this is that the criticisms I shall make are more 
moderate than they might have been against those more extreme examples, but I 
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believe this more subtle, moderate line of approach in the end provides the basis for a 
more robust and rigorous enquiry. 
2.1 Power/knowledge in educational discourse — Cleo Cherryholmes 
Cherryholmes is a pioneer in the field of curriculum theory, who is strongly indebted 
to Foucault. In Power and criticism: poststructural investigations in education 
(1988), he sets out a new, poststructural approach to educational research and practice 
by criticizing prominent structuralist conceptualisations of education and curriculum. 
For this purpose, he employs the ideas of Foucault, Derrida, and other 
poststructuralists. 
In order to understand the interrelationship of knowledge and power in education, 
Cherryholmes tries to gain insight into discursive practices of education. He regards 
education as a discursive practice in which power and knowledge interpenetrate. For 
Cherryholmes, educational discourses are not composed by randomly choosing words 
and statements, but constituted by certain rules and language use. These rules shape a 
discursive practice, and they are relative to time and place, as Foucault suggests. 
Cherryholmes highlights that: "Practices do not exist without rules, nor rules without 
practices" (p. 4). As with educational discourses, for him, educational practices are 
also constituted by sets of rules that constitute their coherence. For instance, 
educational progress is assessed by criterion-referenced testing or norm-referenced 
testing. This standardized norm of testing is one kind of rule. There is knowledge 
about the exercise of these rules. Hence, "knowing rules means knowing how to 
proceed" (ibid). In Cherryholmes' view, the constitution of rules results from 
choices — for example, the standardized exam is a way of distinguishing between the 
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cognitive ability of each student, and this distinction affects their future choices of 
schools. However, Cherryholmes suggests that ideology is the main origin of the 
control of these choices. He says: "choices cannot be made without reference to a 
value, set of values, criteria, or interests" (ibid). These values and interests can be 
thought of as ideology in his view. He shows the way that ideology informs testing: 
...the ideology of educational testing organizes and rationalizes beliefs and 
interpretations about testing—its purpose, process, and outcomes—which justify 
activities and rules that count as testing and evaluation. An ideological orientation about 
testing includes beliefs behind production of tests and their consumption by teachers, 
administrators, students, parents, and social institutions other than schools. (pp. 4-5) 
By drawing on Foucault's notion of discursive practices, Cherryholmes emphasizes 
the influence and the importance of ideology. Ideology structures educational 
discourses and the taken-for-granted lived experience of everyday classroom life. 
Because of ideology, we have shared ideas about what is true or what is false. And, 
hence, because of it, educationalists choose activities that are coincident with 
normative commitments. Cherryholmes claims, therefore, that "ideology and power 
arrangements infiltrate our thinking and actions, they shape our subjectivities, that is, 
how and what we think about ourselves and so act" (p. 6). This is the fundamental 
point in Cherryholmes' employment of Foucault. Next, I shall focus on some of his 
analyses of examples of educational research, textbooks, teacher education, and social 
studies education, used by Cherryholmes to illustrate the effects of power and 
ideology. 
2.1.1 Educational research 
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Concerning the issue of educational research, Cherryholmes draws on the Foucaudian 
method of "interpretive analytics" to criticize the idea of "construct validity", a term 
commonly used to describe the process of deciding whether research data can be 
taken as truth. Cherryholmes describes interpretive analytics as a viewpoint 
emphasizing the role of history and power in the production of the present, which can 
be used to ask why researchers use specific words or utterances when they make 
statements. He draws attention to the way that, in interpretive analytics, "Foucault 
uses power in a productive sense as well as in a negative, coercive, and restrictive 
way" (p. 116). On the one hand, Foucault argues that power is often thought to 
operate as censorship, exclusion, blockage and repression. On the other hand, 
Cherryholmes explains, power produces effects at the level of desire and also at the 
level of knowledge. Power produces knowledge rather than preventing it. In this 
sense, for Cherryholmes, researchers desire to be productive theorists. They are keen 
to write proposals and submit their research for publication, following research norms 
such as "construct validity". Therefore, knowledge is produced by the norm—the 
procedure of legitimation. Research, then, becomes a form of social reproduction. In 
his analysis of interpretive analytics, Cherryholmes comments: "construct validity is 
situated in a power-knowledge nexus over which speakers have limited control" 
(ibid). In his view, researchers have no autonomy because truth is decided in terms of 
measurement and norms. This truth is linguistic and relates to language use (words, 
concepts, statements, discourses) at a given time and place. Within this language use, 
truth is controlled by ideology, interests and power. Cherryholmes claims: 
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...ideology, interests, and power arrangements at a given time and place are implicated 
in the production of what counts as "true". "Truths" of a time and place are politically 
produced, and constructs and their measurement are tools of production. (ibid) 
Following Foucault's idea, Cherryholmes considers that not everything is bad, but 
everything is dangerous, such as construct validity. The danger of construct validity is 
that its judgement is technical and each choice is based on expertise, rationality and 
authoritative knowledge. For Cherryholmes, positivism is underlying construct 
validity. Rather than being located in a specific time and space, positivism reinforces 
acontextual and ahistorical scientific narratives of construct validation, hypothesis 
testing and program evaluation. This systematic research methodology is separated 
from historical elements and from a history of the present. I shall now illustrate what 
Cherryholmes means by the history of the present in terms of Foucault's notion. 
2.1.2 On educational history 
Regarding the Foucauldian perspective on history, Cherryholmes argues that 
Foucault's writing of history is not the writing of narratives. Rather, it is the history 
of the present. Its methodology focuses on "relations between discourse and power 
and how effects of power produce texts and discourses-practices7" (P. 161). 
Cherryholmes argues that there is a need to see educational history in a Foucauldian 
frame in order to "uncover how power operates in, through, and on discourses, 
institutions, and social practices" (p.162). He criticizes two examples of educational 
history in terms of a Foucauldian history of the present. The first is the analysis of the 
For Cherryholmes, no stable distinction can be drawn between discourse and practice, because what 
is done is with what is said. He therefore uses the term—discourse-practice or discourses practices to 
emphasize interpenetration between the two. See Cherryholmes (1988), pp8-9. 
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political economy of textbooks by Michael W. Apple. The second is Thomas S. 
Popkewitz's analysis of teacher education reform proposals. 
For Apple, textbooks are products of political economy. The publication of textbooks 
always follows the consideration of commercial benefits. State and school textbook 
adoption committees place their judgement and constraints on the content of 
textbooks. They decide what kind of materials should be included and excluded in 
textbooks. Besides this, statewide assessment tests and standardized achievement 
tests also influence the content of textbooks. Apple describes this phenomenon as 
"the homogenization of textbooks" (ibid). Cherryholmes counters Apple's view, 
however, by arguing that we can see this as the anonymity of textbook discourse 
practices according to a Foucauldian account. He goes on to explain that, "from a 
Foucauldian perspective, none of the participants (authors, editors, publishers, state 
adoption committees, school adoption committees, teachers, students, parents) have 
many degrees of freedom in which to act" (ibid). For him, the political economy of 
textbooks is driven by the discourse-practice, which results in "bland" textbooks 
because no individual opinion can be made obvious through the mechanism of 
collective decision. That is to say, discourse practice is constituted by collective 
practice rather than individual decision. This is how Cherryholmes explains discourse 
practice as "anonymity", within which the individual has no freedom. 
In addition, Cherryholmes draws on another Foucauldian perspective to see textbooks. 
as discourses which relate to political production. He points out that "Foucault shows 
textbooks to be political, material products that represent a privileged way of seeing 
things, privileged by means of power, position, tradition, and so forth" (p.61). For 
Cherryholmes, this political production or power hides commitments to the effects of 
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efficiency, control, manipulation, instrumentalism, and utilitarianism. And these 
effects derive from ideological bias. He adds "textbooks are products of human 
culture that present partial, local organizations of meanings. It seems their fate never 
escapes partiality and ideological bias" (p.72). If teachers reinforce dominant 
structures, and repeat the structured assertions of textbooks, the dialogue would 
become repetitive and non-instructive in the classroom. If they have a critical attitude 
with which to question the structural and positivist standards in textbooks, then they 
can enact a critical teaching. Unfortunately, for Cherryholmes, critical teaching can 
seldom occur in school structure, because this structure constrains what can and 
cannot be said. It therefore has a tendency to reinforce the authority behind textbooks. 
In an analysis of American teaching reform and teacher education reform proposals 
during the 1980s, Popkewitz suggests that educators held the ideal of choosing 
programs freely and rationally to advance in their role as reformers. However, this 
was mocked by some as "the liberal illusion of social autonomy" (ibid). 
Cherryholmes considers that this unexpected consequence of the liberal illusion was 
the conjunction of several separate discourses-practices. For example, at the federal 
level, statistical measurement and research capability expanded fast in service of 
establishing equal opportunity of access to education by way of an emphasis on 
measurement and test performance. At the state level, the Ministry of Education 
imposed greater surveillance on teacher education programs in order to train the 
competent teachers who can achieve educational aims under new policy. Systematic 
and quantitative measurement was also emphasized for this purpose. Power, in the 
practices of this educational reform, operated through different aspects of 
discourses-practices, which reinforced each other. Within the exercise of power, 
teachers and students became visible in order to be able to be operated on through 
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scientific measurements. This management relates to the knowledge produced in 
education according to Cherryholmes' account. By contrast, the power that controls 
these measures became invisible in its enhancement of social reproduction. For 
Cherryholmes, Popkewitz fails to subtly analyze this power effect, because 
Popkewitz's history of the present "highlights the uncritical social determinism and 
reproduction that such reforms promote" (p.163). 
In the discourses-practices of teacher education, Cherryholmes considers, students in 
teacher education institutions or universities are situated within a mechanism through 
which power shapes how they think of themselves and how they act in terms of 
expectations and desires. Becoming good teachers means they must master 
"appropriate discourses-practices of teaching" (p. 35), such as developing skills of 
controlling a classroom, of teaching specific subjects and of evaluating students' 
learning and achievement. Student teachers have to obey many invisible rules in order 
to be good teachers. Teacher education is therefore linked to the processes of 
socialization. Cherryholmes intends to show how power constitutes the belief and 
subjectivity of these prospective teachers. In this example, power is operated 
effectively by desire. This desire of being a good teacher makes the invisible power 
possible. Cherryholmes draws on a question from Foucault: "How can people gain 
control of their discourses and practices instead of being controlled by them (p. 36)? 
Following this, he would like educationists to think: "How can students be subjects 
rather than objects within the processes of teacher education?", and "How does power 
shape the subjectivities of prospective teachers?" From Foucault's perspective, 
Cherryholmes claims that subjectivity is an important issue in thinking about teacher 
education. 
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2.1.3 Social studies education 
In an essay "Knowledge, power and discourse in social studies education" (1983), 
Cherryholmes offers his critique on social studies education. Again, he regards social 
studies education as a discursive practice in the vein of Foucault's account, and seeks 
to explore knowledge and power relations in this discursive practice. For him, "what 
counts as knowledge in social studies education is constrained by power relations that 
are internal as well as external to the discipline and profession" (p. 349). That is to 
say, disciplinary power is a force to control and to confine knowledge in social 
studies education. 
Cherryholmes criticizes current inquiries into social studies education in the light of 
Foucault's concept of power. He draws on Foucault's view that power relations shape 
a discursive practice and determine what can and cannot be said. He argues, however, 
that these factors have been largely excluded from the discussions of social studies 
education. In his view, "much has been said about how things are and should be. 
Little has been said about how the way things are determine what is said and can be 
said" (p.346). He explains this further: "if it is never considered how our utterances 
are products of social processes and power relations, then we cannot claim to be 
deeply reflective about or in control of what we do" (ibid). To expose what he sees as 
the decisive elements in educational discourses, Cherryholmes analyzes three 
traditions in the curriculum of social studies education: citizenship transmission, the 
social science disciplines, and reflective inquiry, which in turn inform inquiry into 
social studies education. 
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Through the first of these, citizenship transmission, students are indoctrinated into a 
certain body of knowledge relating to citizenship. Geographical or historical 
knowledge, drawn upon to this end, contains specific ideology. In this sense, 
knowledge, assumptions, and beliefs are treated as self-evident truths. For 
maintaining social harmony, controversy is substituted by the idea of cooperation and 
consensus in curriculum. Behind this discourse, for Cherryholmes, there are 
ideological commitments that serve to support or contest power relations. Rather than 
the will of textbook authors, the consideration of marketization is the main power (or 
ideology) that supports this discursive practice. The second tradition, the social 
science disciplines approach, is grounded in the content and methods of social 
sciences. It presumes that rationality is the most important element in constituting a 
society; and that, as an ideal citizen, one should have the ability to solve problems in 
society. This discourse is supported by social science methodologies in which our 
world is seen systematically and everything is assumed to be value-free. In this 
discourse, the fact of socio-economic inequality and injustice are excluded. Social 
scientists are authorities who determine what counts as knowledge; what can be 
talked about and what is left unsaid. Normally, power relations that support this 
discursive practice are influenced by the positivist view that there is absolute truth or 
falsity of statements. 
The third tradition in social studies education that Cherryholmes refers to is reflective 
inquiry. In this approach, citizenship is defined as decision-making in the 
socio-political context. The issues that textbooks highlight are relevant to individual 
or social problems and to the solution of these problems. This approach does not 
exclude the importance of personal value in problem-solving. Comparing this with 
the previous two approaches, Cherryholmes comments: "The power relationships that 
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support this view of social studies education—reflective inquiry—are weak" (p.353); 
because it "poses questions that run counter to the powerful interests that support 
citizenship transmission and the lesser interests behind social science education" 
(ibid). In this respect, Cherryholmes considers that the intensity of power relations 
depends on the degree of the influence of certain interests or ideology, which shows 
also how dominant discourses are constructed. 
At the end of this essay, Cherryholmes claims: "part of Foucault's project and a goal 
of this essay, quite simply, is to help people get control over the constraints and 
power relations of their discursive practices" (p.356). Hence, his analysis of social 
studies attempts to make explicit the political structure and to constitute a new 
politics of truth in order to substitute the dominant regime of truths. Otherwise, under 
the exercise of power, political commitments informing discursive practices will 
remain invisible and beyond our control. 
In this section, Cherryholmes considers that power enhances the procedure of 
nomalization, which functions to make a distinction between what is included and 
what is excluded, and also between what is said and what is unsaid in educational 
discourses. This distinction derives from certain dominant ideologies or interests. We 
may see that, for Cherryholmes, power refers to operations at the macro-level of 
social structure and that his analysis attempts to expose the manipulation of economic 
decisions or social reproduction, as evidenced by his various examples of discourses. 
Knowledge (in the form of educational research or textbooks in his case) in 
curriculum is therefore produced (this is the way that he see knowledge is productive) 
by the ideology of scientific methodology or economic benefits. In Cherryholmes' 
view, we should be aware of this "dangerous" impact and try to control it. 
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2.2 Power/knowledge in critical pedagogy—Henry A. Giroux 
According to Peter McLaren (1998), critical pedagogy is a contemporary educational 
discourse that is "fundamentally concerned with understanding the relationship 
between power and knowledge" (p. 183). In this section, I will focus on Foucault's 
reception in Giroux's theory of critical pedagogy with reference to the concept of 
power/knowledge, and show the way that he use the notions of power and knowledge 
to develop his curriculum theory. 
2.2.1 A critique of the constitution of academic discipline 
In Teachers as intellectuals: Toward a critical pedagogy of learning (1988), Giroux 
reflects on the issue of academic discipline. For him, an academic discipline is not a 
natural subject matter, but "a field which is itself constituted by the practice of the 
discipline85,  (p. 145). The field of academic disciplines is arbitrary because it is 
contingent on historical circumstance, and reflects cultural, social and institutional 
demands, especially in fields outside the natural sciences. Giroux draws on Foucault's 
analysis of "discipline" to consider the constitution of academic disciplines here. He 
puts it like this: 
Though Foucault is not directly concerned with academic disciplines, much of his 
analysis applies to these enterprises. What is characteristic of disciplinary technologies 
is their capacity simultaneously to normalize and hierarchize, to homogenize and 
differentiate. This paradox is explained by the control which discipline asserts over 
8 The "discipline" in "academic discipline" means academic subject. But this "discipline" in Giroux's 
account has different meaning from the former. I consider that it is the discipline in Foucault's idea of 
disciplinary power. 
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difference. Because norms are carefully established and maintained, deviation can be 
measured on a scale. The goal of the professional in a discipline is to move up this scale 
by differing only in the appropriate ways. (p. 146) 
Giroux's purpose is not to show that discourse is limited by disciplinary technologies. 
Rather, his position is that Foucault's work is helpful for us to understand how this 
discipline, in the sense of power, is enforced by institutions through hierarchical 
ranking or normalization, which is related to the tactics of various rewards or 
punishments. For Giroux, the ultimate effect is exclusion or marginalization. 
Statement outside discipline is always excluded. Giroux offers the example of a Ph.D. 
student that has to follow the dominant academic discourse in his study area; 
otherwise, he will be excluded and not get the admission into this academy. 
Discipline in this sense is to build up the norm and to whittle down the difference. 
2.2.2 The language of possibility 
In Education still under siege (1993), Aronowitz and Giroux employ Foucault's 
notion of power/knowledge to develop a language of possibility in their curriculum 
theory. A starting point in their account is the denial that power is treated as a 
negative force that works in the interests of domination. They consider, in the 
classical Marxist view, that power relates to knowledge primarily through the ways in 
which it serves to distort or mystify the truth. The economic and social conditions of 
knowledge are examined through ideological critique. Knowledge is always analyzed 
for its distortions and mystifications. Thus, school knowledge and culture are reduced 
to serving the interests of privileged groups. The question of how power works in 
schools is almost limited to recording "how it reproduces relations of domination and 
subordinacy through various school practices" (p. 150). They argue that the notion of 
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power must be rescued from its current usage if schools are to be seen as active sites 
where possibilities exist. They point out: 
We believe that power is both a negative and positive force. Its character is dialectical, 
and its mode of operation is always more than simply repressive. In actuality, power is 
at the root of all forms of behaviour in which people say no, struggle, resist, use 
oppositional modes of discourse, and fight for a different vision of the future. (ibid) 
They highlight Foucault's analysis of power that views power as not solely negative 
and as a force to say no, but also as producing things and inducing pleasure. Power, 
for Foucault, is seen more as a productive network than as a repressive mechanism. 
Hence, Aronowitz and Giroux claim, the nature of social control and its relationship 
with schooling needs to be redefined. Power is positive and productive in a way that 
produces particular forms of life. We need a positive notion of social control to 
establish the theoretical basis for critical learning and practice, in which social control 
is seen not merely as an instance of domination but also as a form of emancipatory 
practice. They go on to claim that: "the notion of power that underscores this positive 
view of social control takes as its starting point the empowerment of teachers and 
students and the confirmation of their histories and possibilities" (ibid). They 
consider social control as a form of cultural politics to serve the interests of freedom. 
Within this perspective, schools are regarded as sites to struggle for a qualitatively 
better life for all. Curriculum, as an emancipatory form, plays an important role in 
giving students an active and critical voice, the ability to express themselves on the 
basis of their daily experience. 
They raise further questions here: how can teachers and others produce curricula 
based around forms of culture and forms of school knowledge in a way that 
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empowers students who traditionally have been excluded from the benefits of 
education? If curriculum is regarded as a form of cultural politics, what kinds of 
knowledge have to be produced? First, in their opinion, teachers will need to develop 
forms of knowledge and classroom social practices that validate the experience that 
students bring to their own schools. This means giving students who come from 
subordinate social categories an active voice in order to change their disadvantageous 
situations. Second, a critical interrogation of the experiences that students bring to 
schools is needed. It helps students to understand what they need to learn in order to 
reflect on their own experience, and in order to break the chains of domination and 
subordination; namely, to "provide students with the skills and courage in order to 
transform the world according to their own vision" (p. 152). Third, for them, it is 
imperative to "analyze state and nonstate agencies as important sites involved in the 
production of dominant culture and ideologies" (p. 154). As a critical educator, a 
teacher has to know how corporate influences bear down on the shaping of school 
policy and curriculum development. They think, for example, of the growing 
business-school partnerships being promoted by neo-conservative ideologues in the 
United States. Finally, they assert a cultural politics that seeks to rethink the nature 
and the role of being a teacher. For Aronowitz and Giroux, the ideal role of teachers 
is one of transformative intellectual who engages in the struggle for equality and 
democracy on the basis of the moral and intellectual leadership necessary. This 
concept of the transformative intellectual not only suggests a political function but 
also offers the theoretical ground for the examination of the teachers' own histories, 
those connections to the past that define who they are and how they mediate and 
function in the world. 
2.2.3 Border pedagogy 
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Border pedagogy is a concept developed by Giroux, influenced by postmodernism, 
which incorporates ideas of counter-text, the politics of difference, and 
counter-memory. Democracy and difference are essential components in border 
pedagogy. Aronowitz and Giroux (1991) argue that the discourses of democracy and 
difference can be taken up as pedagogical practices through what Foucault calls 
counter-memory. As they put it, counter-memory in Foucault's account is a practice 
that transforms history from a judgment on the past in the name of present truth. By 
placing the present in a new relation to the past, this practice combats our current 
modes of truth, and helps us change our present situation. Following Foucault's 
terms, they claim: 
Counter-memory represents a critical reading of how the past informs the present and 
how the present reads the past. Counter-memory provides a theoretical tool to restore 
the connection between the language of public life and the discourse of difference. It 
presents an attempt to rewrite the language of resistance in terms that connect human 
beings within forms of remembrance that dignify public life, while at the same time 
allowing people to speak from their particular histories and voices. (p. 124) 
For them, counter-memory is an attempt to develop the language of resistance so as to 
substitute the subjugated history. On the basis of this notion, democracy cannot be 
treated as merely inherited knowledge. It also needs to be linked to the notions of 
public life that afford empowering investments. Pedagogical practice, therefore, is the 
rewriting of history through the power of student voice. Democracy becomes a 
referent for understanding how differences are organized by public life, and for 
clarifying how "schools, teachers, and students define themselves as political 
subjects, as citizens who operate within particular configurations of power" (p. 125). 
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As a transformative intellectual, Giroux considers, the teacher's task should begin 
with a recognition of those manifestations of suffering that constitute historical 
memory and the conditions of oppression. He attempts to define educators as bearers 
of dangerous memory, which he describes thus: 
Dangerous memory has two dimensions: that of hope and that of suffering...it recounts 
the history of the marginal, the vanquished, and the oppressed, and in doing so posits 
the need for a new kind of subjectivity and community in which the conditions that 
create such suffering can be eliminated. (Giroux, 1997, p. 105) 
In Giroux's opinion, some forms of historical and popular knowledge have been 
suppressed and ignored, but it is possible to reveal the effects of conflict and struggle 
through the form of these knowledges. Underlying the view of dangerous memory 
and subjugated knowledge, transformative intellectuals can advance both the 
language of critique and the language of possibility. 
2.2.4 Emancipatory authority 
Developing a critical pedagogy consistent with the principles of emancipatory 
authority is of significant interest for Giroux. To achieve this, in his view, radical 
educators need to reconstruct the relations between knowledge, power, and desire, in 
order to bring together two often separate struggles within schools: the changing of 
circumstances and the changing of subjectivities. To begin with, educators have to 
identify the kinds of material and ideological preconditions that need to exist for 
schools to become effective. For example, the concerns of active parent involvement 
in the schools, of adequate health care for students, of high student morale, and of 
adequate financial resources: "All of these factors represent resources through which 
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power is exercised and made manifest" (Giroux, 1997, p. 107). Power refers to the 
means of getting things done in this sense. As Foucault says: power "consists in 
guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome to 
govern, in this sense, to structure the possible field of action of others" (Foucault, 
quoted in Giroux, 1997, p. 107). 
Giroux argues that, for teachers, the relationship between authority and power is 
manifested not only in the legitimate exercise of control over students, but also in 
influencing the conditions under which they work. In this way, teachers can teach 
collectively, produce alternative curricula, and engage in a form of emancipatory 
politics. The main issue that Giroux focuses on is teachers' ability to empower their 
students through what they teach, how they teach, as well as through the formation of 
school knowledge. They are all relevant to the link of power to knowledge. This kind 
of knowledge that educators provide for their students might empower them not 
merely to engage the world around them but also to act so as to change the wider 
social reality. That is, for the purpose of real democracy. Furthermore, Giroux 
suggests that there is a requirement for radical educators to reconstitute the very 
nature of the power/knowledge relation. This requires engaging in a consideration of 
the idea that "power relations exist in correlation with forms of school knowledge that 
both distort the truth and produce it" (p. 108). A curriculum for democratic 
empowerment must examine not merely how knowledge distorts reality, but also how 
knowledge can produce particular forms of life. The latter accords with Foucault's 
emphasis: on the productive and positive function in power/knowledge, which centres 
on "generating knowledge that presents concrete possibilities for empowering 
people" (ibid). 
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According to Giroux's vision, knowledge in the curriculum should include not only 
the basic skills students will need to work and live in the wider society, but also "the 
social forms through which human beings live, become conscious, and sustain 
themselves" (ibid). To put it more specifically, this is the knowledge about power and 
about how it works, as well as the analyses of those practices such as racism, sexism, 
and class exploitation that structure and mediate our daily lives. The point here is to 
"expose and deconstruct the processes through which these dominant ideological 
representations are produced, legitimated, and circulated in society" (ibid). Thus, 
curriculum should be built on knowledge and provide students with a language 
through which they can analyze their own lived relations. 
Giroux assumes that resistance provides an important focus for analyzing the 
relationship between school and the wider society. However, a clarification of what 
resistance actually is and of what it is not is imperative. In this sense, he attempts to 
establish a more rigorous notion of resistance by drawing on Foucault's concept of 
power and resistance. For Foucault, power works in order to be exercised on and by 
people within different contexts where dominance and autonomy interact. Giroux 
highlights this idea: 
...power is never uni-dimensional; it is exercised not only as a mode of domination, but 
also as an act of resistance or even as an expression of a creative mode of cultural and 
social production outside the immediate force of domination. (Giroux, 1983, p. 108) 
Thus, in his view, the behaviour expressed by subordinate groups could be 
incorporated into cultural and creative acts of resistance in which fleeting images of 
freedom are to be found. It also can form a strategy which connects with students' 
own lived experience against structures of domination and constraint. 
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To sum up, we know that the notion of power/knowledge Giroux employs is for the 
purpose of social transformation. Knowledge, in his perspective, is not simply the 
content of curriculum or particular skills that schools provide for students, but also 
needs to be thought about critically in relation to the nexus of power, and in historical, 
ideological and political context. In particular, the daily life and experience of 
students cannot be excluded from the curriculum. In Giroux's idea of cultural politics 
and border pedagogy, the boundary between centre and margin are no longer as firm 
as usually assumed. Knowledge and cultural borders are giving way to shifting 
configurations of power. Power is not merely a form of constraint and control. 
Following Foucault's emphasis on the positive and productive side of power, Giroux 
criticizes the traditional Marxist view of power, that power is always oppressive and 
negative. He indicates the possibility of empowerment and transformation in curricula 
based on illuminating the productive effects of power. As transformative intellectuals, 
teachers' task is not only to engage in the excavation of historical consciousness and 
repressed knowledge, but also to connect curriculum with students' voice based on 
counter-history. They strive for empowering students and themselves. The final 
destination is to construct a more democratic society. 
2.3 Power/knowledge in cultural history—Thomas S. Popkewitz 
Popkewitz draws on Foucault's concept of power/knowledge in his study of the 
history of curriculum, using an approach that he terms "cultural history". In this 
section, I begin by outlining Popkewitz's interpretation of Foucault's notions of 
power and knowledge, in which he focuses on the productive effect of power; 
rethinks the meaning of knowledge in curriculum theories; and develops the idea of 
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the decentering of the subject. I shall then describe Popkewitz's account of social 
epistemology. It bears on his new idea of cultural history and challenges the 
presuppositions of the historicist tradition. After that, I will show Popkewitz's 
critique of hidden curriculum traditions by Foucauldian perspective. And finally, 
express his claim: "curriculum as a governing practice", informed by Foucault's work 
in the thinking of curriculum. 
2.3.1 Laying stress on the productive effect of power 
In an essay "Restructuring of Social and Political Theory in Education: Foucault and 
a Social Epistemology of School Practices", Popkewitz and Brennan (1998) elaborate 
two interpretations of power: first, power as sovereignty; the second, power as 
deployment. They explain these two approaches as follows: 
The view of power as sovereignty focuses on larger historical structures, which 
determine that in our daily life we cannot avoid the affect of sovereign power. 
Popkewitz and Brennan consider that we may find this concept of power evident in 
much of the sociology of school knowledge. This concept is normally employed to 
interpret the origin of domination and subjugation in schools, and to explain how 
gender, racial, and class distinctions are re-produced in our society. They suggest, 
structural uniformity is assumed in this perspective. It also premises that society is 
constituted by groups, social interests and the force of coercion; and that dominant 
groups always repress and subjugate less powerful groups. 
For Popkewitz and Brennan, the idea of "power as sovereignty" comes from the 
philosophy of consciousness. The purpose of studying power in this context is to 
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identify the origin of power, which lies in understanding the actors who control, and 
who benefit from such arrangements. For example, the question "in whose interest 
the curriculum is selected or achievement assessed" (p. 16) arises from this approach. 
It is concerned with identifying which groups are favored in decision-making and 
how these decisions produce values that effect domination and subordination. 
In the view of Popkewitz and Brennan, however, this notion of sovereign power is 
limited on a number of counts. They argue, first, that power is treated as immanent to 
the specific setting rather than asking questions about "how it is possible to exist in 
this form or what the conditions of its production are" (p. 17). Second, this concept 
homogenizes and essentializes categories of analysis. The historical contingencies 
and multiple boundaries, in reality, are relational fields that are fluid and 
multidimensional, rather than being of a single origin or a universal characteristic. 
Not only does such an understanding of power create a dichotomous world, such as 
through the dualism of oppressor/oppressed, they argue. It also loses sight of the 
subtleties through which power is exercised in multiple arenas and in social practices. 
Because of the deficient consideration in the first approach of power, they favour the 
second approach of the analysis of power, power as deployment, which derives from 
Foucauldian thinking. 
This second interpretation considers the concrete practices through which power 
produces and circulates by multiple strategies. The establishment of subjects based on 
resistance is also made possible by way of the exercise of power. In Popkewitz and 
Brennan's view, Foucault's notion is concerned with productive effects of power, 
which circulate through institutional practices and discourses of daily life. They 
highlight Foucault's argument that, "power is embedded in the governing systems of 
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order, appropriation, and exclusion by which subjectivities are constructed and social 
life is formed" (ibid). This concept of productive power focuses on how the subject is 
disciplined through the rules of knowledge. It links to the governing principles that 
organize individual action and participation, and it enables us to see the ways that 
individuals construct both boundaries and possibilities. For Popkewitz and Brennan, 
Foucault's work extends the ideas of the Frankfurt School with a specific historical 
focus. The theorists of the early Frankfurt School were concerned with the expanding 
rationalization and instrumental reasoning that underlying modernity. In Popkewitz 
and Brennan's view, however, Foucault's insight "enables us to understand that such 
reasoning has multiple trajectories and to explore the various strategies through which 
individuality is constructed as both disciplining and productive of power" (p. 19). 
With regard to teaching and teacher education, for example, Popkewitz and Brennan 
consider that the notion of productive power can be used to re-conceptualize the issue 
of socialization. The term child or teacher as "subject" should not be assumed to be 
stable categories. Through processes of socialization, discursive practices constitute 
what it means to be a teacher or to be a child. 
2.3.2 The redefinition of "knowledge" 
For Popkewitz, knowledge in Foucault's account is "something that is used in social 
practices to affect some outcome" (Popkewitz, Pereyra and Franklin, 2001, p. 12). 
This notion of knowledge relates to the way in which a collective or individual uses 
ideas to achieve their purpose effectively in social action. The purpose of Popkewitz's 
analysis is to examine the particular expressions that link reason to the 
problem-solving rationalities of science, and in turn link that issue to the actor who is 
identified as the agent of change. This attention "is directed to the systems of reason 
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through which the objects of schooling are classified and ordered over time, 
providing a way to think about change" (ibid). Popkewitz views curriculum as "a 
practice of regulation and governance through the reason generated for organizing 
action (and actors) and establishing purposes (structurally or individually)" (p. 29). 
Popkewitz et al. disagree with the central premise of those prior studies of schooling 
in which "knowledge is an epiphenomenon to other forces, structures, or groups that 
exercise control over the ideas and organizational arrangements of schooling" (ibid). 
They give an example: when people draw on the idea of Gramsci to analyze 
schooling, knowledge is an essential element for the establishment of hegemony. For 
Popkewitz, it is better to see knowledge as "a technology of power" (Popkewitz, 
1991, p. 37). In modern society, knowledge, as a technology of power, is organized 
and supervised by a professionalization of social affairs, in which psychology, for 
instance is a central discipline for defining new patterns of supervising individuality. 
Popkewitz is critical of the notion of knowledge assumed in British 
philosopher—Herbert Spencer's question: "what knowledge is of most worth". In 
Popkewitz's view, this question "assumes a certain philosophical, ahistorical a priori" 
(Popkewitz, Pereyra and Franklin, 2001, p. 28), in which a foundational knowledge 
can be identified and can lead to the essential purpose or normative function of the 
school. Moreover, this question "inserts theories of action that inscribe the agent who 
is to bring progress through that absolute knowledge" (ibid). This means that there is 
a performative reiteration of an absolute ideal that stands as a pragmatic position to 
measure the progress of schooling. Thus, knowledge becomes an instrument that is 
used to achieve certain purposes. Popkewitz argues, however, that this Spencerian 
question can be reconsidered in the thinking of how people tell the truth about 
society, themselves and their routes of salvation. Instead of asking what knowledge is 
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of most worth, we may ask: "how that worth is produced as a cultural field of 
practices" (ibid). Following this, what counts as knowledge is embodied in the 
conflicts over who can speak, and in the criteria of truth. As a governing practice, 
curriculum is concerned with the administration of the child through forms of 
knowledge that order the sensibilities and feelings of the individual. For Popkewitz, it 
is the way that knowledges fabricate worlds and individuality that goes unnoticed. 
2.3.3 The decentering of the subject 
In contrast to dominant thinking in Western philosophy concerned with the centering 
of the subject, Popkewitz explores the idea of knowledge as a "decentering of the 
subject" (Popkewitz and Brennan, 1998, p. 10), which aims is to understand how the 
subject is constituted within a field understood in terms of power/knowledge. 
Popkewitz explains what he means by "decentering of the subject": 
It is not to eliminate subjects seeking to change their worlds but to give historical 
specificity to the systems of ideas that enclose and intern the "reason" and the 
"reasonable person" as alternatives are sought. (p. 11) 
Popkewitz attempts to work against the systematic thinking that constrains subjects 
by the dominant reason of the current curriculum practices. Through examining how 
an autonomous self is possible, Popkewitz would like to problematize our relation to 
present modes of reasoning in terms of the practice of the decentering of the subject. 
A subject-decentered approach focuses on systems of ideas as historical practices 
through which the objects of the world and the systems of action are constructed. 
Taking the study of the notion of difference in educational studies as an example, 
Popkewitz argues that difference might be seen as that of studying blackness instead 
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of blacks, femininity instead of women, homosexuality instead of homosexuals, and 
childhood instead of children. That is, there is a need to understand the specific 
historical context behind the fact of difference. We can then see how a concept has 
been constituted and how it has imposed upon subjects and their self-identity. In this 
way the decentering of the subject is made possible. 
2.3.4 Social epistemology 
Popkewitz develops his idea of social epistemology as offering a different perspective 
from the historicist tradition. Social epistemology links to Foucault's notion of 
genealogy, in which points he argues that the human subject is constituted within a 
historical framework. As such, unlike the philosophical tradition that treats 
epistemology as a search for the essential rules of knowledge, Popkewitz claims that 
his use of epistemology is related to Foucault's notion of "regimes of truth" 
(Popkewitz, 2001, p. 178) according to which social practices are oriented. Take the 
notion of "child" for example. Many systems of ideas place "child" into calculable 
epistemological spaces through which competence, achievement, and salvation are 
acted upon. A child in traditional epistemology might be regarded as a learner, a 
citizen in the future, or the shoot of a plant. Popkewitz claims that his idea of social 
epistemology enables us to consider the notion of "child" not as standing alone, but as 
embodying a range of historically constructed values, priorities, and dispositions, 
which affect how one sees and acts towards, the world. 
The reason, that is the dominant rationality, through which the rules of truth are 
produced is central to Popkewitz's social epistemology. By investigating a "system of 
reason", for Popkewitz, it is possible to enquire into questions concerning how 
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different discourses about the child, teaching, learning, school administration, and 
sociopolitical discourses overlap to become the common-sense of schooling and its 
practices. Such an investigation emphasizes the significance of the relation of the 
social (the organization, the operational systems of rules, and relations among actors 
and actions) to the cultural in which knowledge, as Popkewitz understands it, is the 
main point of inquiry. According to a Foucauldian perspective, in Popkewitz's view, 
historical change in the curriculum "is viewed as one of the breaks in the structuring 
of knowledge rather than as an evolutionary process of universal progress" (p. 164). 
In other words, we can think of historical change as rupture, in which there is no a 
priori philosophical formulation in knowledge systems, but a change of the subject 
that is brought into history. 
2.3.5 Cultural History 
In the book Cultural history and education: Critical essays on knowledge and 
schooling, Popkewitz, Franklin and Pereyra (2001) regard history as an understanding 
of the present and of collective memory. They develop their notion of "cultural 
history" as follows (pp. 32-33): 
First, the concern with knowledge is a central object of the study of cultural history. 
Language can be considered not only as giving information or getting information, 
but also as disciplining, ordering, and dividing a field of cultural practices. The 
inquiry of knowledge involves different trajectories of integrating social and political 
theory; involves different views of historiography; and also involves different ways of 
thinking about the culture of human beings. Second, a cultural history is a history of 
the present. It is an ironic undertaking to suspend history itself through an 
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understanding of the past in the present. In this perspective, history is not a 
programmatic moral role to identify the absolute, transcendent values in schooling, 
but an attempt to "grasp the conditions concerning what is possible to say as 'true,' 
and to consider the present configuration and organization of knowledge through 
excavating the shifting formations of knowledge over time" (p. 32). Third, cultural 
history entails systematic and continuous interdisciplinary interaction. The normal 
disciplinary boundaries are dissolved in it. Fourth, a notion of change is built on the 
politics of knowledge. Knowledge, on the one hand, is a strategy that interns and 
encloses consciousness. On the other hand, it can also be a strategy to open up 
different possibilities and alternatives. Fifth, cultural history dissolves the divides of 
knowledge and practice, and of the dichotomy between what people say and what 
people actually do. Cultural history is relevant to the academic movement of the 
"linguistic turn" that is not only related with text or discourse, but also with the 
relation of knowledge and society. Its methodological approaches aim at dissolving 
the boundaries between discourse and reality, text and the world. 
This cultural history, Popkewitz et al. claim, offers a different approach from the 
notions of regulation and control that we may see in most social histories. These 
social histories of control embody a sovereign concept of power as something that 
someone holds, and that such actors, as owners of sovereign power, use to develop a 
collective authority according to their own interests. Popkewitz et al. argue against 
this dominant thinking: 
...power and historical narratives can be ordered differently, namely without a search 
for the origins of sovereignty and without the ahistorical a priori subject inscribed in 
actor-centered social histories. Regulation and governance can be thought about 
historically as the imposition of order through knowledge. Through this sense of 
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knowledge as regulation and governance we can approach a cultural history of schools 
without an epistemology of a constantly unfolding progression and a subservient 
relation to philosophy. (Popkewitz, Pereyra and Franklin , 2001, p. 19) 
Following this, they draw on Foucault's understanding of power to consider 
regulation and governance as a productive, rather than a repressive, force. They claim 
that although knowledge can also be understood as constructing the world and 
individuality by enclosing possibilities, by focusing on knowledge and reason their 
study dislodges the ordering practices that enclose the boundaries that are established 
for thought as action (p. 20). History, for Foucault, means a rejection of a historicism9 
that looks for origins. In their view, Foucault's refusal of traditional historicist 
knowledge is not a rebuff to history itself, but is a different way of thinking about the 
primacy of its contents, its uses and its practices. For Popkewitz et al., Foucault's 
meticulous historical construction of the genesis of social practices and discourses 
aims, eventually, to create multiple forms of subjectivity. 
2.3.6 A critique of "Hidden Curriculum" traditions 
Certain perspectives in the writing of social histories and historical sociology refer to 
social regulation that connects with regulatory functions and therefore effects of 
social control in the knowledge of schooling. In Popkewitz's view, the "hidden 
curriculum" argument in curriculum study is one of these approaches (Popkewitz, 
Franklin and Pereyra, 2001, p. 10). In the idea of hidden curriculum, knowledge is 
considered not as a productive practice in the operation of power itselfl°, as 
Popkewitz would have it, but as a means of articulating the interests of dominant 
9 Historicism is related to the idea of "philosophy of consciousness" that Popkewitz mentions earlier. 
I° This is central concept of Popkewitz's cultural history. 
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social groups. For example, some so-called revisionist historians of education in the 
United States placed the issue of social regulation and social control at the heart of 
their work. They saw the American public school as an agency of social control. 
Popkewitz claims, however, that this account has been challenged since the 1980s, as 
it is too simplistic to assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
administrative practices in schools and citizenship requirements of society. It is also 
nave to assume that schools simply serve to reproduce existing culture. The notion of 
regulation that was employed by these educational historians was related to a 
repressive notion of power. They study issues such as how curriculum differentiates 
children in conformity with certain a priori structures. For Popkewitz, curriculum is 
not merely part of explanatory frameworks of social regulation. Likewise, knowledge 
in curriculum can not only serve as a framework to understand social interests that are 
brought into schooling to produce inequities and injustices; it can also serve as "a 
field of cultural practice and cultural production" (p. 15) in the study of curriculum or 
schooling. 
2.3.7 Curriculum as a governing practice 
Popkewitz offers an account of the nature of curriculum in terms of the thinking of 
power/knowledge. He argues that what students learn in school is not only concerned 
with what to do and what to know. Learning science, mathematics, history or 
geography is also concerned with learning dispositions, awareness, and sensibilities 
towards the world. Popkewitz's aim in relation to the study of curriculum is "to make 
the problem of knowledge and reasoning in schools—the forms by which we 'tell the 
truth' about ourselves and others—an issue of governing" (Popkewitz, 2001, p. 159). 
Furthermore, he intends to offer a history of curriculum that focuses on knowledge as 
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a governing practice. This idea of "knowledge as governing" denies that rationality is 
a unified and universal system by which we can judge what is true or false. 
Popkewitz's aim, then, is to explore how particular doctrines of reason become 
effects of power, and how particular systems of thinking and rules of reasoning are 
embedded in the practice of schooling. For this purpose, he considers the possibility 
of conducting a historical inquiry into curriculum that makes problematic the 
assumptions of positivism and the philosophy of consciousness. He also suggests the 
possibility of engaging in a self-reflective stance towards the relation of intellectual 
work to social movements (ibid). 
Curriculum, for Popkewitz, can be viewed as an invention of modernity, as a 
particular organization of knowledge by which individuals regulate and discipline 
themselves as members of a society. Curriculum, then, "involves forms of knowledge 
whose functions are to regulate and discipline the individual" (ibid). Embedded 
within the curriculum are certain rules related to the way students reason about 
themselves and discipline the actions they take. Its procedure does not work through 
violent force, but through symbolic systems that organizes the way individuals 
behave. School, in this sense, has become an institutional form that is located in the 
changing patterns of governing. Here, Popkewitz employs Foucault's notion of 
governmentalityll in order to explain new principles of governing embodied in 
pedagogy. After the 19th centrury, governmentality was made possible through such 
H Governmentality is a new term coined by Foucault, which associates "government" with 
"mentality". It means the way that our mentality is governed by the practices of government. Foucault 
refers it to the development of the modem State that is a specific governmental apparatuse. For 
improving economic and social development in the modern State, through the exercise of 
power/knowledge, individuals govern themselves by certain kinds of rationality. This govenance is not 
as the sovereign power in order to control people, but as the bio-power (I shall elaborate this notion 
later) to ensure security, welfare, prosperity and the subsistence of population in one country. For 
example, statistics had become a new governmental technology following scientific rationality to deal 
with the emergence of the problem of population in the eighteenth century (see Foucault, 1991b). 
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devices as the establishment of the concept of "childhood" (pp. 160-162). For 
Popkewitz, new ideas of childhood were always associated with the occurrence of 
new ideas of learning and schooling. The dominant discourse of science enabled the 
operation of governmentality through its role in the creation of knowledge concerning 
"childhood". At this time, social sciences were developing, which described, 
explained, and gave direction for solving social problems. Systems of ideas in the 
social sciences were brought to bear not only on the interpretation of social life, but 
also onto social practices themselves. In Popkewitz's view, emerging pedagogical 
theories and sciences of education were unavoidably formulated in terms of 
governing practices based on the techniques of science and social science. Statistics 
were central to the construction of knowledge. State reforms and the policing of 
health and wealth were constructed by reference to statistical aggregates of 
populations. This rationality divided people into specific units that could be 
calculated and organized through the administration of the state, for example as in the 
control of epidemics and crime. It also produced new cultural forms for constructing 
individuality. For example, the child study movement of the time was informed by 
the knowledge produced by statistics. Thus, the growth and development of a child 
was supervised and monitored according to this rationality. The concept of childhood 
was also a focus of this governing practice, which had a great influence on family 
education and schooling. Popkewitz explains that pedagogy was, therefore, a central 
strategy related to political rationalities concerned with individual consciousness in 
the social administration of the child. When we approach curriculum history as a 
perspective of governing, the issue of child development not only links to what 
knowledge is to be taught, but also associates with diverse trajectories of social and 
cultural forms that emerge in new sets of relations and institutions. 
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In traditional thinking, schooling is seen to define the boundaries of what is to be 
taught and what is to be known. This relates again to the Spencerian question: "What 
knowledge is of most worth?" that Popkewitz cites. The process of selection of 
valuable knowledge in this sense is enacted through the classifications that are 
sanctioned. Popkewitz, however, considers curriculum, or the history of curriculum, 
differently. The selection of knowledge is decided by power relations based on 
discipline or a dominant rationality. Through this governing practice, individuals 
organize their view of "self'. Schooling thus informs this view of self through the 
production of a set of strategies that direct students' reason and their view of their self 
in the world. Rather than highlighting the notion of repressive power, as in hidden 
curriculum traditions, Popkewitz's focus on the decentering of the subject, social 
epistemology and cultural history attempts to draw on knowledge as a strategy 
through which to examine regimes of truth and the way the subject is constructed 
through schooling. He aims then to challenge, 
 the limits of transcendent values, and to 
open up different possibilities for curriculum. 
2.4 Power/knowledge in education policy analysis—Stephen J. Ball 
Stephen J. Ball is the most prominent scholar in using Foucauldian ideas in the field 
of education policy analysis. He treats education policies as texts and discourses and 
examines them in terms of Foucault's concept of power/knowledge. He focuses 
particularly on issues relating to UK education reform, such as the 1988 Education 
Reform Act, the National Curriculum, the political trajectory of neo-conservativism, 
neo-liberalism and the New Right. In this section, I shall explore Ball's account of 
discourses in education, focussing particularly on the advent of discourses of 
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management and school effectiveness in educational policy that accompanied the 
1988 Education Reform Act. 
2.4.1 Dividing practices in educational discourses 
Ball draws on Foucault's idea of "dividing practices12" to look at educational 
discourses. He considers that such practices currently operate in the organizational 
processes of education in the UK (Ball, 1990a, p. 4). In his view, dividing practices 
have become prevalent in the UK educational context, exemplified in the use of 
testing, examining, and profiling. Through such processes, different types of 
intelligence, ability, and scholastic identity in schooling are ordered according to 
different criteria. Individual identity and subjectivity are constituted and normalized 
through certain techniques that exist in forms of organization, teacher-student 
relationships, curricula and pedagogies. Ball sees that within many arenas of the 
educational sciences, such as: educational psychology, pedagogy, and the sociology 
of education, "truth games" are played out according to these dividing practices. He 
offers an example to explain this: in the 1960s and 1970s, the development of the 
sociology of education was guided overwhelmingly by the issues arising from the 
problem of working-class underachievement. Working-class family life was 
constructed in terms of deficiency and cultural deprivation, that is, as abnormal. Their 
misfortune was regarded as the result of cultural determination, which it was 
impossible to change. As a result, individual students were objectified in terms of 
various fixed social class or other social indicators. From this perspective, Ball argues, 
we may see that knowledge and practices in educational discourse provide modes of 
12 Dividing practices, for Foucault, is the objectivizing of the subject. We can see it in the examples of 
the distinction between the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, and the criminals and the "good 
boys" (Foucault, 1983, p. 208). 
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classification, control, and containment; often, paradoxically he notes, couched within 
a humanitarian rhetoric of reform and progress. 
From a Foucauldian perspective, Ball suggests that "the student is compiled and 
constructed both in the passive processes of objectification, and in an active, 
self-forming subjectification" (ibid) through the processes of schooling. The latter, in 
Ball's view, involves a process of self-understanding informed by an external 
authority figure — such as a teacher: the way teachers look at the achievement of 
students influences how students think about themselves. For Ball, this process is 
related to Foucault's concept of power/knowledge. He interprets that the effects of 
power are not only negative, but also positive: "education works not only to render its 
students as subjects of power, it also constitutes them, or some of them, as powerful 
subjects" (p. 5). 
2.4.2 The discourses of management and school effectiveness 
In an essay "Management as moral technology: A Luddite analysis" (1990b), Ball 
critiques the UK's 1988 Education Reform Act. For him, the very nature of the 
school had been transformed by this policy because it shifted the governance of 
schools from a professional/collegial style to a managerial/bureaucratic one. Teachers 
became subject to systems of administrative rationality. Through the techniques of 
management, control was exerted over teachers' work. Schooling, in this mode of 
governance, became clearly embedded into the logics of industrial production and 
market competition. Ball expressed his concern regarding this change: 
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Our point here is that concepts like efficiency are treated as though they were neutral 
and technical matters, rather than being tried to particular interests. The question of 
"efficiency for whom?" is rarely asked. Efficiency itself is taken as self-evidently a 
good thing. The costs involved for workers in achieving greater efficiency 
(intensification, loss of autonomy, closer monitoring and appraisal, non-participation in 
decision-making, lack of personal development through work) are rarely considered. (p. 
154) 
In other words, his concern about the discourse of school effectiveness relates to the 
question of whose interest is fulfilled, and teachers' loss of autonomy—their role in 
decision-making. The 1988 Educational Reform Act, for Ball, is an example of 
industrial management. He explains: management is a "moral technology" or a 
technology of power in Foucault's account. As Foucault suggests, "it is a modern, 
all-purpose equivalent of Bentham's panopticon, a generalizable model of 
functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men" 
(p. 156). 
Ball provides a characterization of this form of management through his reading of 
the Educational Reform Act. First, management is a professional and 
professionalizing discourse within which exclusive claims are made by its speakers 
and by its incumbents to certain expertise such as organizational leadership and 
decision-making. In this sense, management is a set of procedures that cast 
subordinates as objects. In educational settings, the professional claims of 
management are set against the autonomy of teachers and of institutions. Second, 
"management is a theoretical and practical technology of rationality geared to 
efficiency, practicality, and control" (p. 157). It embodies a rationalist epistemology. 
Organizational control and individual action are incorporated into a technical 
perspective. Organization presents itself as an objective, technically neutral 
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mechanism, dedicated only to maximum efficiency. Third, Ball claims: "management 
is also an imperialistic discourse" (ibid). In the presumption of management theory, 
the social world is locked into irrational chaos which needs to be brought into its 
redeeming rationalist order. By way of a set of potent discursive oppositions, 
management theory constructs its superiority. For instance, order is set over and 
against chaos, rationality against irrationality, sanity against madness, efficiency 
against inefficiency, and meritocracy against personal influence. Fourth, "the 
language of management deploys rationality and efficiency to promote control; it is a 
regime of 'jurisdiction' and `veridiction'" (ibid), Ball describes using Foucault's 
terms. As a system of possibility for knowledge, the language of management 
eschews or marginalizes the problems, concerns, difficulties, and fears of "the 
subject" (the managed) who is the objectified product of organization, authority, and 
responsibility. Limits, meaning and possibilities of action are determined by position 
and expertise. Through the lens of Foucault, Ball considers, management constitutes 
"subjected and practicised bodies"; and "increases the forces of the body in economic 
terms of utility and diminishes these forces in political terms of obedience" (p. 158). 
The managed is supposed to be fragile, prone to irrationality, and surfeits of emotion. 
Control and change are therefore employed to resolve these problems. At the same 
time, the discourses of psychoanalytic or psychological analysis are mobilized in 
response to individual resistance because dissension or conflict is regarded as being 
aberrant and pathological. From the perspectives of dominant groups, oppositional 
activities within the organization are defined as inherently irrational. The 
subject—the individual worker or practitioner—is constructed in terms of the ideal of 
sameness and of "normalized normality". Rather than as part of the system and the 
result of collective interests, all problems are taken to be "in" the person. The resistor 
is treated as a social deviant, and is normalized via coercive or therapeutic 
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procedures. Thus, "management is both a totalizing and individualizing system" 
(ibid). 
Moreover, in Ball's view, the personal file and the personnel manager are key 
mechanisms in the moral technology of management. For instance, the techniques 
and research findings of psychology provide norms and models through which 
individuals can be compared and monitored. He refers to Foucault's ideas of 
hierarchical observation, normalizing judgments, and examination etc. in this respect. 
And in particular, these forms of managerial knowledge are embedded within the 
development of techniques of teacher appraisal. Ball considers how, since the 1980s, 
"appraisal has become one of the prime features of the political reconstruction and 
disciplining of teachers as ethical subjects" (p. 159), which has extended the logics of 
quality control and performance indicators into teaching. Appraisal made teachers 
calculable, describable, and comparable. Individual teachers were, therefore, drawn 
into an evaluating eye and its disciplinary power. Ball employs Foucault's 
understanding of examination to explain the effects of appraisal (pp. 159-160). For 
Foucault, he suggests, examination transforms the economy of visibility into the 
exercise of power. It is a space of domination, a process of inspection and of review 
without favour or prejudice. It is a compulsory objectification. Through the 
mechanism of examination, individuality is drawn into the field of documentation, 
into a meticulous archive which can be observed. This personal information is the 
basis for the decision of promotion, reward, competency and dismissal. Each 
performance is measured and categorized in order to be compared. Furthermore, the 
examination makes each individual a "case". This involves a process of what 
Foucault calls "subjectification". Ball argues: 
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The techniques of appraisal have been developed and legitimated to the extent that they 
co-opt individuals, and established notions of professionalism, into their operation. The 
teacher is encouraged to view the procedures of appraisal as a part of the process of 
self-understanding and self-betterment—professional development—which Foucault 
calls "subjectification." (pp. 160-161) 
In Ball's view, "subjectification" refers to an active engagement of the subject in 
self-formation. Its procedure refers back to people's own bodies, to their own souls, 
and to their own conduct. In the appraisal interview, for instance, where confession 
and techniques of psychoanalysis are encountered together, appraisees are encouraged 
to display their shortcomings, to identify appropriate therapeutic procedures, and to 
judge themselves. By way of this technology of self and the dynamics of 
self-revelation, appraisees are thus completed. 
For Ball, school-effectiveness research represents another approach through which 
the school is reconceptualized within the management discourse for several reasons 
(pp. 162-163). First, effectiveness studies and school-difference studies define the 
achievement of schools in pupil performance in ways that are calculable and visible. 
These studies provide a technology for the possibility of blaming and judging schools 
as "delinquent" or "failing". Second, by "neutral" performance measures, 
effectiveness studies have developed a technology of power that enables monitoring 
and control of schools. Schools have been reworked not only as forms of but also as 
subject to surveillance. The "poor" school and the "failing" school have to cure and 
improve themselves under this surveillance. Through schemes of self-appraisal, 
school improvement, and institutional development, teachers are also involved into 
taking responsibility for their own discipline. They are urged to believe that their 
commitment to the engagement in such processes will enable them to become more 
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professional. By way of these techniques, Foucault's so-called "normalizing 
judgments" are turned upon a whole school. Each school is inscribed into a field of 
knowledge for the exercise of comparison. The order and the norm are constituted on 
the basis of opposing values—good and evil, good school and bad school, effective 
practice and ineffective practice. If schools fail in self-examination and 
self-improvement, the expert, the authority and the moral disciplinarian are at hand to 
intervene. Ball criticizes the studies of school effectiveness thus: 
In a dramatic sense the language, concepts, and field of concern of effectiveness 
research imposes stringent limits to the possible ways of thinking and speaking about 
and studying schooling. Effectiveness reconstructs the school and the teacher as its 
subject, to be evaluated, monitored, and managed. (p. 164) 
In Ball's argument, effectiveness and management was linked to the political 
discourse of Thatcherism in the UK. Its central concerns are the control of teachers 
and the achievement of consensus. As a new mode of discipline, management is a 
form of organization based on the strength of a specific rationality. Ball believes that 
although it is couched in an ideology of neutrality, it is a "political technology" in 
reality and is inevitably involved in "dividing practices". As a "regime of truth", Ball 
argues, the discourse of management "empowers the manager and objectifies and 
subjects the managed" (p. 165). Through this, subjugation is achieved by the 
interrelation between power, knowledge, and the body. 
2.4.3 Discourse in educational policy 
At the beginning of his Politics and policy making in education: explorations in 
policy sociology (1990c), Ball posits: "Policy is clearly a matter of the 'authoritative 
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allocation of values' (p. 3). This authoritative allocation of values refers to power 
and control and can not float free of the social context. In Ball's view then, "we need 
to ask whose values are validated in policy, and whose are not?" (ibid) Rather than 
simply reflecting the interests of one social class, however, education policy is a 
complex and heterogenous configuration of elements. Ball therefore tends to focus on 
multiple aspects in his policy analysis, such as the relationship between education and 
ideology, or between education and economy. In particular, he is concerned with the 
way that policy changes in education can be traced to ideological shifts and changing 
patterns of influence within the ruling political party. He focuses on issues of conflict 
and incoherence within the state, and its constitutive institutional elements. These 
conflicts cause disputes over the meaning of education, and thus cause the struggles 
for control within it. 
For Ball, discourse is the crucial concept in Foucault's account which is of the 
relationship and inter-relationship between power and knowledge. In Ball's view, 
discourse is an object where power is invested. Conversely, discursive practices 
produce and maintain power relations. He argues: 
...knowledge is that of which one can speak in a discursive practice. Meanings thus 
arise not from language but from institutional practices, from power relations, from 
social position. Words and concepts change their meaning and their effects as they are 
deployed within different discourses. (pp. 17-18). 
Ball uses the concept of power/knowledge to explain the fact that discourses are 
constructed in certain possible ways. They are constituted by exclusions and 
inclusions, by what cannot and what can be said. They also "stand in antagonistic 
relationship to other discourses, other possibilities of meaning, other claims, rights 
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and position" (p. 18). For Ball, this is Foucault's "principle of discontinuity". This 
discontinuity, in his view, derives from the opposing strategy and the struggle. In 
discourses, not only specific words and meanings (such as, in education, 
progressivism or comprehensivism) are debunked, but also the speakers (such as 
experts, specialists and professionals) of these words are replaced. As such, a new 
discursive regime has been established, which accompanies a new form of authority. 
For Ball, in the light of Foucault's concept of "discontinuity", discourses of education 
are now very different. It is to be produced in more disciplined ways (greater state 
intervention and monitoring and more centralised control) and more efficiently 
(reallocation of funds and cuts in expenditure) (p. 19). Ball considers that discourse 
provides a particular and pertinent way of understanding policy formation. Policies 
privilege certain visions and interests and they legitimate practices. For Ball, "they 
are power/knowledge configurations par excellence" (p. 22). As Foucault shows in 
the arenas of sexuality and politics, the procedures of exclusion and control over 
discourses are strict in our society. Ball quotes Foucault's idea to echo this: "We 
know very well that we are not free to say anything, that we cannot speak of anything 
when and where we like, and that just anyone, in short, cannot speak of just anything" 
(ibid). Ball would like to draw attention in particular to the way in which these 
emergent discourses were constructed to "set limits to the possibilities of education 
policy" (p. 23). 
In sum, we can see that Ball draws on Foucault's notion of dividing practices and 
disciplinary power (such as the techniques of examination, normalization or 
hierarchical observation) to expose the problems of the UK's 1988 curriculum reform. 
For him, the interests, ideology, or specific values of dominant groups lead to 
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subjugated technicians, teachers who lose autonomy in the process of schooling. Ball 
not only shows the limits of education policy, he also seeks to extend the thinking 
about education policy beyond a state control perspective by drawing on Foucault's 
idea that there is an "economy of power", a set of technologies and practices which 
are realized and struggled over in local settings (Ball, 1994, p. 10). For Ball, policy 
has its multiple aspects. It is a sophisticated, contingent, complex and unstable 
practice, created within the effects of dominance, resistance, chaos and freedom. But 
control and dominance, he argues, cannot totally contain all power relations. In power 
relations, however, "subjugated knowledges" cannot be totally excluded from arenas 
of policy implementation. In Ball's view, discourse can be seen not only as an 
instrument, an effect of power, but also as a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of 
resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. He would like to recognize 
and analyze "dominant" discourses, regimes of truth, and erudite knowledges (like 
neo-liberalism and management theory) within social policy. By this exploration, 
resistance in the discourse of policy and the positive aspect of power is made possible. 
For Ball, this is an example of what Foucault calls "the real political task" in our 
society (Ball, 2005, p. 52). 
In this chapter, four curriculum theorists—Cherryholms, Giroux, Popkewitz and 
Ball—whose ideas represent different thinking on curriculum theories and on 
curriculum policies are introduced. In the next chapter, the original conception that 
influenced each of these curriculum theories—Foucault's concept of 
power/knowledge—will be elaborated. 
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Chapter 3 Foucault's concept of power / knowledge 
Foucault's idea of power/knowledge is the main theme that I would like to explore in 
relation to the study of curriculum, and of education more broadly, in this thesis. 
Foucault develops his concept of power/knowledge mainly in two books: one is 
Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison (1991a) and The History of Sexuality, 
vol. 1(1990). In this chapter, I shall focus first on how the idea of power/knowledge is 
developed in these two works. I will illustrate the concept using examples and also 
refer to some of Foucault's own interpretations found in interviews he gave, which 
are relevant to this theme. The issue of the subject is also important in understanding 
Foucault's articulation of power/knowledge. I therefore pay particular attention to 
Foucault's essay "The subject and power" (1983), through which Foucault's reason 
for studying power, and the development of his notion of power/knowledge in 
relation to different aspects of historical concern, can be clearly understood. 
It is fairly common among interpreters of Foucault to draw clear distinctions between 
the different phases of his writing, and it would be possible to do this in relation to 
theme of power/knowledge. My own view, however, is that the distinctions between 
these phases are less clear that these commentators sometimes make out, and that the 
lines of his thought intertwine through the different phases of his writing. Hence, in 
what follows I have chosen not to draw such distinctions in any systematic way. 
3.1 A brief introduction to Discipline and Punish 
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This book, subtitled The Birth of the Prison is Foucault's study of the establishment 
of the prison in the French modern penal system. In the opening chapter, Foucault 
depicts the cruel public execution of a criminal for regicide in 1757. The body of the 
condemned person, as many eyewitnesses saw, was "drawn and quartered by four 
horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes 
thrown to the winds" (Foucault, 1991a, p. 3). By the end of the eighteenth and the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, however, punitive objectives had changed. 
Punishment was no longer treated as a spectacle, and the body was no longer the 
major target of penal repression. Physical punishment had been replaced by the loss 
of wealth or rights that imposed on the heart, the thoughts and the inclinations. The 
new juridical mechanisms judged the "soul" of the criminal rather than crimes. 
The birth of the prison, therefore, symbolized a historical shift regarding penal 
mechanisms in Europe. From the nineteenth century onward, imprisonment had 
become the essential form of punishment and covered the whole middle ground of 
punishment, between death and light penalties. Punishment was replaced by the 
uniform machinery of the prisons, which, in Foucault's view, violate the 
corresponding relationship between offences and penalties. For him, this phenomenon 
looks like "a physician who has the same remedy for all ills" (p. 117). As detention 
was denounced by reformers as an inappropriate punishment before the 19th century, 
Foucault's inquiry concentrates on why and how it can became the most general form 
of legal punishment in such a short time. In his interpretation, prison was not only the 
place that deprives convicts of liberty, but also that rendered individuals docile and 
useful. It showed an unceasing discipline and an apparatus for transforming 
individuals. 
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Besides imprisonment, several other new measures were invented at this time, based 
on constraints, prohibitions or obligations, which marched distinct shifts in the 
operation of power. First, there was the scale of the control: it didn't treat body as 
"wholesale", but as "retail" (p. 137), by which the body was a dissociable 
unity—movements, gestures and attitudes are involved in the power mechanisms. 
Second, there was the aim of the control. It was dictated by the economy, the 
efficiency of movements, and the internal organization. Finally, there was the 
modality of control. It implied a constant coercion, a supervision of the processes of 
the activity, and an exercise according to codification. Foucault terms these forces of 
subjection that impose upon bodies "disciplines". For Foucault, discipline has four 
types of character: it is cellular (by the play of spatial distribution), it is organic (by 
the coding of activities), it is genetic (by the accumulation of time), and it is 
combinatory (by the composition of forces) (p. 167). In these features, it uses four 
great techniques: it draws up tables; it prescribes movements; it imposes exercises; 
lastly, in order to obtain the combination of forces, it arranges "tactics" in disciplinary 
practice. Through the method of time-tables, collective training, exercises, total and 
detailed surveillance, for Foucault, a disciplinary society has been formed. The 
feature of this disciplinary power is exercised at the lowest possible cost. It brings the 
effects of this social power to their maximum intensity, and links the economic 
growth of power with the output of the apparatuses within which it is exercised. As a 
result, the object of discipline in modern society is no longer the body of the guilty 
man, but the disciplined individual. The process of the constitution of this disciplined 
individual is a central concern in Foucault's work. 
Foucault claims that this work is "a genealogy of the present scientifico-legal 
complex" (p. 23). Rather than the history of the past or the history of the past in terms 
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of present, genealogy, in Foucault's account, is the history of the present. This means 
that he has less concern about how the events happened in the past or how they could 
be employed to provide the solution for our present problems, but pays more attention 
to how our modern society and individual subject is formed through historical events. 
He argues: 
I would like to write the history of this prison, with all the political investments of the 
body that it gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am 
interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of 
the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present. (p. 31) 
In fact, this "present" refers to our current situation and how the milieu in which we 
exist constitutes our own subjectivity. The history of the "micro-physics" of punitive 
power described in Discipline and Punish, then, is a genealogy, or an element in a 
genealogy, of the modern "soul". In this work, Foucault not only discusses the 
consequences of legislation or the indicators of the development of penal system, he 
also aims to write the history of the modern soul and of a new kind of power 
exercised in punitive mechanisms. He regards punishment as a complex social 
function and as a political tactic. Rather than the negative effect, the productive effect 
of power in punitive systems is his focus. For Foucault, punitive measures are not 
simply 'negative' mechanisms which repress, prevent and eliminate people. On the 
contrary, they are linked to a series of productive and useful effects. The technology 
of power in these measures includes the principles both of the humanization of the 
penal system and of the knowledge of human beings. Next, I shall give an account of 
the notion of power/knowledge as it emerges in Discipline and Punish. 
3.2 Power/Knowledge in Discipline and Punish 
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In this section, I shall concentrate on a number of points pertaining to Foucault's idea 
of power/knowledge in Discipline and Punish. First, I will show the meaning of 
discipline and its connection with power. Next, I will describe modes of disciplinary 
power in pedagogical practice, which I am particularly concerned with. After that, I 
will discuss a mechanism of the operation of power identified by Foucault, which 
draws on the idea of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon. Finally, the correlations between 
power and knowledge, and the nature of power will be clarified with reference to 
Foucault's thinking. 
3.2.1 Discipline and power 
"Discipline" is an important concept in Discipline and Punish. Foucault explains its 
meaning thus: 
"Discipline" may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a 
type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, 
techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a "physics" or an "anatomy" 
of power, a technology. (p. 215) 
Discipline, then, is a technique, a form of power. Through the embodiment of specific 
techniques of power, discipline in this sense enable the rearrangement of individuals' 
bodily action, in response to particular social and political needs This force of 
discipline operates in two ways. First, it organizes a positive economy for maximum 
speed and efficiency by distribution. The target of this distribution could be space, 
rank or time. In this distribution, the body of an individual is not located in a fixed 
position, but circulated in a network of relations. Second, this operation treats 
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individuals both as objects and as instruments of the exercise of power, and also 
constitutes a network of coercions that dominates bodies. The manipulation of power 
is effected, for example, by means of the tactics of hierarchical observation, 
normalizing judgement and examination that Foucault illustrates. The effect of 
discipline is to produce "docile bodies". For instance, in the prison, criminals have to 
obey a strict time-table within which very detailed regulations are prescribed. A lot of 
routine physical work must be completed in different areas every day according to 
this timetable. This is a concrete example of rearranging the action of bodies by the 
organisation of space and time. In this way, the body is used for producing positive 
economy by becoming obedient, and by becoming more useful and functional. 
Eventually, all mechanisms become habit or aptitude immanent in the body of 
prisoners, and this process of subjection is effected by the habitual obedience. As 
Foucault explains: 
...discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, 'docile' bodies. Discipline 
increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these 
same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the 
body; on the one hand, it turns it into an 'aptitude', a 'capacity', which it seeks to 
increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might 
result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection. (p. 138) 
Foucault is actually not predominantly concerned with what happens in the prison. 
His concern is with the social development of the disciplinary power of the prison 
being expanded outside it, namely, to the whole society. The focus of disciplinary 
technology moves from prisoners to individuals and from imprisoned periods to our 
daily lives. For Foucault, Western society is a disciplinary society where disciplinary 
control prevails. As a "new micro-physics of power" (p. 139), this disciplinary 
control connects with the techniques for arranging the force of human bodies. 
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Foucault's main concern, then, is not the essence of power, but how it operates 
through its investment and its effects on the human body and the subject. 
3.2.2 Disciplinary power in pedagogical practice 
Though Foucault's doesn't refer to the issue of education directly, he offers several 
examples of disciplinary power regarding pedagogical practice in Discipline and 
Punish. These examples of disciplinary tactics are both a technique of power and a 
tactic of knowledge. In Foucault's view, discipline is an art of distributions, an art of 
rank, and a technique for arrangements in education. Some examples from the text 
and from my own experience illustrate different techniques of discipline. 
In the example of Jesuit Colleges in the eighteenth century that Foucault gives (pp. 
146), two or three hundred pupils in one "class"—a basic unit in these 
colleges—were subdivided into groups of ten. These groups competed against each 
other. Each pupil was assigned a functional place as a combatant within a unitary 
group through the confrontation with rivals. This distribution is one means of 
utilizing human resources effectively by assigning individuals a suitable place in 
order to win victory for the whole group. 
After 1762, Foucault suggests, "rank" began to define the distribution of individuals 
in the educational order. Rank was attributed to each pupil at the end of each task and 
each examination. Pupils occupied one rank or were placed according to their 
performance, their age, and their behaviour. In elementary education, this made it 
possible to supervise each student and to stimulate his work. This may also be seen in 
the arrangement of tables in the classroom according to the level of learning 
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achievement. Such distribution functions to provide a whole series of distinctions 
based on students' progress. Consequently, the educational space was operated not 
only as a learning surrounding, but also as a machine for supervising, hierarchizing 
and rewarding (p. 147). 
The timetable is another technology of the control of daily activity through which the 
actions of students are governed in detail by its ordering. Time is the meticulous 
control of power that guides the action of bodies. In primary schools in Taiwan,13 for 
example, every student in the same class has the same time-table. Detailed 
information in this timetable shows how time is divided in the school and the time 
and duration of each academic subject. The sound of the school bell is a signal that 
reminds students to go to a lesson or that the class is dismissed. The sound of a bell is 
a tactic of disciplinary power that controls students' school activities and their bodies. 
It assigns an individual pupil to the right place at the proper time in order to prevent 
disorder. 
Gesture is another manipulation of power over the body. The control of gesture has 
been applied to army barracks for a long time. It is now also seen in schools. When I 
taught children in a primary school in Taiwan, I found the use of gestures to be an 
effective strategy for teaching small children. This discipline of gesture could be 
effected through a game. For example, when I said "little eyes", all the pupils in the 
class had to respond with "look at teacher". At the same time, they should all move to 
look at me. By associating this word game with this gesture, I could easily and 
13 
 Although Foucault's work is explicitly focussed on Europe and develops his ideas of 
power/knowledge in this context, I consider that his concept can apply elsewhere that includes my 
country. 
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immediately gain the attention of the pupils. This "look at teacher" is an utterance or 
a code that functions to discipline children's body. 
Examination, for Foucault, is also another important disciplinary power in 
educational practices, which originated as a new type of power/knowledge relation 
for the government of populations during the eighteenth century (Foucault, 1997a, p. 
20). In the examination itself, human beings become numbers and codes. Schools use 
examinations, which by virtue of embodying students as codes, numbers and 
documents, enable them to be compared, measured, judged and classified. But 
examination also refers to broader disciplinary practices than the examination as test. 
As Foucault points out: 
...the school became a sort of apparatus of uninterrupted examination that duplicated 
along its entire length the operation of teaching. It became less and less a question of 
jousts in which pupils pitched their forces against one another and increasingly a 
perpetual comparison of each and all that made it possible both to measure and to judge. 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 186) 
On the one hand, examination is exercised through its invisibility; on the other, "it 
imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility" (p. 187). This 
visibility assures the force of power exercised over individuals who are arranged in a 
mechanism of objectification, such as writing. Writing is a concrete, visible matter 
and it can be transcribed and accumulated. For example, the university joint entrance 
exam in Taiwan is held annually. After the exam, each student is given a score for 
each subject and in total. This score is a form of writing that determines which 
university and department this student can study in. In this case, students are the 
embodiment of codes that become easy to arrange in the procedure of distribution. 
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They are fixed under the gaze. In this sense, for Foucault, "examination is at the 
centre of the procedures that constitute the individual as effect and object of power, as 
effect and object of knowledge" (p. 192). 
Hierarchical observation is one application of examination that Foucault identifies. It 
might be found in the military camp, housing estates, hospitals, asylums, prisons and 
even schools. This disciplinary gaze specifies the surveillance and aims to increase 
the productive function in a particular place. Foucault gives the example of the 
organization of elementary teaching (pp. 175-176). In 1669, following the 
development of the parish school, the number of pupils increased and disorder 
occurred in the classrooms simultaneously. A system of supervision was, therefore, 
needed, so, in order to help teachers to teach. Batencour selected a whole series of 
"officers" from among the best pupils. Their roles, as intendants, observers, monitors, 
and tutors, involved two main functions. The first involved material tasks such as 
distributing ink and paper, giving alms to the poor or reading spiritual texts on feast 
days. The second involved surveillance, recording who left his bench, who was 
talking, who committed an impure act among the pupils, for example. Such 
surveillance is a specific technique in the disciplinary power that functions for 
maintaining order and for improving efficiency in the school. 
According to these disciplinary techniques, also tactics of knowledge, disciplinary 
power in education is organized to enhance "normalization", which serves to 
standardize the behaviour of individuals. It functions to reduce gaps, to impose 
homogeneity and to fix specialities. In schools, we may see that the behaviour and 
performance of students are judged by the binary standard—good or bad. This is an 
example of normalizing judgement. Students know which category they belong to, 
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and, therefore, what kind of award or punishment they deserve. By way of the tactic 
of normalization, they know how to follow regulations and to be a "satisfied" good 
student. As Foucault comments: 
...it exercised over them a constant pressure to conform to the same model, so that they 
might all be subjected to subordination, docility, attention in studies and exercises, and 
to the correct practice of duties and all the parts of discipline. So that they might all be 
like one another. (p. 182) 
Normalization, therefore, affects how people (or students) look at themselves or 
behave in relation to others. This effect homogenizes individuals by excluding and 
blurring differences. By means of distribution, examination and normalization, then, 
the body is the object to be arranged, and to be transformed according to specific 
educational intentions. These intentions, however, should not be understood as full of 
ideology or as means of domination by dominant groups. They are drawn by the 
demands of enhancing the efficiency of learning, teaching, and economic utility 
within and of education. In this respect, Foucault argues that this feature of 
power/knowledge is not only negative, in an oppressive sense, but also productive. 
This is an important aspect of Foucault's conception of power that I shall elaborate 
further later. 
3.2.3 Power of surveillance—Panopticism 
Surveillance, which is central to achieving economic efficiency, is a perfect 
mechanism of disciplinary power. As Foucault claims: "It was more efficient and 
profitable in terms of the economy of power to place people under surveillance than 
to subject them to some exemplary penalty" (Foucault, 1980a, p. 38). Surveillance is 
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a new mode of the exercise of power that developed during the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. It makes the "disciplinary gaze" possible, and thereby enhances 
productive effects through internal, articulated and detailed control. 
Jeremy Bentham's panopticon is an ideal type of building for effecting unceasing 
all-round surveillance. According to Foucault, it is made to strengthen the productive 
forces, "to increase production, to develop the economy, spread education, raise the 
level of public morality; to increase and multiply" (Foucault, 1991a, p. 208). The 
architecture of the panopticon characterised by is its axial visibility and lateral 
invisibility. Every cell is located opposite the central tower. No-one can escape the 
gaze of guardians from the central tower; yet prisoners never know when they are 
being inspected, only that they always may be. Individual prisoners are isolated and 
cannot talk with each other. For Foucault, this was a marvellous metaphor for the 
mechanism of disciplinary power because no matter who exercises power, by virtue 
of the guardians' invisibility in the central tower and the permanent visibility of 
prisoners, he or she produces the same effect of power. The operation of power is also 
economical because only a single person is required in the central tower for this 
mechanism to operate. Through the central tower, the panopticon ensures the 
automatic functioning of power. 
In schools, we may see many examples that are similar to this technique of power. In 
a classroom, normally, the teacher's desk is located in a "proper" place from which he 
or she can monitor the movement of each student by surveillance. The function of this 
position is similar to that of the central tower of the panopticon. Children do not 
necessarily know when they are being inspected, but they fully understand that they 
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are always visible. This knowing pushes them to engage in their work without 
playing and chatting with each other, as their bad behaviour will be noticed. 
In modern society, disciplinary power akin to the panoptic model is expanding. First, 
inspection is imposed not merely by warders, but also by society as a whole. For 
instance, educational practices in schools might be inspected by the public. Any 
educational activity happening in the classroom cannot not be hidden from the gaze 
of parents and public. Second, a panopticon is not only a metaphor of architecture, 
but also a symbol of disciplinary mechanisms that have been extended everywhere 
without concrete buildings and without the limitation of space and time. As Foucault 
puts it: 
...Bentham dreamt of transforming into a network of mechanisms that would be 
everywhere and always alert, running through society without interruption in space or in 
time. The panoptic arrangement provides the formula for this generalization. It 
programmes, at the level of an elementary and easily transferable mechanism, the basic 
functioning of a society penetrated through and through with disciplinary mechanisms. 
(p. 209) 
Definitely, instead of the architecture at a fixed place far away, the panopticon has 
already penetrated through the whole body of society, as, for example, where CCTV 
has been used everywhere for the purpose of surveillance in the society. It is one kind 
of disciplinary power exercised through a more detailed, subtle way to monitor our 
mind, our thought, and our lives. 
3.2.4 The relation between power and knowledge 
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In Discipline and Punish, the "knowledge" that Foucault refers to is the knowledge of 
the human sciences. This is the knowledge that is referred to as a tactic of the 
management of human beings. For instance, demography is one kind of knowledge 
concerned with the phenomena of population in modern society. As mentioned above, 
confession, timetable, gesture and panopticon also belong to the corpus of knowledge 
of the human sciences, which shapes docile bodies in the punitive system. They are 
all correlative to the exercise of power. Foucault coins a new term, then, in 
"power/knowledge" as power and knowledge cannot be separated from each other. 
As discipline is both the exercise of power and the employment of knowledge in the 
form of tactics that individuals are subject to. Foucault claims: 
...power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that 
does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.... the subject who 
knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so 
many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical 
transformations. In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces 
a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the 
processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the 
forms and possible domains of knowledge. (pp. 27-28) 
"Symbiosis" perhaps captures the mutual relation between power and knowledge as 
Foucault understood it. We cannot understand power without considering the function 
of knowledge, and can not comprehend knowledge without observing the operation 
of power. Foucault concentrates more on the way power/knowledge is exercised and 
the effect it has than on the meaning of power/knowledge. In Discipline and Punish, 
his main purpose is to investigate these power/knowledge relations and their 
transformative effects in the history of punishment. 
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In an interview with Paul Rabinow, Foucault explains power/knowledge further: 
...power and knowledge are not bound to each other solely through the action of 
interests and ideologies; so the problem is not just to determine how power subordinates 
knowledge and makes it serve its ends or how it superimposes itself on it, imposing 
ideological contents and limitations. No knowledge is formed without a system of 
communication, registration, accumulation, and displacement that is in itself a form of 
power, linked in its existence and its functioning to other forms of power. No power, on 
the other hand, is exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution, or 
restraint of a knowledge. At this level there is not knowledge on one side and society on 
the other, or science and the state, but the basic forms of "power-knowledge". (Foucault, 
1997a, p, 17) 
In Foucault's view, then, the basic element that combines power with knowledge is 
not merely the interest and ideology of rulers that Marxists identify. This does not 
mean Foucault denies the dominant aspect in power and knowledge. Certainly, 
hegemony or ruling ideology is also a result of the manipulation of power. 
Power/knowledge for Foucault, however, ought to be examined in a broader scope, 
which is different from the traditional Marxist account, in which power and 
knowledge is thought of in terms of dominance and oppression. The social processes 
and cultural practices within the exercise of power/knowledge are more significant 
than the consideration of the political and ideological oppression. In Foucauldian 
thinking, the specific manipulation of power (the policy to render bodies docile and 
useful) requires the involvement of knowledge (the technique of facilitating 
subjection and production). Moreover, power defines what can be constituted as 
knowledge, and in what manner knowledge is accumulated, transmitted and 
contributes to judgement. Each society has its own mode of operation of 
power/knowledge. New configurations of power/knowledge constitute new forms of 
society. 
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3.2.5 The nature of power 
Power is camouflaged inside tactics 
Power, from a Foucauldian perspective, is always an enigmatic issue. It is never easy 
to understand because it completes things silently and unconsciously rather than 
ostentatiously and obviously. There is no definite, clear idea about what it is, how it is 
exercised and where it is imposed. Foucault claims that power is not a matter that 
someone can really own: 
Everywhere that power exists, it is being exercised. No one, strictly speaking, has an 
official right to power; and yet it is always exerted in a particular direction, with some 
people on one side and some on the other. It is often difficult to say who holds power in 
a precise sense, but it is easy to see who lacks power. (Foucault, 1977, p. 213) 
Unlike during the classical age in which power was owned by the sovereign, in 
modern society power exists everywhere. It penetrates into each place. Power is 
always anonymous in Foucault's account, and does not belong to anybody. Foucault 
would like to draw our attention to the strategy of power, the exercise of power, 
rather than the ownership of power as in characteristics. Rather than dominant 
ideology or interests, power assures its control and guarantees its use for dominating 
individuals through effective tactics. 
Power is productive 
Foucault criticises the concept of power put forward by Marxists. According to a 
Marxist account, power is regarded as an instrument of class domination in Western 
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capitalism. Foucault argues, however, that "the mechanics of power in themselves 
were never analysed" (Foucault, 1980d, p. 116). In Foucault's view, on the one hand, 
power has its multiple aspects. It is not as univocal as that in a Marxist account. It 
would be wrong to say that power is only an instrument to affect human 
consciousness and to reproduce repressive ideology. It is also insufficient to say that 
power is manipulated only for domination. On the other hand, power has its 
productive aspect that cannot be adequately covered only by the notion of repression. 
Foucault argues: 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do 
you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what 
makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says 
no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, 
produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs 
through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is 
repression. (p. 119) 
In Foucault's view, power does not simply prevent knowledge; instead, no matter 
whether in barracks or schools, power produces a physiological and organic 
knowledge, which constitutes docile bodies within its disciplinary mechanism. As 
Foucault puts it: 
If, on the contrary, power is strong this is because, as we are beginning to realise, it 
produces effects at the level of desire—and also at the level of knowledge. Far from 
preventing knowledge, power produces it. If it has been possible to constitute a 
knowledge of the body, this has been by way of an ensemble of military and educational 
disciplines. It was on the basis of power over the body that a physiological, organic 
knowledge of it became possible. (Foucault, 1980b, p. 59) 
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In Foucault's view, the effect of power should not be put in negative terms once and 
for all. On the contrary, "power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of 
objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of 
him belong to this production" (Foucault, 1991a, p. 194). From the historical context 
of the formation of the disciplinary society that Foucault sets out in Discipline and 
Punish, the tactics of power can be seen to be tied with economic principles. Namely, 
power is exercised at the lowest cost to reach the maximum outcome. Its effect is 
both more efficient and less wasteful. Power links with the output of apparatuses, it 
exists within the mechanism that is employed to meet the demands of production for 
commercial, industrial or political need. This leads Foucault to engage in thinking 
about such questions as: What is the truth behind the process of this production which 
follows the principle of economy and efficiency? What is power/knowledge in this 
truth? And how are individuals governed in this regime of truth? 
Though Foucault sheds light on the productive nature of power, we have to bear in 
mind that the meaning of "production" in Foucauldian account is placed in a broader 
sense. This "production" could be useful or harmful. It could be a matter of the 
`production' of construction; in contrast, it also could be used for the 'production' of 
destruction, as with the army (Foucault, 1980d, p. 161). 
3.3 A brief introduction to The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 
At the beginning of this book, Foucault argues that we must abandon the hypothesis 
that modern Western society developed in an age of increased sexual repression. On 
the contrary, there was a steady multiplication of discourses concerned with sex. As a 
topic of discussion, sex had never disappeared. Instead, "things were said in a 
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different way; it was different people who said them, from different points of view, 
and in order to obtain different results" (Foucault, 1990, p. 27). The same applies to 
the proliferation of the discourse of confession (the confession of the flesh in which 
the desire of human beings was incorporated into discourse) in Western society. 
Confession was an obligation for committed Christians from the seventeenth century 
and had gradually become a part of Western culture. In Foucault's view, after the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the utterance of sex was embedded in the internal 
discourses of institutions, such as schools and hospitals, as the scope of such 
discourses expanded. These institutions could be schools or hospitals. The discussion 
of sex in terms of perversion is another example that Foucault offers to indicate the 
increasing discourses relating to sex. In reality, sex was talked about and was 
recorded continuously within the discourses of medicine, psychiatry, prostitution and 
pornography in modern society, each in turn, he notes, relating to various economic 
interests. 
The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 is an introduction to Foucault's series of three 
studies concerning the historical relationships of power and the discourse of sex. The 
sexual attitude of people is not the main focus of Foucault's account. Instead, he aims 
to explore the language that is spoken about sex; the person who does the speaking; 
and the positions from which they speak; as well as the institutions that prompt 
people to speak about it and that store and distribute the utterances that are said. In 
brief, these indicate what Foucault termed "discursive fact"—through the way in 
which sex is considered in relation to pleasure and desire, it becomes part of the 
discourses of daily lives. Foucault explains his purpose like this: 
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...my main concern will be to locate the forms of power, the channels it takes, and the 
discourses it permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and individual modes of 
behavior, the paths that give it access to the rare or scarcely perceivable form of desire, 
how it penetrates and controls everyday pleasure. (p. 11) 
This power reveals not only refusal, blockage, and invalidation, but also incitement 
and intensification. What Foucault was interested in were "the polymorphous 
techniques of power" (p. 11) and the "will to knowledge" (p. 12) which serve as both 
support and instrument of the truth of sex. He intends to write a history about the 
transformation of discourses, about the production of power, and about the 
propagation of knowledge. 
Foucault attempts to elucidate the objective, the method, the domain to be covered, 
and the periodizations used in his study of the history of sexuality. First, the aim of 
his inquiry is not a "theory" of power, but an "analytics" of power. He attempts to 
"analyze a certain form of knowledge regarding sex, not in terms of repression or law, 
but in terms of power" (p. 92). Here, sexuality is seen in the context of the entire 
technical machinery, and power/knowledge is examined particularly through the 
discourse of sexuality. Rather than the repression of sex, power/knowledge is 
involved in a productive mechanism of the discourse of sexuality. Second, Foucault 
criticises the traditional viewpoint of power which represents law, absolute monarchic 
power, sovereignty and prohibition. He tries to explore a new method of analysing 
power, which is defined by technique, by normalization, and by a different kind of 
control. This method can apply to all levels of analysis and goes beyond the state and 
its apparatus. Third, with regard to the domain of this study, Foucault distinguishes 
four strategic unities deployed in the nineteenth century, which formed specific 
mechanisms of knowledge and of power regarding sex. These four strategic unities 
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are: a hysterization of women's bodies, a pedagogization of children's sex, a 
socialization of procreative behaviour, and a psychiatrization of perverse pleasure 
(pp. 104-105). All of these strategies are practised by means of a focus on the unit of 
the family for controlling the population and maintaining health in a country's 
population. In this context, the human body plays an important role in producing and 
consuming. Lastly, concerning periodization, two ruptures are generally supposed in 
the history of sexuality: first, the strict treatment of sex in the seventeenth century and 
second, the loosening of the grip of prohibitions in the twentieth century. But 
Foucault disagrees with this distinction because it is based on assumptions of the 
mechanism of repression. In his view, there was no age of sexual restriction; there 
was no unitary sexual politics. The deployment of sexuality was not established as a 
principle of limitation by "ruling classes". On the contrary, we might see many 
rigorous techniques were applied first to the politically dominant class, because the 
bourgeoisie were concerned with their health, hygiene, and the heredity of their 
"class" body. Sexuality therefore became an essential issue. 
In the last part of this book, Foucault also inquires into the transformation of power 
mechanisms in Western society. He refers to the concept of "bio-power", which he 
saw as an indispensable element in the process of the development of capitalism. 
History shows us, Foucault argues, that "it was life more than the law that became the 
issue of political struggles (p. 145). 
3.4 Power/Knowledge in The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 
In The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Foucault tries to examine how power is exercised 
over the discourse of sexuality through the economic and political spheres. In this 
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section, with Foucault's analysis of discourses of sexuality I will begin by outlining 
why he denies that there was a repression of sexuality during the Victorian era. I shall 
then expound the relations between power/knowledge and truth in this discourse of 
sexuality. Foucault's critique of a traditional vision of power using the concept of the 
"juridico-discursive" is significant for the clarification of power/knowledge and I 
outline this here. In the final part of this section, several propositions of power, some 
research methods for the analysis of power, and the specific concept of "bio-power" 
in Foucault's account will be shown. 
3.4.1 The hypothesis that there is a Victorian repression of sexuality is wrong 
In Foucault's view, power in the discourse of sexuality is not as repressive as it 
appears on the surface. He supports this claim by identifying that, far from people 
stopping talking about sex after the seventeenth century, people had never stopped 
talking about it. The issue of sexuality appeared across various modalities of 
discourse. I shall, in this section, describe Foucault's perspective regarding this by 
offering several examples of the nature of the developing internal discourse of 
institutions and the idea of perversion. I will also expound the way that 
power/knowledge operates in these discourses of sexuality in Foucault's view. 
The increasing internal discourse of the institution 
We might imagine that inside the secondary schools of the eighteenth century, for 
example, sex was scarcely spoken about. Foucault illustrates, however, that the 
architectural layout, the rules of discipline, and their internal organization meant that 
sex was a constant preoccupation for educators. The distribution of space of 
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classrooms, the arrangement of desks, the plan of courses, and the distribution of 
accommodation, which Foucault calls "the internal discourse of the institution" (pp. 
27-28) all refer to the sexuality of children. According to this analysis, it would be 
wrong to say that pedagogical institutions keep silent on the issues of the sexuality of 
children and adolescents. On the contrary, the discourses of sex have multiplied in 
many ways. For Foucault, it "has established various points of implantation for sex; it 
has coded contents and qualified speakers" (p. 29). Educators, physicians, 
administrators and parents, or even children themselves, are induced to speak of it. 
Take another example offered by Foucault concerning the discourse of sex in families 
(Foucault, 1980d, p. 120): The books for parents related to pedagogy and child 
medicine published in the eighteenth century speak constantly and in every possible 
context of children's sexuality. The discourses found in these books seemed to be 
intended to prevent children from having any problems concerning sexuality. The 
effect, however, was to remind parents that the sexuality of their children was a 
fundamental problem by referring to their educational responsibilities as parents. 
These books also reminded children that their own body or their own sexuality was a 
fundamental problem. Consequently, the discourses of these books forced the 
sexuality and the body of the child under constant parental gaze. Foucault sees this as 
"an intensification of the interventions of power to a multiplication of discourse" 
(Foucault, 1990, p. 30). 
Discourses of sexuality were produced by a whole series of mechanisms operating in 
different places, such as the institutions of medicine and psychiatry, as well as the 
school and the family. They all emerged from a cluster of power relations through 
which various discourses were created to arouse people's awareness of the hidden 
danger of sex. In this way, more discourses of sexuality were generated. For Foucault, 
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from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, the discourse of sexuality expanded 
from the confession of the sins of the flesh to the practices of demography, biology, 
medicine, psychiatry, psychology and pedagogy. It operated in the "wide dispersion 
of devices" (p. 34) in which continuous speaking, listening, recording, transcribing 
and redistributing are invited. People regard sex as a private matter, yet 
simultaneously and ironically discourses with regard to it proliferated. 
The implantation of perversion 
The perversion of sex is another example, given by Foucault, of the proliferation of 
sexual discourses. Perversions are commonly regarded as harmful to the ethics of 
society and are therefore always the target for eradication. During the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, however, activities defined as perversions rapidly expanded. As 
Foucault argues, the bourgeois society "was a society of blatant and fragmented 
perversion" (p. 47). The discourse of the perversion of sex had never been repressed. 
Foucault endeavors to analyze the exercise of power behind this expanding discourse. 
In his view, the discursive explosion of sex started around the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, which underwent two modifications: a centrifugal movement 
with respect to heterosexual monogamy; and increased scrutiny of the sexuality of 
children, mad men, women and criminals. Different kinds of peripheral sexualities 
that were ignored in the past had acquired more attention within this trend. Under the 
mechanisms of control and surveillance, sexuality was put into operation by the field 
of pedagogy or therapeutics. Rather than merely prohibition, power exerted its 
influence on this mechanism using particular tactics. For example, educators, parents 
or doctors treated children's onanism like an epidemic and engaged in eradicating it. 
They searched for every element that might cause the occurrence of onanism; and 
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scrutinized every trap that children fell into. Their presupposition was that all children 
were guilty, and they were going to face danger. This extraordinary effort from adults 
meant that the discourse of sexuality was in constant use, constantly spoken and 
thought about, through which power multiplied its relays and its effects. The 
discourse of onanism, therefore, strengthened itself through the strategies of power. 
The discourse of homosexuality was produced in a similar way. Generally speaking, 
sodomy was a category of forbidden acts and was nothing more than a juridical 
subject. This did not change until the nineteenth century, when the past, case history, 
childhood and the type of life that a homosexual led had become the popular target of 
analysis. The psychological, psychiatric and medical study of homosexuality 
intensified as homosexuality came to be regarded less as a habitual sin than as a part 
of one's nature. For Foucault, the machinery of power that focused on this issue did 
not aim to suppress it, "but rather to give it an analytical, visible, and permanent 
reality" (p. 44). Through the techniques of psychology, psychiatry and medicine, as 
well as the strategy of dissemination (such as many erotic books on the basis of 
commercial profits), power proceeded by means of examination and observation. We 
might suppose that the medical examination, the psychiatric investigation, and 
pedagogical report, and the family controls would say "No" to all this peripheral, 
unproductive sexuality. In reality, however, power promoted discourses of perversion 
by means of the pleasure of its process. Foucault explains it like this: 
The pleasure that comes of exercising a power that questions, monitors, watches, spies, 
searches out, palpates, brings to light; and on the other hand, the pleasure that kindles at 
having to evade this power, flee from it, fool it, or travesty it. The power that lets itself 
be invaded by the pleasure it is pursuing; and opposite it, power asserting itself in the 
pleasure of showing off, scandalizing, or resisting. (p. 45) 
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In the above example, on the one hand, educators and parents enjoyed the pleasure of 
checking on any possibility of a child's onanism. They were satisfied with fulfilling 
their obligation by doing so. On the other hand, children might feel much pleasure if 
they succeeded in using tactics to evade detection from adults. Since the nineteenth 
century, parents and children, adults and adolescents, educators and students, doctors 
and patients, chased each other for pleasure in what Foucault terms "perpetual spirals 
of power and pleasure" (ibid). This is a dynamic procedure in which the discourse of 
sexuality is produced and renewed and through this, therefore, the "devices of sexual 
saturation" (ibid) were constituted. This is a complicated network in which power and 
pleasure are linked together, and reinforced each other in a reflexive relationship. 
Sexuality became part of a mechanism less of inhibition than of incitation and 
multiplication. Sexuality, within the exercise of power, was not excluded and seen as 
outside our life, but influenced our behaviour and thinking. For this reason, Foucault 
denies that power is operated by prohibition and repression as in Marxist account. 
Power, in fact, reveals its influence by increasingly clever tactics. 
3.4.2 Power/knowledge and truth 
There is an indivisible relation between power/knowledge and truth in Foucault's 
account. He claims that: "We are subjected to the production of truth through power 
and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth" (Foucault, 
1980c, p. 93). In The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Foucault mentions the concept of 
"truth" again and again. For him, the production of truth is present in the 
power/knowledge of the discourses of sexuality and is concerned with how the truth 
of sexuality was formed by the exercise of power. Hence, Foucault claims that the 
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discourse of sexuality is the "interplay of truth and sex" (Foucault, 1990, p. 57). Truth 
has a broader meaning here. Even though the discourses apparently present the 
prevention of utterance, as in the discourses of sexuality, they still show one kind of 
truth. 
With reference to the production of truth in the discourses of sexuality, Foucault 
considers that there is a form of power/knowledge, confession, which exists in 
Western society. In his view, confession has been established as one of the main 
rituals for truth-telling in Western societies since the Middle Ages. From the religious 
penance to interrogation in the juridical procedure, confession plays a central role. It 
has permeated deep into every aspect of daily life, in the field of justice, medicine, 
education, family relationships, and sexual relations. People confess their crimes, 
their sins, their thoughts, their desires, and their troubles everywhere and anytime. 
Western society has become a confessing society, or as Foucault comments: 
"Western man has become a confessing animal" (p. 59). This is exemplified in the 
TV program "Big Brother", which began in the Netherlands and is now franchised in 
many countries including the UK. Housemates frequently perform confession in the 
Big Brother House. For Foucault, through confession, the production of truth links 
with relations of power. People become used to exposing themselves, their thoughts 
and feelings, by endless confession through the exercise of power. Sex is always an 
essential issue in confession. Far from being something hidden, however, in 
Foucault's view people continuously talk about issues relating to sex by way of 
confession. In Foucault's analysis truth and sex are interconnected. For instance, a 
Catholic believes their sin would be pardoned after confessing their guilt of sex to the 
priest. This belief is the truth that is established by the manipulation of 
power/knowledge. 
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In capitalist society, the discourse of science has a great influence on the production 
of confession and hence Foucault uses the term the "confessional science" (p. 64). An 
example of how this "confessional science" is constructed is founding the process of 
clinical codification, which has the function of examination and production of 
confession. The data of clinical codification comes from the knowledge elicited 
through interrogation, by means of exacting questionnaire or hypnosis. This 
knowledge is placed under the gaze of scientific observations and therapeutic 
operations by the exercise of power. Sex, then, derives its meaning (or "truth") from 
these medical interventions. In modern society, many institutions such as hospitals, 
schools, and the mass media generate this kind of truth about sex. In these contexts, 
people engage in talking about sex for therapeutic or for educational purposes. 
Through the incitement to confession, the discourses of sexuality, therefore 
proliferate. 
3.4.3 Foucault's Critique of the Juridico-Discursive 
Rather than a "theory" of power, Foucault aims to construct an "analytics" of power 
(p. 82) in the series of The History of Sexuality. This means that a definition of the 
specific domain that is constituted by the relations of power is needed in order to 
make an analysis of power possible. For this purpose, Foucault endeavours to free the 
analytics of power from an inappropriate perspective, which he terms the 
"juridico-discursive" (ibid). Both the hypothesis of repression and the theory of law 
are affected by this perspective of power. According to Foucault, this causes the 
limited interpretation of power and leads to two contrary results: "either to the 
promise of a 'liberation', if power is seen as having only an external hold on desire, 
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or, if it is constitutive of desire itself, to the affirmation: you are always – already 
trapped" (p. 83). Following these limited interpretations, the notion of power is either 
to be regarded as being for the purpose of liberating or empowering people; or, on the 
contrary, to be considered as something that entraps us within the network of power 
and whose repression we cannot escape. Although these two considerations are 
employed frequently, not only in the analysis of the discourse of sexuality, but also in 
the political analysis of power, in Foucault's view, the way in which power operates 
goes far beyond them. 
In order to raise his critique, Foucault indicates several principal features of the 
discourses of sexuality in terms of the "juridico-discursive" (pp. 83-85). The first is: 
"the negative relation". This means that the relation between power and sex is 
absolutely negative. In other words, power can do nothing but say "No" to sex. The 
second is "the insistence of the rule". In this feature, the discourses of sexuality are 
placed in a binary system—such as licit and illicit, permitted and forbidden—by the 
exercise of power. Furthermore, power is seen in terms of its relation to the law. That 
is to say, power is employed as an instrument to control the discourses of sexuality 
through creating a rule of law. The third is "the cycle of prohibition". This means that 
power prompts nothing more than a law of prohibition; it restrains the discourses of 
sexuality. The fourth feature is "the logic of censorship". There are three forms of 
interdiction in this logic: affirming that such a thing is not permitted, preventing it 
from being said, and denying that it exists. The final feature is "the uniformity of the 
apparatus". This "uniformity" means that power acts in a uniform manner in the 
reproductive mechanisms of law, taboo, and censorship. In sum, power is the law that 
shows its effect by creating obedient subjectivity. Foucault criticises this narrow and 
partial perspective of power like this: 
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...this power is poor in resources, sparing of its methods, monotonous in the tactics it 
utilizes, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed always to repeat itself. Further, it 
is a power that only has the force of the negative on its side, a power to say no; in no 
condition to produce, capable only of posting limits, it is basically anti-energy. This is 
the paradox of its effectiveness: it is incapable of doing anything either, except for what 
this power allows it to do. And finally, it is a power whose model is essentially juridical, 
centered on nothing more than the statement of the law and the operation of taboos. All 
the modes of domination, submission, and subjugation are ultimately reduced to an 
effect of obedience. (p. 85) 
Power, in Foucault's view, is not a matter that stands only on a negative side to say 
no, or on a violent side, to oppress people. It is not simply operated by law or taboos. 
If power only operates like that, it would reduce its force, and could not complete 
things effectively and productively. As discussed earlier in this chapter, disciplinary 
power is not exercised in order to say no to human beings. Instead, it drives bodies 
for the purpose of production. Moreover, the discourses of sexuality are not 
monotonous discourses constructed in terms of law or prohibition. In both scientific 
discourse and confessional discourse, people talk about the issues of sex rather than 
being prevented from discussing about them. Power multiplies discourses by various 
strategies rather than being limited by juridical rules. Although the issue of sex is still 
regarded as a taboo in Western society, beneath the surface, however, multiple 
discourses are produced by desire, curiosity or pleasure, as the examples above have 
shown. Prohibition, in a Foucauldian perspective, is merely one tactics of power. 
Though it is obvious and easily seen, it is not the whole thing of power. 
Foucault tries to answer a question: "Why are the deployments of power reduced 
simply to the procedure of the law of interdiction?" (p. 86) Foucault argues that 
"power is tolerable only on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its 
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success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms" (ibid). Indeed, if the 
tactics of power are clearly exposed, it is impossible for people to yield to its 
indication. The strategy of concealment is a good policy to reduce the resistance to 
power and get more control. Foucault also argues that, since the Middle Ages, law 
has been the acceptable mode of the manifestation of power in monarchical systems. 
It is easy to see that the exercise of power was formulated in terms of law, and that 
monarchy was always connected with dominant power in juridico-political discourse. 
In modern society, however, the configuration of power has become more complex. 
This leads Foucault to claim that we need to "cut off the head of the king" (p. 89). 
This is because the new operation of power "is not ensured by right but by technique, 
not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are 
employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus" (ibid). 
That is to say, the repressive, juridical vision of power that is conceived in terms of 
law, prohibition, liberty, and sovereignty should be replaced by another perspective 
of power, which is strategically multiple and effectively productive. Instead of 
liberating us or trapping us, power is placed within a more complicated operation. 
Foucault would, therefore, like to construct an analytics of power of sexuality not 
from the perspective of law and sovereignty. The aim of this analysis is to explore the 
technical machinery of power, rather than the repressive aspect of power. 
3.4.4 Several propositions of power 
In Foucault's view, power should be understood as the multiplicity of force relations 
and as existing in complex strategies. Through the ceaseless process of struggles, 
confrontations and transformations, these force relations form a chain in our society. 
for Foucault, power is everywhere, because "it comes from everywhere" (p. 93), 
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unlimited by time and space. Several propositions relating to this view of power are 
elaborated by Foucault as follows (pp. 94-96): 
First, power is not something that can be acquired, seized, or shared. It is not a 
substance that can be caught, but the mobilization of force. Foucault explains this 
further in one of his lectures (Foucault, 1980c) by criticising two other conceptions of 
power. According to the juridical conception of political power, power is a right 
which as a commodity can be transferred or alienated. In this sense, power is a 
concrete matter that an individual holds and as such this mode of power is seen as a 
contractual exchange. According to the general Marxist concept of power, concerned 
with "an economic functionality of power" (p. 88), power is conceived in terms of the 
role it plays to maintain relations of production and class domination. Its principle 
action is located in the function of the "economy". Foucault argues, however, that 
"power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and that 
it only exists in action" (p. 89). For him, power is not a property or a matter of simply 
maintaining and reproducing economic relations; it is a relation of force. There is no 
absolute and stable power. Power is exercised at innumerable points, in a dynamic 
network in which force is spread. Foucault's analysis is not predominantly concerned, 
then, with who owns power or who lacks power. 
Second, the relations of power are immanent rather than external to other types of 
relationships, such as economic processes, knowledge relationships and sexual 
relations. Power relations show the immediate effects of the division, inequality, and 
disequilibrium that occur in each social relation. In addition, power relations are also 
the internal conditions of these differentiations. For example, the distinction between 
teachers and students is formed by power relations. There are also power relations 
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within this distinction in the educational system, determining the self-identity of 
teachers and students. On the one hand, no social relation can ever be independent of 
power. Power is always there. As Foucault claims, "power is co-extensive with the 
social body" and "relations of power are interwoven with other kinds of relations" 
(Foucault, 1980e, p. 142). On the other hand, power cannot exist alone and without 
other relations. Through unstable, imbalanced and disunited social relations, power 
gains space to exercise. 
Third, power comes from below. In Foucault's account, the exercise of power is 
similar to the physical phenomenon of "capillarity", a term that refers to the upward 
movement of a liquid through an absorbent substance. This means that the analysis of 
power he offers is bottom-up (starting from the local, or individual) rather than 
top-down (from the global, or the state). If this premise is right, monarchical power is 
not the root of power relations because it comes from above, and exercises power 
from the top-down. For Foucault, the relationships of power are generated from the 
basic structure of a social body, for instance in families, limited groups and 
institutions. By means of redistributing, realigning, rearranging and converging loose 
forces within these social units, the effect of power is achieved. 
Fourth, power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective. It is "intentional" 
because, for Foucault, "there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims 
and objectives" (Foucault, 1990, p. 95). Power achieves specific purposes, but this 
does not mean that power is decided by an individual subject. There are no groups or 
headquarters that really control directly the entire network of power in a society. 
Though the logic of tactics in the mechanism of power is decipherable, there is no 
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way to prove who invokes these tactics. Hence, power relations are nonsubjective in 
Foucault's view. 
Finally, "where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, 
this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (p. 95). 
According to this point, resistance exists within the relations of power. But it is a 
misunderstanding to say that because people exist in the entrapment of power, they 
need the action of resistance to break out of this dominant situation. It would also be 
wrong to say that resistance always stands in the passive position, without success. 
For Foucault, resistance is not the matter that is destined for failure. It is the 
"irreducible opposite" (ibid) in relations of power. The distribution of the force of 
resistance, as power, is constituted in an irregular, dispersive way. The knots of 
resistance appear at different times, exist across different spaces, and with varied 
densities. They may appear at certain moments in life, arouse certain types of 
behaviour, or even mobilize certain groups. Resistance is a part of the relations of 
power. It exists everywhere in the network of power, and plays the role of adversary, 
target, support or handle. In Foucault's view, there is no single great point of revolt or 
rebellion. The resistance is rooted in multiple points and shows its character of 
plurality. Though these points are mobile and transitory, they could make a 
tremendous revolution possible. 
3.4.5 Four principles of Foucault's analysis of power 
Foucault claims that we should analyze the mechanisms of power in the sphere of 
force relations. In this way political thought with respect to power can be liberated 
from the dominant thinking of "Law-and-Sovereign" as outlined above. I shall 
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discuss here Foucault's suggestions of four possible rules to analyze power in terms 
of force relations (pp. 98-102). These rules are laid out in relation to sexuality and its 
discourses. 
Rule of Immanence 
Foucault considers that sexuality is not a matter that should be considered to be free 
from power or knowledge. Instead, power/knowledge is immanent in and cannot be 
separated from the discourses of sexuality. Sexuality is historically involved in the 
techniques of knowledge and the production of discourse. Foucault states that: 
"between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority" (p. 
98), meaning that no discourse can be separated from the power/knowledge network. 
Power/knowledge is everywhere and is already there. All social relations, in 
Foucault's view, are incorporated into the power/knowledge network. Foucault 
suggests that the study of sexuality can start from the "local centres" of 
power/knowledge. A local centre can be seen as a discursive centre or a centre of 
practice. For example, the child was an obvious local centre of focused attention. 
Since the eighteenth century, his cradle, his bed, or his room were watched 
continuously by parents, nurses, servants, educators and doctors. This way of 
focusing on local centres shows a different approach from looking at power in the 
global social structure, as in Marxist thinking. 
Rules of Continual Variations 
Rather than assuming an inactive condition in local centres, Foucault concentrates on 
the development and transformation therein. In Foucault's view, relations of 
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power/knowledge are not static forms of distribution; instead, they are "matrices of 
transformations" (p. 99). He is interested in exploring the dynamic transformation 
within power/knowledge matrices and its continuous evolvement. This dynamic 
transformation, in The History of Sexuality, Vol.], is the historical development, the 
constant modification and the continual shift of the discourses of sexuality. During 
the developmental process, in each epoch, contingent events occur and change 
people's perspectives on sexuality. These contingent events that Foucault seeks to 
examine are breaking points that show the variations in discourses, and launch 
another new historical stage of thinking about sexuality. 
Rule of Double Conditioning 
For Foucault, in the local centre, the pattern of transformation cannot function 
without entering into an over-all strategy. And conversely, the strategy cannot 
achieve comprehensive effects without tenuous relations serving as its anchor point in 
local centres. The "double conditioning" Foucault refers to implies an inseparable 
relation between strategies and local centres. By means of this double conditioning, 
power/knowledge can be exercised. In other words, relations in local centres cannot 
be seen as subordinated relations. Rather, these relations are constituted by multiple 
strategies or tactics in power mechanisms. In the organization of the family, for 
example, that Foucault discusses, the father is not the "representative" of the 
sovereign or the state; and the latter is also not the projection of the father. The family 
does not duplicate society, but it provides it with its own power relations to support 
the "maneuvers" employed for the Malthusian control of the birthrate, for the 
adjustment of population and for the medicalization and psychiatrization of sex (p. 
100). 
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Rule of the Tactical Polyvalence of Discourses 
Power/knowledge and discourse are not separable from each other. For Foucault, the 
relations of power cannot be established, consolidated or implemented without the 
production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse (Foucault, 1980c, 
p. 93). Discourse is the place where power and knowledge link. In Foucault's account, 
discourse is regarded as "a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function 
is neither uniform nor stable" (Foucault, 1990, p. 100). That is to say, multiplicity is 
the nature of discourses. Each discourse has its own tactics to be exercised and these 
tactics are adaptive according to historical situation. The distributions between 
different discourses and their effects are what Foucault concentrates on. He writes: 
It is this distribution that we must reconstruct, with the things said and those concealed, 
the enunciations required and those forbidden, that it comprises; with the variants and 
different effects—according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional 
context in which he happens to be situated—that it implies; and with the shifts and 
reutilizations of identical formulas for contrary objectives that it also includes. (ibid) 
To be more precise, for the discourse of sexuality, we may inquire what kind of 
words relating to sex are said, and what remains unsaid; what kind of sexual practice 
is permitted, and what is prohibited? We also need to examine different effects of 
varied ways of talking about sex, varied positions of power, and varied institutional 
contexts in which discourses about sex are located. The central concern of these 
inquiries is not historical facts, but the way that historical facts are established by 
different strategies of power in discourses. In addition, Foucault's concern is not how 
discourses of sex are subservient to power or how they work against it. There is a 
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more complicated process at work in discourses of sex determining how the discourse 
can be both an instrument and an effect of power, and also how it is formed as 
resistance to an opposing strategy. For Foucault, the relationship between discourse 
and power is that "discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also 
undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it." (p. 
101) For instance, silence is a discourse that enables different strategies. It could be a 
strategy for anchoring and reinforcing the prohibitions of power; but on the contrary, 
it could also be a strategy for loosening the control of power. It becomes clear, then, 
that discourse has multiple compositions and might incorporate various strategies. 
Foucault also discusses some methodological precautions regarding the analysis of 
power in one of his lectures (Foucault, 1980c, 96-102). First, the analysis should not 
concern itself with the regulated and legitimate forms of power. By contrast, it should 
be concerned with power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those 
points where it becomes capillary. This means that we need to examine how power 
invests in its more regional and local institutions, as "local centers", as discussed 
above. Second, the analysis should not concern itself with power at the level of 
conscious intention or decision only. That is to say, do not ask the questions such as 
"Who has power and what has he in mind?" or "What is the aim of someone who 
possesses power?", but ask instead "how things work at the level of ongoing 
subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which 
subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours" (p. 97). This question 
is essential for preventing oneself from the subjugation of one's subject. Third, power 
is not to be taken as the domination of one individual over others, or of one group or 
class over others. Power must be analyzed as something that circulates in a social 
chain. It is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. Individuals are 
104 
the vehicles of the chain of power. An individual is an effect of power, and at the 
same time, he or she is the element of the articulation of power. In other words, 
individuals should not be observed as a fixed point, but as active within the dynamic 
procedures of power. Their interaction with power is significant. Fouth, 
methodological precaution is that one must conduct "an ascending analysis of power" 
(p. 99), which departs from its infinitesimal mechanisms, and sees how power has 
been invested, utilized, transformed, displaced and extended in these mechanisms. 
With regard to the repression and interdiction of sexuality, for example, it is 
necessary to identify the agents involved (parents, the wider family, doctors, etc.) and 
to see how these mechanisms of power become economically advantageous and 
politically useful. We then can see how these mechanisms come to be effectively 
incorporated into the social whole. 
In the fifth methodological precaution, Foucault offers he does not deny that it is 
possible to connect the mechanism of power with ideological production. However, 
he claims: 
I do not believe that what has taken place can be said to be ideological. It is both much 
more and much less than ideology. It is the production of effective instruments for the 
formation and accumulation of knowledge—methods of observation, techniques of 
registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control. All this 
means that power, when it is exercised through these subtle mechanisms, cannot but 
evolve, organise and put into circulation a knowledge, or rather apparatuses of 
knowledge, which are not ideological constructs. (Foucault, 1980c, p. 99) 
Ideology, for Foucault, could be one element of the mechanism of power, but it is not 
a necessary imperative in this mechanism. Instead, the apparatuses of "knowledge" 
should be seen as the foundation of the exercise of power. Regarding education, 
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Foucault would disagree with the idea that all educational practices are constituted by 
ideology, or that nothing regarding education is ideologically free. We may consider 
this by an example. When a teacher thinks about the question of how to organize a 
useful timetable for students, or how to arrange space in a classroom, this is related to 
what Foucault calls "knowledge". Rather than ideology, this is the knowledge that 
enables the exercise of power; it enables effective teaching and effective learning. It 
would be arbitrary to analyze all educational discourses in terms of ideological vision. 
3.4.6 Bio-power 
"Bio-power" is a notion that Foucault introduces during the examination of the 
historical development of Western society. A long time ago, the sovereign power of 
the king gave the monarch the right to decide between the life and death of subjects. 
Power in this circumstance was a right of seizure; it seized the life in order to 
suppress it. Since the classical age, however, the mechanisms of power have 
undergone a transformation. Rather than hindrance, destruction and submission, 
power has become a force for organization, control, incitement, monitoring and 
growth. The right of the sovereign was manifested as the reverse of the right of social 
body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Power, in this respect, "is situated and 
exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of 
population" (Foucault, 1990, p. 137). For instance, wars were no longer fought in the 
name of defending the sovereign. Instead, they came to be seen in the context of the 
subsistence of a race or a country. Slaughter or massacre was carried out in their 
name. 
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In the seventeenth century, this power over life evolved in two basic forms. The first 
focused on the body as a machine, in which human bodies were integrated into the 
systems of economic control. It was "ensured by the procedures of power that 
characterized the disciplines: an anatomo-politics of the human body" (p. 139). In 
Discipline and Punish Foucault elaborates this kind of disciplinary power. The 
second form was established later. It focused on the species body, on the body 
imbued with the mechanics of life on the basis of the biological processes, such as 
propagation, health, life expectancy and longevity. Political and social supervision, in 
this sense, worked through "an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a 
biopolitics of the population" (p. 139). It is this idea of power that Foucault develops 
in The History of Sexuality. These two forms were constituted by disciplines of the 
body and by regulations of the population. Their purpose was no longer to kill, but to 
invest life. 
During the classical period, diverse techniques were developed rapidly in social 
institutions such as schools or barracks, for achieving the subjugation of bodies and 
the control of populations. An era of "bio-power" was thus beginning. The life of the 
human species became inscribed into the order of knowledge and power, and into the 
sphere of political techniques. Historically, bio-power was an indispensable element 
in the development of capitalism due to the need to insert human bodies into the 
machinery of production and the importance of the examination of populations for 
economic processes. The accumulation of human resources and therefore of capital, 
the expansion of productive force, and the differential allocation of profit, became 
possible through the exercise of bio-power. Bio-power differs from the traditional 
concept of power in the judicial mechanism; which serves and promotes effects of 
oppression, domination, exclusion and rejection. Bio-power is a positive, productive 
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power to ensure the continuing existence of a race, of each citizen, or of human life 
more generally. 
Following this elucidation of the notion of power /knowledge as found in Foucault's 
Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1. I now turn to one of 
Foucault's remarkable essays regarding power/knowledge "The subject and power" 
(Foucault, 1983). Here, Foucault explains why he intends to study the concept of 
power and power relations. He shows us the way that power is exercised, and the way 
he analyzes power relations 
3.5 The subject and power 
Foucault claims that the goal of his work has not been to analyze the phenomena of 
power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. Instead, his objective has 
been "to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human 
beings are made subjects" (p. 208). In other words, rather than the theory or the 
methodology of power, he is concerned with the development of human subjectivity 
in the particular historical context. The issue that he concentrates on is not power, but 
the self, or the way that subjects have been governed. 
3.5.1 Why study power? 
Since Foucault's purpose is to explore the way that subjectivity is constituted, why 
does he attempt to explore the idea of power? He claims that the reason is that, so far, 
the tools for the study of power relations are still insufficient. First, though, it is 
necessary to clarify the dimensions of this definition of power Foucault uses in 
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studying the objectivizing of the subject. Foucault does not mean that we need a 
theory of power, but that we need an ongoing conceptualization, a constant checking 
of power. This relates to the need for an examination of the historical conditions that 
motivate our conceptualization. That is, "a historical awareness of our present 
circumstance" (p. 209) is needed. Second, it is also important to grasp the type of 
reality with which we are dealing. For example, fascism and Stalinism are two 
pathological forms of the reality of power, which indeed changed the ideas and the 
devices of our political rationality. 
Foucault claims that "what we need is a new economy of power relations" (p. 210). 
This is "economy" in both a theoretical and practical sense. To make this new 
economy of power relations clear, Foucault intends to explore the links between 
rationalization and power. He does not take the rationalization of society or of culture 
as a whole, however, instead, focussing on it as a process in specific fields. Each of 
these refers to a fundamental experience, such as crime, illness, madness or sexuality. 
For Foucault, it is better to analyze specific rationalities rather than to invoke the 
process of rationalization in general. In addition, Foucault also suggests another way 
to proceed towards a new economy of power relations: "It consists of taking the 
forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point" (p. 211). This 
is a way of "analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies" (ibid), 
rather than in terms of its internal rationality. Foucault offers an example of this. If 
we want to find out what our society means by sanity, the issues around insanity 
should also be investigated. In the same way, power relations can be examined by a 
series of oppositions such as: the power of men over women, of parents over children, 
of psychiatry over the mentally ill, or of administration over the ways people live 
(ibid). 
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These oppositions, or power relations, for Foucault, have several features in common 
(pp. 211-212). First, they are "transversal" struggles. Namely, they are not limited to 
one country or confined within a particular political or economic form of government. 
Second, the aims of these struggles are power effects as such. For instance, the 
medical profession is criticized not because its concern is profit-making, but because 
it exercises an unlimited power over people's bodies, health and death. Third, they 
are "immediate" struggles. People do not fight against the chief enemy, but fight 
against the immediate enemy. Instead of struggling against specific social class or 
government, this is an anarchistic struggle. Fourth, these struggles involve 
questioning the status of the individual. In Foucault's view, however, these struggles 
are not exactly directed towards individuals or against them, but are against the 
"government of individualization". Fifth, they are an opposition to effects of power, 
which are linked with privileges of knowledge. What is questioned is the ways in 
which knowledge circulates and functions, and the relations of these ways to power. 
Foucault calls it "the regime du savoir" (p. 212). Sixth and finally, all of these 
struggles arouse a significant question: "Who are we?". These struggles accompany a 
refusal of economic and ideological state violence, which ignore who we are, and also 
a refusal of a scientific or administrative inquisition, which determines who one is. In 
sum, the main target of these struggles, for Foucault, is not a group, a class, or an 
institution of power, but a technique, a form of power. This is a form of power that 
"makes individuals subjects" (ibid). "Subject" carries two meanings here: one refers 
to being subject to someone else by control and dependence; the other refers to the 
relation to one's own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both of them 
associate with a form of power, which subjugates and makes subject to. 
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Foucault adds that, generally speaking, there are three types of struggle (ibid): against 
forms of domination (ethic, social, and religious); against forms of exploitation, 
which separate individuals from what they produce; and against the individuals 
having no right to decide what they themselves are (such as struggles against the 
forms of subjection or submission). These three modes of struggles could operate 
together or in isolation. Nowadays, in Foucault's view, the struggle against forms of 
subjection (against the submission of subjectivity) is becoming more and more 
important. It is because a new political structure, a new form of power, namely state 
power, has been continuously developed. This power of the state is both an 
individualizing and a totalizing form of power. Its political structure includes both 
individualization techniques and totalization procedures through which our 
subjectivity might be subjugated. Pastoral power plays an important role in the 
process of the development of the modern state. It is a role of dominant power, which 
Foucault stresses. I shall show this below. 
3.5.2 Pastoral power 
In the modern Western state, not only a new political perspective had been shaped, 
but also an old power technique had been operated in it on the basis of Christian 
institutions. This old power technique is what Foucault terms "pastoral power". 
Foucault explains this traditional pastoral power like this (p. 214) First, its ultimate 
aim is to assure individual salvation in the next world. Second, not only exercising a 
form of power for command; the pastors also prepare to sacrifice individual life itself 
for the life and salvation of the flock. Third, not only is the whole community 
concerned with pastoral power, but also each individual in particular for the duration 
of his life. Finally, pastoral power implies a knowledge of an individual's conscience 
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and an ability to direct it. It cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of 
people's minds, without exploring their souls, and without being able to elicit their 
innermost secrets. To sum up, this form of power is oriented toward salvation and is 
therefore different from general political power and sovereignty. For Foucault, it also 
connects with the production of truth, that of the individual himself. 
Foucault considers that, as a modern matrix of individualization, the exercise of the 
state can be regarded as a new form of pastoral power. He describes this new form of 
power as follows (p. 215). First, there is a change in its objective. Foucault argues 
that "it was no longer a question of leading people to their salvation in the next world, 
but rather ensuring it in this world" (ibid). The meaning of "salvation" had also been 
changed to become more "worldly" (ibid). Salvation functioned to ensure the health, 
well-being and security of people in this current world. Second, the number of 
officials (or agents) of pastoral power had been increased. Pastoral power began to be 
exercised by a state apparatus, or by public institutions such as the police, the 
hospitals, or schools. It was not only exercised in public institutions, its agents had 
also been expanded to private institutions such as private organisations, welfare 
societies, benefactors, or philanthropists. Even the family had been mobilized to take 
on pastoral functions. Lastly, a new knowledge of human beings had been developed 
in this context. That knowledge played two roles in its own development: on the one 
hand, it was concerned with population and was globalizing, normalizing and 
quantitative; on the other hand, it was concerned with the individual and was 
analytical and differentiating. This new form of "pastoral power" is, I believe, 
consistent with the idea of "bio-power" that Foucault refers to in The History of 
Sexuality, Vol. 1. Power, in the modern state, was no longer operated only for 
oppression, but also for the investment of life and existence. 
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In relation to his analysis of the development of pastoral power, Foucault reconsiders 
Kant's concern with Enlightenment and repeats his questions: "What are we?" Rather 
than the Cartesian question "Who am I?" within which the "I" is a universal and 
unhistorical subject, "What are we?" in Foucault's inquiry refers to both ourselves 
and our present. Foucault elaborates the question like this: 
...the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate 
the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both 
from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state. We 
have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of 
individuality which as been imposed on us for several centuries. (p. 216) 
Here, Foucault highlights his point that "the target nowadays is not to discover what 
we are, but to refuse what we are" (ibid). To be more precise, he regards the 
exploration of "what we are" as the way to find out how historical events affect the 
formation of modern rationality (such as the application of normalization, 
examination, surveillance, and the new form of pastoral power), and how modern 
rationality constitutes what we are and shapes our subjectivity at present in the 
process of state development. Through the analysis of both ourselves and our present, 
he endeavours to contribute to new forms of subjectivity in which human beings can 
liberate themselves not only from the manipulation of state apparatus, but also from 
the individualizing process within this manipulation. In other words, through the 
refusal of the kind of individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries, 
a new form of subjectivity becomes possible. 
3.5.3 How is power exercised? 
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In Foucault's question: "How is power exercised?", this "how" includes both "By 
what means is it exercised" and "What happens when individuals exert power over 
others?" (p.217). In the study of power, Foucault claims, it is better to ask the 
question "What happens?" than to ask the questions "What is power?" or "Where 
does power come from?". This "What happens?" means to attempt a critical 
investigation into the theme of power. For Foucault, to best comprehend the 
disciplining of societies in Europe since the eighteen century is not to conclude that 
individuals had become more obedient in this system, or that they it functioned 
through the construction of barracks, schools, or prisons. It should, instead, be 
considered that "an increasingly better invigilated process of adjustment has been 
sought after—more and more rational and economic—between productive activities, 
resources of communication, and the play of power relations" (p. 219). By analysing 
"How?" in relation to the theme of power in this context critically shifts a 
fundamental supposition about power. The object of this analysis is not power itself, 
but power relations, which Foucault attempts to grasp in terms of the diversity of their 
logical sequence, their abilities, and their interrelationships. 
For understanding power relations, Foucault generalizes three elements that constitute 
the specific nature of power, action, conduct and freedom. I describe these below (p. 
219-222): 
Action 
Not merely a relationship between individual and collective, the exercise of power is 
a way in which "certain actions modify others" (p. 219). For Foucault, "power exists 
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only when it is put into action" (ibid). The nature of power is not a renunciation of 
freedom, nor is it a transference of rights. A relationship of power is a mode of action 
that does not act immediately and directly on others. Rather, it is an action upon an 
action, of a set of actions upon other actions, in existing actions or on those which 
may arise in the present or the future (p. 220). The exercise of power occurs in a 
structure of actions that produces other possible actions. It incites, induces, seduces 
them; makes them become easier or more difficult. Consensus and violence in 
Foucault's view do not constitute the principle or the basic nature of power. They are 
merely the instruments or the results of power. 
Conduct 
Foucault uses the term "conduct" to specify power relations. It is at the same time 
both to "lead" others and a way of behaving within a more or less open field of 
possibilities (pp. 220-221). Basically, the exercise of power guides the possibility of 
conduct and puts the possible outcome in order. This relates also to Foucault's 
inquiry into government. Foucault defines the meaning of "government" like this: 
"Government did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; 
rather it designated all the ways in which the conduct of individuals or of groups 
might be directed" (p. 221). In other words, it is not only political or economic 
subjection, but also the modes of action of individuals or groups, that are considered 
and calculated in order to act upon the possibilities of action or of other people. To 
govern, in this sense, means to structure the possible field of action of others. 
Freedom 
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Freedom, in Foucault's consideration, is an important element in the exercise of 
power. We might think that power is exercised only over the subjugated subject. 
Foucault, however, claims that "power is exercised only over free subjects, and only 
insofar as they are free" (ibid). He denies that slavery is a power relationship. In his 
view, power is exercised in the places where individual or collective subjects are 
presented with a field of possibilities for their behaviour and reactions. Rather than 
being mutually exclusive, power and freedom constitutes a more complicated 
interplay. For instance, freedom is the foundation of the occurrence of resistance. For 
Foucault, the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom are central to 
and coexist within the power relationship. According to this, "agonism" is an 
appropriate term to express power relations. Agonism, in Foucault's definition, means 
"a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle" (p. 222). 
Rather than a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides, permanent 
provocation is the real situation of agonism. 
3.5.4 The way to analyze power relationships 
Foucault suggests that we should analyze institutions from the standpoint of power 
relations, rather than vice versa, and that the fundamental point of anchorage of these 
relationships must to be found outside the institution. Foucault understands a specific 
institution through power relations and through the circumstances encompassing 
these power relations. The specific institution is one of Foucault's so-called "local 
centres" discussed earlier. Power relations, in Foucault's view, are diffused in social 
networks, rather than being "reconstituted 'above' society as a supplementary 
structure whose radical effacement one could perhaps dream of (ibid). Power is 
everywhere; there cannot be a society without power relations. What Foucault does 
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not intend to say that the establishment of power relations is necessary, nor that 
power constitutes a fatality at the heart of societies that cannot be undermined. 
Instead, he would like to implement a political task that through analysis and 
elaboration, brings into question "power relations and the agonism' between power 
relations and the intransitivity of freedom" (p. 223). The political task is to explore 
the possibility of freedom in subjectivity by way of agonism between power relations. 
Following this idea, he presents several areas of concern in establishing these 
analyses of power relations (p. 223): 
The first relates to the system of differentiations that permits one to act upon the 
actions of others. The relationship of power is exercised in the system of 
differentiations which are its conditions and its results. This differentiation could be 
determined by the law or by traditional privilege, such as, linguistic or cultural 
differences. The second concerns the types of objectives pursued by those who act 
upon the actions of others, for instance, the maintenance of privileges, and the 
accumulation of profits. The third is the means of bringing power relations into being. 
Specifically, the threat of arms and economic disparities are examples of these means. 
The fourth is forms of institutionalization. These forms may link to traditional 
predispositions, legal structures, custom, or fashion. They have their own regulations, 
hierarchical structures, and specific loci. They also have complex systems within 
multiple apparatuses, such as in the case of states. The last one concerns the degree of 
rationalization. This may be the possibility in relation to the effectiveness of the 
instruments and the certainty of the results. Or it could be in proportion to the 
possible cost, based on economic consideration. In each case, the operation of power 
is elaborated, transformed and organized, and it is related to the adjustable processes. 
In the contemporary Western societies, in Foucault's view, the state becomes an 
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important apparatus where power is exercised. Not because power relations derive 
from the state, but because that they have come increasingly under state control. That 
is, power relations are elaborated, rationalized and centralized in the form of state 
institutions. 
In this chapter, I have revealed the central tenets of power/knowledge in Foucault's 
account through his own work. Next, in Chapter Four, I will draw on some of 
Foucault's secondary literature in terms of this concept in order to gain further 
interpretation of it. 
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Chapter 4 Secondary literature relating to Foucault's 
concept of power/knowledge 
Power/knowledge is a long-term project in Foucault's work. According to Olssen 
(2006, p. 23), the source of the idea of power/knowledge can be seen in The Order of 
Things, in which the production of knowledge in social structure is related to 
technologies of power. Foucault examines the way that different human sciences 
interact with social structure, within which power and knowledge are produced. This 
theoretical interest informs a critique of the contemporary human sciences. This 
account then became the source for what developed in Foucault's genealogical 
inquiry. For Olssen, Foucault's concern starts from the constitution of discourses in 
terms of legitimate science; this then turns to connect to the micro-physics of power. 
Foucault seldom refers to the idea of power in his earlier work. Later, however, he 
focuses on "how human populations became objects of positive knowledge and to 
explore the bio-medical roots of modern knowledge" (ibid). Bio-power is a power in 
this respect that is identified as the increasing ordering and regulation of all realms of 
society under the requirement of improving welfare of individuals and population. 
Knowledge, under these circumstances, is the technique that regulates populations by 
discipline. The link between discipline and power, in Olssen's view, is offered to 
build on his idea of the relations of power and truth (p. 24). Truth, which is produced 
in power/knowledge strategies in a given society, is political in nature. This 
epistemological issue, in Foucault's view, affects the ontology of the self within the 
power/knowledge nexus. Self, therefore, is an important target in the operation of 
power/knowledge because it is constituted institutionally by its mechanisms. This is a 
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rough outline of how Foucault's concept of power/knowledge developed, and is the 
context of the interpretations of this idea that I shall elaborate later. 
This chapter is concerned with secondary literature concerning Foucault that refers to 
the idea of power/knowledge. I shall choose several notable interpretations of 
power/knowledge, and shed light on their individual viewpoints in preparation for 
next chapter, which offers a critique of curriculum theorists' use of Foucault. These 
interpretations are provided by Dreyfus and Rabinow, Smart, Gordon, Masschelein, 
Butler, Flynn and Deleuze, which highlight different aspects of Foucault's concept of 
power/knowledge. After reading these interpretations, the concept of 
power/knowledge in my account has been changed, I shall describe this change at the 
end of this chapter. 
4.1 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow 
In this section, I shall focus on the interpretation of Foucault offered by Dreyfus and 
Rabinow. First, for Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault successfully develops a new 
method, which entails a type of archaeological analysis influenced by structuralism, 
and an interpretive dimension that is related to hermeneutic perspectives in terms of 
its concern for cultural practices. They term this method "interpretive analytics". 
Second, Dreyfus and Rabinow claim that the issue of power is central to Foucault's 
diagnosis of our current situation. The concept of power, in their view, remains 
elusive but is important in Foucault's account. I will give a more explicit description 
of their ideas concerning this below. The third point concerns Foucault's response, 
following Kant to the question "What is Enlightenment?". I shall, then, sketch out 
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Dreyfus and Rabinow's interpretation of the concept of maturity that is investigated 
within Foucault's idea of Enlightenment. 
4.1.1 Foucault's method 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault states that he is interested in writing "the history 
of the present" rather than writing "a history of the past in terms of the present". 
Dreyfus and Rabinow explain what Foucault means by "the history of the present". 
There are two fallacies in historical analysis (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 118), 
they claim. One is "presentism" in which present interests, institutions, and politics 
are read back into history for the discovery of their current significance. In this sense, 
the historian takes a model from the present and tries to explore its parallel meaning 
in the past. That is the writing of the history of the past in terms of the present. One 
such example is the writing of the history of Medieval Christianity in terms of 
individual psychology with which history offers an instruction to current individual 
psychology. The other fallacy is "finalism". This history finds the core of the present 
based on the remote past, and shows the finalized necessity of the development from 
the past to the present. Everything happened in this march forward and is situated by 
the final goal of a history that suggests the final destination of human beings. For 
Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault's approach to "writing the history of the present", 
however, starts from a diagnosis of the current situation. It is located in the acute 
manifestations of a "meticulous ritual of power" or "political technology of the body" 
(p. 119) to see where it arose and how it took place. The target that Foucault tries to 
explore is neither a simple unity of meaning nor a changeless significance. Instead, he 
intends to "construct a mode of analysis of those cultural practices in our culture 
which have been instrumental in forming the modern individual as both object and 
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subject" (p. 120). Taking the example of confession for example, Foucault never tries 
to give us the true history of confession in different epochs. Rather, he isolates the 
central components of political technology nowadays by tracing them back in time, to 
show that confession is a vital component of modern power. He therefore provides "a 
history of the present". Dreyfus and Rabinow find that the topics that Foucault 
chooses are all peripheral and relatively minor in history. This is because they are 
enmeshed within forms of power/knowledge in cultural practices to some degree. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow call the method that Foucault applies "interpretive analytics" 
(p. 122). They explain, this "analytic" as drawing on both Kant's transcendental 
analytics in the problematization of Enlightenement and Heidegger's pursuance of a 
transcendental ground in knowing the subject by exploring the ahistorical and 
cross-cultural existential preconditions of human self-understanding. Both of them 
intend to provide a universal theory and to explain the sources of the concepts. In the 
view of Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault accepts their project but rejects the aims of 
finding a universal foundation. They consider that analytics today "must find a way 
of taking seriously the problems and conceptual tools of the past, but not the solutions 
and conclusions based on them" (p. 122). Furthermore, their use of "interpretation" 
follows both Nietzsche's concept of genealogy and the thinking of Heideggerian 
hermeneutics. Nietzsche's genealogy shows that we are nothing but our history in the 
making. In Heidegger's argument, we must read our history in terms of our current 
practices; otherwise, genealogy is only an arbitrary interpretation. For Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, Foucault's interpretation, however, is based not in seeking the true and 
deepest meaning underneath people's surface behaviour, as it is in hermeneutics. 
Instead, the deeper meaning that Foucault intends to investigate is something that can 
lead the individual to see deeper meanings masked by everyday behaviour (p. 124). In 
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other words, Foucault's concern with the deeper meaning is not what truth is, but how 
truth is constituted by human everyday behaviour. This, in Dreyfus and Rabinow's 
view, is the place where Foucault turns to what they refer to as interpretation, and 
also creates more possibility for the actor to resist the current practices of dominance. 
Rather than searching for the everyday meanings shared by actors, or revealing the 
intrinsic meaning of practices, Foucault's interpretive understanding, for Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, can be obtained by someone who not only shares the actor's involvement, 
but also "distances himself from it" (ibid). This keeping distance is undertaken 
through an analysis of the history of current cultural practices. Dreyfus and Rabinow 
argue that this is the reason why Foucault's method is not hermeneutic. For them, 
Foucault's interpretive analytic is neither a strict research method nor a general theory, 
but a way of looking at our current situation. They expound Foucault's method 
further: 
It is Foucault's unique combination of genealogy and archaeology that enables him to go 
beyond theory and hermeneutics and yet to take problems seriously. The practitioner of 
interpretive analytics realizes that he himself is produced by what he is studying; 
consequently he can never stand outside it. The genealogist sees that cultural practices 
are more basic than discursive formations (or any theory) and that the seriousness of 
these discourses can only be understood as part of a society's ongoing history. The 
archaeological steer back that Foucault takes in order to see the strangeness of our 
society's practices no longer considers these practices meaningless. (pp. 124-125) 
In Dreyfus and Rabinow's interpretation, interpretive analytics reveals that the human 
subject is constituted within the network of history and cultural practices. Foucault's 
objective is to examine how these practices make us what we are, in order to achieve 
distance from that constitution of our subjectivity. 
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4.1.2 The nature of power 
Dreyfus and Rabinow discuss several of Foucault's propositions regarding power in 
their work (pp. 185-187). The first is that power relations are "nonegalitarian and 
mobile". For them, political technologies throughout the social body set up 
nonegalitarian, asymmetrical power relations. The "mobile" in Foucault's account 
implies an analytics of power, rather than a theory of power. Because power relations 
are mobile, the task for the analysis of power is to identify how it operates. In 
Dreyfus and Rabinow's view, Foucault's aim is to escape from the representation of 
power as law (that is, in the juridical sense as discussed in the previous chapter) by 
drawing attention to the mobilization of power. In this sense, the understanding of 
power is taken "to the level of the micropractices" (p. 185), in its materiality, and in 
its day to day operation. The second aspect Dreyfus and Rabinow draw attention to is 
that power is productive. In their interpretation, Foucault highlights this idea in order 
to argue that power cannot be restricted to political institutions. This productive 
power is multidirectional, "operating from the top down and also from the bottom up" 
(ibid). Rather than being identified with particular institutions, the technologies of 
power only find a localization within specific institutions. The disciplinary 
technology is effective while it establishes to links between institutional settings. 
Power is productive in this respect. Dreyfus and Rabinow argue, however, that power 
and institutions are not identical, neither is their relationships merely a pasted-on, 
superstructural detail (ibid). For example, the school, therefore, cannot be reduced to 
its disciplinary function. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow's third point concerns the relationships of power to domination. 
Althought Foucault is saying that we are all enmeshed in power, "he is not suggesting 
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that there is no domination" (ibid). For Dreyfus and Rabinow, power does not control 
in any simple sense, only applied by those at the top to those at the bottom. The 
characteristic of power is in fact more multiple than that and is operated with actual 
material functioning. In Dreyfus and Rabinow's view, "power is exercised upon the 
dominant as well as on the dominated; there is a process of self-formation or 
autocolonization involved" (p. 186). This self-formation or self-constitution is an 
important aspect in power relations, but it cannot be considered in terms of a 
simplistic understanding of power relations, such as class domination. 
The fourth proposition that they draw attention to is that power is "intentional and 
non-subjective". This raises the difficulty of how to talk about intentionality without a 
subject, a strategy without a strategist? For Dreyfus and Rabinow, the answer can be 
found in the practices themselves. In practices, there is a push for achieving a 
strategic objective, but no one is pushing. This is because, at the level of the practices, 
there is no inherent logic of stability, but "there is a directionality produced from 
petty calculations, clashes of wills, meshing of minor interests" (p. 188). This 
directionality, in Dreyfus and Rabinow's view, is not shaped by individual aims, but 
by the political technologies of power. 
4.1.3 What is maturity? 
Dreyfus and Rabinow elaborate Foucault's concept of maturity in an essay entitled 
"What is maturity? Habermas and Foucault on 'What is enlightenment?"' (1986). For 
them, Foucault's study responds to what is intolerable in the current situation in order 
to frame a general problem and to embody a style of action that enables us to see 
which ways of functioning as human beings are worth opposing or strengthening. 
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Rather than deconstructing texts, in their view, Foucault uses texts for the aims of 
social practices. As with the pre-Platonic rhetoricians, they consider that the language 
that Foucault uses serves "to articulate an understanding of our situation which moves 
us to action" (p. 114). In later works, they comment, Foucault turns his attention to 
the productive dimension of power relations and formulates the repressive hypothesis 
as part of the problem. He draws on genealogy to reinterpret the discourses of 
sexuality not merely regarding them as an epistemic structure, but also as a stage 
showing how a Western individual is constituted as both the subject and the object. 
Concerning truth, in Dreyfus and Rabinow's view, Foucault disagrees with the claim 
that truth serves to function against power, or that it and power are external to each 
other. The role of intellectuals, for Foucault, is someone who identifies "the specific 
forms and specific interrelationships which truth and power have taken in our 
history" (p. 116), namely, to see the way truth is established by the operation of 
power, and the way the subject is constituted by this operation. Dreyfus and Rabinow 
consider that Foucault's main purpose "has never been to denounce power per se nor 
to propound truth but to use his analysis to shed light on the specific dangers that 
each specific type of power/knowledge produces" (ibid). 
Dreyfus and Rabinow draw attention to Foucault's view on how the coherent form of 
life that we call modernity has been formed. In the analysis of modern society, 
Foucault offers the concept of "bio-power" as the form of power/knowledge specific 
to modernity. It can be defined as a complex of practices to ensure health, security 
and productivity for Western people. Through seeing the operation of bio-power, we 
gain a clear understanding of what we are today. For Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault 
has never claimed that bio-power is the only thing to shape our life nowadays. 
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Instead, it should be seen as an interpretation, rather than a normative claim. In 
Discipline and Punish, Dreyfus and Rabinow consider, Foucault singles out and 
describes the practices that produce modern subjects as objects. The History of 
Sexuality plays an import role in tracing the development of those practices of 
confession and self-mastery that have made Western people into self-interpreting, 
autonomous, meaning-giving subjects. These disciplinary and confessional practices 
shape who we are in modern society. 
The original question of the meaning of "maturity" in Foucault's account follows 
Kant's questioning in terms of the spirit of Enlightenment? In Dreyfus and Rabinow's 
view, maturity does not only entail having the lucid and heroic ability to face up to 
the collapse of the old order, but also to having an ironic stance toward one's present 
situation. For them, understanding the use of the term "ironic" is helpful to 
differentiate Foucault's view of maturity from those of other contemporary 
philosophers. Dreyfus and Rabinow put its meaning like this: 
It is an abandonment of traditional seriousness while preserving active engagement in 
the concerns of the present. It seeks to avoid preserving some special status for truth 
which grounds serious involvement, and also to avoid the frivolity which arises when 
one abandons all seriousness to dance on the grave of god, or logos, or phallo-centrism, 
etc. (p. 117) 
Briefly, the ironic stance of Foucault is not simply an attitude of destroying the old 
system and deriding out-of-date tradition. It is an action of concerning ourselves with 
our present world and of seeking the practices that provide a different way to live at 
present. Dreyfus and Rabinow explain this further. Like Heidegger, Foucault attempts 
to change our world, but he never laments the default assumption of the existence of 
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God nor does he himself try to look for a new one. In fact, his main task is not really 
to offer alternative possibilities for acting. He intends only to diagnose the 
contemporary danger and, in his last work, to provide the constitutive elements of 
modern ethics. He suggests that a philosopher will bring his own philosophy to bear 
on his present situation, and seek a way "to reconcile human dignity with the current 
social arrangements" (p. 118). This reconciliation does not urge human beings to 
follow the rules of the current social arrangement, but to consider how to maintain 
their dignity within the mechanisms of that social arrangement. The central argument 
of Dreyfus and Rabinow's paper is that Foucault's maturity would "consist in at least 
being willing to face the possibility that action cannot be grounded in universal, 
ahistorical theories of the individual subject and of writing, nor in the conditions of 
community and speaking" (ibid). In this respect, Foucault denies that there is a 
common form of morality that is acceptable by everyone, and that everyone has to 
submit to. For Dreyfus and Rabinow, this perspective is different from Habermas' 
idea that one must reach agreement on valid claims on the basis of reason and 
communicative practice. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow offer a clear explanation of several issues arising in Foucault's 
account, such as the meaning of "the history of the present", and the characteristics of 
power. They claim that Foucault's method of interpretive analytics or his 
interrogation into Enlightenment is an approach that enables action towards reaching 
a diagnosis of our current situation. For Dreyfus and Rabinow, "the history of the 
present" never refers to finding a solution or a conclusion, especially not a universal, 
global one. In the next section, I shall discuss Barry Smart's interpretation of 
Foucault to see his different elucidation of aspects of power/knowledge. 
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4.2 Barry Smart 
Barry Smart is a sociologist who invokes Foucault's analysis in a rethinking of the 
traditional Marxist analytical framework of the development of the Western society. 
Since the twentieth century, the emergence of "non-class"-based political subject 
groups have replaced the differentiation of class levels in social structure. Complex 
relations and technologies of power gradually increase their significance in modern 
society. For Smart, new conceptual frameworks, therefore, need to be articulated, 
which are different from or extend the scope of historical materialism. Foucault's 
theory could overcome the limitations of Marxist analysis in understanding our 
present. It is in this context that Smart locates his commentary on the work of 
Foucault. In this section, I shall start by referring to two controversial issues relating 
to the misunderstanding of Foucault that Smart attempts to clarify. These relate to 
what he calls "the modern state and relations of power" and "resistance and power" 
(Smart, 2002, p. 122). I shall then describe his interpretation of the concept of 
power/knowledge and of Foucault's methodological rules. 
4.2.1 Power and the state 
Smart is critical of the theory of power in the social sciences in which the exercise of 
power is seen in terms either of the actions of individual or institutional agents, or of 
the effects of structures or systems. Power has been defined as the capacities of 
agents to realize their will or interest against the will or interest of others: "power has 
been conceptualized as a property or an effect of structures and systems" (ibid). Smart 
offers several examples from sociological theory. For example, Weber considers that 
power relations are articulated in systems of domination. Parsons suggests that, 
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instead of a property held by groups or individuals, power is conceptualized as a 
generalized resource flowing through the political system. For Marx, power is rooted 
in the economic structure of society. Foucault's account of power in Smart's view is, 
however, of a qualitatively different order. Similarly to Dreyfus and Rabinow, Smart 
argues that power is neither a matter that is controlled by certain agents or 
individuals, nor a matter of the aim of domination. It is neither a resource operated in 
the political system, nor is it merely rooted in economic structure. Rather than 
something that can be seized, shared or acquired, power is relational; it is exercised 
from a variety of points in the social body. Relations of power are not considered to 
be secondary to other relationships, such as economic processes, knowledge 
relationships or sexual relations, but are immanent in them all. Smart explains these 
aspects of power further: 
...power is not conceived to be imposed from the apex of a social hierarchy, nor 
derived from a foundational binary opposition between a ruling and ruled class, 
rather it operates in a capillary fashion from below. (ibid) 
Smart uses Foucault's term "capillary" to draw attention to the way that power comes 
from below and expands everywhere in the social body. Confrontations in the form of 
binary divisions, for Smart, are merely temporary and exceptional states of 
accumulation of the multiplicity of cleavages and resistances within power relations. 
They are one type within the plurality of power relations. 
Again similarly to Dreyfus and Rabinow, Smart highlights how in Foucault's 
conceptulisation "power is presented as intentional yet non-subjective" (p. 123). He 
claims that state apparatus should not be a labelled as representative of power because 
this would direct our focus specifically towards sovereignty or law, which connects 
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with other apparatus like the army and police and consequently contributes to 
understanding everything as repressive. In Smart's view, Foucault does not intend to 
construct an approach that analyses power in terms of the state, sovereignty and the 
law. The State and its apparatuses are not pivotal in Foucault's exploration of the 
exercise of power. Smart argues, however, that "the importance of the modern state as 
the political form of centralised and centralising power is both acknowledged and 
addressed" (p. 126). As such, power relations are seen as localized in and imposed 
upon the constitution of the State and modern society. "Pastoral power" is one of 
these power relations, which comes from Christian thought, and is operated in order 
to ensure, sustain and improve the lives of individuals. This is associated with 
techniques of power developed to govern the human subject in a subtle way. Hence, 
Smart comments that the heart of Foucault's work is "a shift from the predominance 
of sovereignty-law-repression to the development and diffusion of more subtle and 
economical forms of power exercised over life—over individuals and populations" 
(p. 127). 
4.2.2 Power and resistance 
Smart contests critics of Foucault's work who argue that his idea of resistance lacks a 
foundation or any unique and unified agency of social change. He argues that 
Foucault's work reflects the rejection of the common conception of power relations in 
terms of a binary division along class lines. In Foucault's statement "where there is 
power, there is resistance," Foucault means, in Smart's view, that "resistance is 
present everywhere power is exercised, that the network of power relations is 
paralleled by a multiplicity of forms of resistance" (p. 133). As in power relations, 
resistance is also characterised by multiplicity, and thus cannot be generalized as 
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being from a limited source. Moreover, resistance is not always and already colonized 
by power and thereby is doomed to defeat. Smart argues: power and resistance 
constitute an "irreducible opposite" (ibid) in Foucault's term within power relations; 
and their respective forms may change in this opposition. In Foucault's account, the 
exercise of power should not be conceived simply in terms of a relationship between 
individual or collective agents, or as a relationship of violence or consent. Actually, 
power induces, incites and seduces. It is a way of acting upon an acting subject. 
Opposition or resistance to power is conceptualized in terms of freedom, because 
power is exercised only over free subjects (individual or collective). The conduct or 
action of subjects exists within a field of possibilities. In this way, the recalcitrance of 
the will and the intransigence of freedom are provoked constantly in power relations. 
The "irreducible opposite" that Smart highlights is the struggle derived from this will 
or freedom against power. For Foucault, this is the process of permanent provocation. 
Because this provocation is ongoing and the opposing two sides are necessary, the 
opposition between power and resistance is irreducible. Though, for Foucault, the use 
of violence and the achievement of consent are not excluded from the field of power 
relations, they are not the basis and the imperative constitutive element in power 
relations. In Smart's interpretation, power relations "cease to exist where 
insubordination or the means of escape or possible flight are absent" (p. 133). The 
attitude of insubordination, as the opposite side of power—resistance, is exactly the 
imperative element in power relations. Therefore, for Smart, every relationship of 
power implies a potential "strategy of struggle" in Foucault's account. In Smart's 
view, Foucault's concept of resistance, opposition, and struggle still remain as 
enigmatic: in Discipline and Punish, forms of resistance and revolt were not 
addressed. In the first volume on The History of Sexuality, though the concept of 
resistance is offered through the analysis of power and a counter-attack against the 
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various mechanisms of sexuality, it provides little clarification. Forms of resistance to 
power in Foucault's work, however, constitute the basis of further studies. Through 
analysis of resistance and struggle, relations of power might be understood explicitly. 
Smart believes that Foucault's notion of power is a "non-class"-based analysis. For 
Foucault, the development of modern Western societies cannot be ascribed only to 
class struggle—consider other power relations such as in the concern of men over 
women, of parents over children and of psychiatry over the mentally ill. Instead, these 
forms of "non-class" struggle manifest several common characteristics. Smart 
summarizes them as follows (p. 135). First, they are "transversal", which means that 
they are not limited to a particular nation or political or economic formation. Second, 
they have as their target the effects of power per se over people's bodies and lives. 
Third, they are "immediate". Individuals direct their opposition to local exercises of 
power, and power exercised over individuals. Rather than a global solution set in a 
distant future (e.g. liberation, revolution, and the end of class struggle), the 
consequence of power is direct and immediate. Fourth, they are opposed to a 
government of individualization. Fifth, they contest in the "regime du savoir", that is 
the effects of power which are linked with knowledge, competence and qualification, 
and they oppose secrecy, deformation and mystifying representations imposed on 
individuals. Finally, they are each concerned with the question "Who are we?" In 
summary, such struggles stand opposed to a particular technique of power that 
categorizes individuals, marks their individuality and attaches them to their identity. 
As the interpretation of Dreyfus and Rabinow also suggested, Foucault attempts to 
diagnose our current situation, and diagnose the danger in modernity. Smart's account 
is similar to this, focusing on individual identity and the present. For him, then, it is 
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wrong to merely reduce Foucault's thinking to "that of the determination of forms of 
subjection and subjectivity through class and /or ideological structures" (p. 136). 
4.2.3 Foucault's account of domination 
For Smart, Foucault's idea of a non-economic analysis of power is important to an 
unprejudiced understanding of the interconnection between politics and the economy. 
Power is exercised and is a relation of force rather than being given or exchanged in 
this analysis. In the non-economic analysis, power relations are not relations of 
sovereignty, but of domination in Foucault's view. This notion of domination is 
different from sociologist's thinking of domination in general. Smart explains it 
further: 
The sense of domination invoked here is not that of one individual, institution, or class 
over the people or the nation, but the multiplicity of forms of domination exercised 
within the fabric of society. (Smart, 1983, p. 82) 
That is to say, Foucault's concept of domination does not come from specific 
dominant individual or groups. Rather, it has multiple origins and is embedded into 
the whole society. If, as Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest, Foucault's analysis of power 
sheds light on the specific dangers that each specific type of power/knowledge 
produces, Smart's account of "domination" appears to represent the "danger" that 
Dreyfus and Rabinow refer to. Power is not always coercive and repressive. Instead, 
it is one kind of domination that fixes our way of doing things and our thinking of 
ourselves. 
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In Smart's view, Foucault's notion of domination is easily misunderstood as referring 
to the domination by class or superiority. He argues, "the analysis of power should be 
ascending rather than descending" (ibid). He says: 
It is a matter of examining how the techniques and procedures of power operating 
routinely at the level of everyday life have been appropriated or engaged by "more 
general powers or economic interests" rather than the converse, namely of 
conceptualising power as a property located at the summit of the social order employed 
in a descending direction over and throughout the entire social domain. (ibid) 
A descending analysis of power is a global form that focuses on macro operation of 
power. Power, in this sense, is a property located at the summit of the social order 
employed in a descending direction throughout the entire social domain. On the 
contrary, Foucault's analysis of power is ascending: it starts from local centres, from 
the level of everyday life. It is a kind of micro-physics of power. Smart argues that 
Foucault disagrees with the idea that "anything can be deduced from the general 
phenomenon of the domination of the bourgeois class" (Foucault, cited by Smart, p. 
84). Rather, the procedures of power reveal a political and economic utility for the 
bourgeoisie, which have been incorporated into the social whole. For Smart, 
Foucauldian analysis allows an unprejudiced exploration on which "specific 
mechanisms, techniques and procedures of power may achieve a degree of economic 
and political utility for dominant state apparatuses, oligarchies or ruling classes" 
(ibid). There is no general, global theory of the connection between power and 
economic relations, however; the relations between power and economy are decided 
by individuals. 
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In Smart's interpretation, Foucault's purpose is not to discover a global rationality of 
the modern state, or to revolt against sovereign power. Nor does he intend to work out 
a solution for the problems in the development of modern society. Instead he is 
concerned with how power has affected our present daily lives, how this influence 
has occurred in the formation of state, and how the human being has become a 
political and economic utility through disciplinary power. Rather than social status, 
the objects that are governed are our bodies, gestures and behaviour. In this sense, 
Smart shares a common view with Dreyfus and Rabinow. Perhaps because of his 
sociological concerns, Smart offers many explications related to the concept of 
resistance and clarifies the different meanings of domination in Foucault's account 
and in the Marxist framework. Smart's analysis leaves open several questions about 
how resistance may work against domination and what forms this may take. In the 
next section, I shall sketch out Colin Gordon's exegesis of Foucault to see if any 
different ideas emerge. 
4.3 Colin Gordon 
Gordon has edited a number of anthologies of Foucault's work. He is very familiar 
with Foucault's thought as well as its historic, cultural, and philosophical scope. 
Several of his papers make an incisive exegesis of Foucault's work. There are three 
main aspects developed in this section. First, I shall illustrate Gordon's elaboration of 
the notion of power/knowledge, which includes the source of this thought and several 
methodological issues regarding this idea. This first part mainly comes from the 
"Afterword" of his edited book: Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972-1977. Second, I shall focus on ethical and political issues arising in 
Gordon's interpretation of Foucault's notion of governmentality. This concept relates 
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to power/knowledge and the discussion here derives from an introductory essay in 
another jointly edited book: The Foucault Effect—studies in Governmentality (1991). 
He expounds in detail the political and economic aspects concerning governmental 
rationality. Finally, I will sketch out Gordon's perspective on Foucault's essay: 
"What is Enlightenment?". This shows a profound connection with genealogical 
thinking, and the way Foucault considered the implications of the notion of critique. 
4.3.1 On Power/knowledge 
In Gordon's view, the development both of Foucault's study of power/knowledge and 
of new technologies for the governance of people links to a new philosophical 
conception: "'Man' as a simultaneous subject and object of knowledge" (Gordon, 
1980, p. 234). Gordon argues that Foucault's works, from Madness and Civilization 
to The History of Sexuality are not histories of madness or sexuality at all. Rather, 
through the problems he addresses, madness and peripheral subjects have been 
constituted as both an object and a subject of certain forms of knowledge and as 
targets of certain institutional practices. Gordon considers that Foucault's 
conceptualisation of power/knowledge indicates an obvious methodological shift, 
which leads to a reflection on power in terms beyond good and evil. In Gordon's 
view, Foucault's analysis of power is constructed by two methodological principles: 
the principles of neutrality and scepticism, which are based neither on a moral 
philosophy nor on a social ontology. For neutrality, power is not an institution, a 
structure or a certain force that are endowed by certain agent, but is "given to a 
complex strategic relation in a given society" (p. 236). This has nothing to do with 
good and evil, but is involved into a mobile process for establishing social orders and 
socialized individuals. Gordon explains it like this: 
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So, as with Kant, the task is not that of fixing an ontologically primitive, definitively 
"real" stratum of historical reality, but in tracing the mobile systems of relationships and 
syntheses which provide the conditions of possibility for the formation of certain orders 
and levels of objects and of forms of knowledge of such objects. (ibid) 
Foucault's study of history, therefore, attempts to make the analysis of objects, and of 
relations encompassing these objects, available in order to catch the mobile trajectory 
of power. The notion of power/knowledge belongs within a Nietzschean project of 
genealogy that relies on the principle of ethical and ontological skepticism. To clarify, 
Gordon suggests that the purpose of power/knowledge is not a critique of ideology, in 
the manner influenced by the Frankfurt School. He goes on to explain that knowledge 
of "Man" is able to serve a technological function in the domination of people and 
that this need not be a matter of the ideological mystification, in which ideology has 
the ability to define a certain field of truth. Rather than functioning as a ruse or a 
fraud, the history of Man is compatible with "their authentic espousal of the humanist 
values of self-emancipation, self-improvement and self-realization" (p. 237). This 
position leads Gordon to see Foucault as less of an anti-humanist than Nietzsche, 
which opens up more potential for the existence of human beings. In Gordon's 
interpretation, it is this feature of genealogy that makes Foucault's characteristics of 
modern apparatuses of power positive and productive. Gordon's argument goes 
beyond the interpretation of Dreyfus and Rabinow, or that of Smart, in which the 
productive power is seen only as serving economic utility. Productive power, in 
Gordon's view, presumes the possibility of human self-making. He emphasises 
Foucault's point that the object "is not to arrive at a priori moral or intellectual 
judgment on the features of our society produced by such forms of power, but to 
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render possible an analysis of the process of production itself' (ibid). This process of 
production implies the potency of human development. 
For Gordon, the historical matrix of conditions for modern human sciences must be 
understood in terms of a whole range of techniques and practices for the discipline, 
surveillance, administration and formation of populations of human individuals in 
Foucault's account. These forms of knowledge and these apparatuses of power are 
constituted interdependently. Here, Gordon claims that two complementary shifts of 
philosophical perspective are necessary to make a genealogy of this relationship 
possible (p. 239). First, the ethical polarization of the subject-object needs to be 
discarded. This discarding makes possible a conception of domination that can take 
the form both of a subjectificaiton and an objectification, and enables subjectivity to 
be seen as a form of moral autonomy. Second, on the one hand, the assumption that 
domination (the class domination in Marxist terms or the domination of instrumental 
rationality in the idea of critical theory) falsifies the essence of human subjectivity 
has to be rejected. On the other hand, an assertion needs to be addressed, which is that 
power promotes and utilizes a "true" knowledge of subjects and constitutes the very 
field of that truth. This "true" knowledge of subjects seems to me to equate to the 
knowledge of the self, or the care of the self, in Foucault's terms. The truth in this 
knowledge is not related to judgement or to theoretical construction, but is an 
ongoing pursuit of self-transformation. The "subject", in Gordon's view, must be 
thought of as a fictive or constructed entity, but this is different from saying that 
subject is false or imaginary. For Foucault, it is an ironic usage employed in order to 
struggle against the way that subjects are constituted or governed by a certain 
sovereign truth. In sum, for Gordon, Foucault's position in his methodological 
skepticism includes both the ontological claims and the ethical values that humanist 
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systems of thought invest in the notion of subjectivity. He does not intend to judge or 
to subvert these ethical values, only to investigate how they become possible. 
With regard to Foucault's concept of the "history of the present", Gordon considers 
that the object of Foucault's critique is the status of the present. The Foucaudian 
method of genealogy utilizes George Canguilhem's analysis and critique in which the 
present is a standpoint of scientific thought and a standpoint of the history of that 
thought. This is a history of the present as "modernity". In this respect, Gordon 
explains, it is "the present as the form of a particular kind of domain of rationality, 
constituted by its place on a diachronic gradient" (p. 242). Foucault's philosophical 
challenge to history is, therefore, not to inquire into the reality of "the past" but to 
interrogate the rationality of "present" that is constituted in his history. To 
"interrogate" here is what Dreyfus and Rabinow refer to as "diagnose", a diagnosis of 
modernity and our present. It is also an ironic stance towards modern rationality, and 
towards our being at this moment. 
Concerning the concept of power, Gordon supposes that Foucault uses it in a 
relational rather than a substantialising mode. He suggests that power in Foucault's 
view "is not an omnipotent causal principle or shaping spirit but a perspective 
concept" (p. 245). This "perspective concept" has the same sense as the 
term—"directionality" that Dreyfus and Rabinow use. Power relations have direction 
and movement, but they are not something visible and accessible for people to own. 
Moreover, Gordon explains the reason why power is nonsubjective in terms of 
techniques. Technique possesses an intrinsic rationality of its own. But we cannot 
reduce the history of this rationality to that of its individual or institutional users, or to 
the ulterior purpose of its applications. Gordon comments that Foucault does compile 
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a random collage of scattered and heterogeneous elements in Discipline and Punish. 
These relatively autonomous technologies, for Gordon, contribute to produce the 
multiplication, adaptation and reorganization of effects. According to this 
interpretation, a technology of normalization "always admits of a certain free play 
with respect to any specific programmatic norm" (p. 253). That is, this play makes a 
whole range of strategies possible. It is also possible for a technological apparatus to 
adapt itself continuously to a strategic role opposite to that of its initial programme. In 
the case of the prison, Gordon explains, it is not seen as being for the elimination of 
criminality, but for its exploitation, in Foucault's account. Beneath the multiplicity of 
technology, it is possible to identify a basic structural bipolarity that characterizes 
modern projects of human governance. Gordon explains this structural bipolarity as 
consisting of two modalities of the technology of power, "microscopic" and 
"macroscopic" (p. 254). The former effects an orthopaedic training of the body, the 
soul and the individual. The latter secures and enhances life and well-being of a 
population or a social body. Every social practice needs to be evaluated 
simultaneously on both levels. Modern forms of governance are thus conceptualized 
by means of this "double-entry system of calculation" (ibid). In this sense, power 
integrates the dual imperatives of good government—the individual and the society. 
Unlike Smart who concentrates only on Foucault's micro-physics of power, Gordon 
argues that the technology of power is both microscopic and macroscopic. He 
supplies, however, two clarifications (pp. 254-255). First, the "macroscopic" focus on 
the population is not equivalent to Foucault's notion of strategic effects in the real. 
Foucault does not assert an inexorable globalization of effects of power. That is the 
reason why he distinguishes our disciplinary society from a disciplined society by 
docile, obedient, normalized subjects. Second, Foucault also does not claim that the 
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governance of collectivities is merely a resultant or a projection of a discipline in 
closed institutions such as the prison. As a matter of fact, there are different forms of 
the exercise of power in our society. A social government is constituted by minute 
capillary relations. Gordon explains the meaning of "capillary": it is not equated with 
individual. It may properly be regarded as "sub-individual or trans-individual" (p. 
255). Additionally, the notion of State that Foucault refers to so often in his later 
works "is neither the definitive form assumed by government nor its subject, but 
rather one of its effects or instruments" (ibid). As Smart puts it: power is immanent in 
rather than exterior to the State. 
4.3.2 On Governmentality 
For Gordon, the issue of "government" is pivotal in Foucault's political analysis of 
the "microphysics of power". The constitution of the modern state, of modern 
societies can be understood by way of Foucault's analysis of government. Gordon 
explains the meaning of "government" in Foucault's account: government is "the 
conduct of conduct," that is "a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the 
conduct of some person or persons" (Gordon, 1991, p. 2). In Gordon's view, the 
practices of government occur within the network between self and self, and between 
human beings and social institutions. The target of governmental rationality is the self 
and others. In turn, Foucault's conception of govermentality raises the question of 
how to govern, in Gordon's view. This "how" relates to the immanent conditions and 
constraints of practices. It cannot be explained by the theory of the legitimated 
foundations of political sovereignty. For Gordon, "how to govern" relates to the 
interdependence between the "government of men" and the "manifestation of truth" 
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(p. 8). That is, this manifestation of truth and the government of human beings 
according to it, is the art of government. 
Unlike Machiavellian political thinking which is concerned mainly with retaining the 
prince's sovereignty, Gordon explains, how Foucault's account identifies a shift of 
political rationality from prince to state characterised by a form of "secular 
perpetuity" (p. 9). State rationality is established through government concerned with 
the state's strength. Gordon elaborates that ideas of prosperity and happiness become 
the principles which identified the state with each and all subjects. The role of ruler is 
thus as a shepherd, and the population, the governed, is as a herd. After the prosperity 
of individual lives is ensured, this in turn enhances the strength of the state. This is 
the basic outline Gordon provides of the function of government in Foucault's 
account. 
Gordon emphasizes one aspect of Foucault's account in particular: "nothing is an evil 
in itself, but everything is dangerous" (p. 47). As in Dreyfus and Rabinow's 
interpretation, Gordon identifies the shedding of light on these dangers as Foucault's 
central concern. Gordon, however, goes further to think of this point more positively. 
For Gordon, things are liable to go wrong, but there is also a possibility of doing 
something to prevent this. This can be applied to modern Western forms of 
government. Gordon identifies the need for action in Foucault's account. Gordon 
points out that Foucault disagrees with "the project (neo-liberal or socialist) of a 
guaranteed freedom or a definitive Enlightenment" (ibid). The liberty of men in 
Foucault's account is never assured by the institutions and laws. The exercise of 
freedom cannot be guaranteed inherently in the social structure. For Foucault, the 
only guarantee of freedom is freedom. Gordon therefore considers power as positive, 
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following Foucault's claim that power is infinite rather than being ill (or repressive) 
(ibid). In this view, unbreakable laws and unrestricted rights never exist. So, on the 
one hand, in order to be operable, to be credible to both the governed and the 
governing, governmental rationality is conditional. Although, on the other hand, our 
existing conceptions of ourselves may be more contingent and modifiable than we 
think. Because government is the "conduct of conduct," the relation between subjects 
and government is like a "moral judo" in Gordon's terms (p. 48) (or the "agonism" in 
Foucault's terms). Gordon draws attention to Foucault's view that it is important to 
keep in mind that the possibility of change never disappears in governmental process. 
As Foucault says: "one can simultaneously work and be restive" (Foucault, cited in 
Gordon, ibid) in working with a government. Resistance could occur in any power 
relationship. 
4.3.3 On Foucault's response to the question: "What is Enlightenment?"" 
Gordon comments that Foucault's response to Kant's reflections on Enlightenment is 
neither to concern the present possibilities of Enlightenment, nor to achieve liberation 
from this idea. Rather, it is a critical interrogation on the limits of Kant's thinking of 
it and on the abuses of power it has lead to. Enlightenment reason can be seen, in 
Foucault's view as despotically spread in history. For Gordon, the experience that 
Foucault refers to as Enlightenment is not that of doctrinal conversions and 
deconversions, but rather "a mutation in the problem of political identity as 
such"(Gordon, 1993, p, 21). The pressing question of political identity is no longer 
14 "What is Enlightenment?" is a question that Immanuel Kant raised in a short essay in a Berlin 
newspaper in 1784, a few years before the Revolution in France. Two centuries later, Foucault refers 
back to this text in a series of lectures, interviews, and prefaces. He found in it that Enlightenment 
would be taken up in a new way—a "historico-philosphical critique" that is based on the examination 
of modem political rationality. See John Rajchman (2007, p. 9). 
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"how can we exist?", but "who are we?". Rather than "engagement in", this is 
"experiment with" in Foucault's terms. For Gordon, the moral issue that Foucault 
raises here is not that of whether things should be changed or remain unchanged, but 
that of "How is it possible for us to hold on to liberty and truth in our ways of 
changing and not changing?" (ibid). This is a way that of being engaged in dominant 
truth, but of experimenting with the experience of it otherwise. Gordon connects this 
idea to Foucault's interpretation of Kant's concept of revolution. Following the 
revolutionary movement in France in 1968, Foucault reflects on what a desirable 
revolution could be like and how it might be possible. By drawing on the idea of 
revolution from Kant, Foucault considers that some revolutions have not been worth 
repeating, but repetition is a sense of the contradictory nature of the will to a 
revolution. Foucault argues, therefore, that the important matter regarding revolution 
is something other than revolution itself. It is the "wishful participation bordering 
closely on enthusiasm of its audience" (p. 21). May 1968 was a revolution consisting 
in nothing beyond or other than enthusiasm for revolution. For Foucault, Kant sees 
enthusiasm as a political object, through which life was taken at its face value and 
turned back against the system bent on controlling it. Gordon points out that Foucault 
raises a further question in his discussion: Since revolutions had fallen back into their 
former rut: "Can they still provide the basis of a consistent political rationality which 
is distinct from—even, in a sense, the opposite of—the traditional ethos of 
revolution?" (p. 22). In Gordon's view, for Foucault, the rationality of revolution was 
always trapped into the effects of despotism in which hope itself was lost. Kant's 
notion of revolution gives Foucault inflection towards the answer of what the 
Enlightenment is. Gordon expounds: 
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Kant distinguishes between revolutions as events and the enthusiasm for revolution 
which is the true and sure sign of progress. Foucault distinguishes between an 
Enlightenment of sure identity, conviction and destiny, and an Enlightenment which is 
question and questioning, which is commitment to uncertainty. (ibid) 
In Gordon's perspective, Kant's questions for Enlightenment and revolution inspire 
Foucault's thinking of Enlightenment as a permanent possibility of questioning. 
Foucault, however, discards Kant's philosophical meaning as the decisive valorizing 
judgment in the history of humanity, and as "man's release from his self-incurred 
tutelage15" (p. 23) in the context of the present moment. Foucault recognizes "a 
reflexivity of the contingent and the inessential in the time and in ourselves" (ibid). 
Foucault's treatment of Kant's thought is not merely a polemical refusal, but 
produces different thought from it. This can be seen in Foucault's notion of critique, 
outlined by Gordon: 
The point, in brief, is to transform critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation 
into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression...criticism is no 
longer going to be practiced in the pursuit of formal structures with universal value, but 
rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves 
and recognize ourselves as subjects of what we do, think and say. (pp. 23-24) 
This is the "ironic stance" in Foucault's account that Dreyfus and Rabinow draw 
attention to. This is also what Foucault calls the attitude of "maturity", which is 
related to his genealogical inquiry into the constitution of what we are. In this way, 
we get new impetus for the undefined work of freedom. As Gordon highlights, the 
point perhaps is no longer to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are, as 
15 
 Kant gives the meaning of Enlightenment like this: "Enlightenment is man's release from his 
self-incurred tutelage" (Kant, 2007, p. 29). Tutelage, in Kant's term, means that men make use of their 
understanding by the direction from another. The cause of self-incurred in this tutelage is not because 
men lack of reason, but because men lack of resolution and courage to use their own reason without 
direction from another. 
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Foucault claim's in the essay "The subject and power". Gordon explains that an ethic 
of "refusing what we are" does not mean a leap into the void, or an immoralism of the 
gratuitous act. First, such a form of freedom needs a form of knowledge obtainable 
only by means of exacting historical and political investigation. The questioning of 
"what we are" follows a principle of permanent contingency that demands a vigorous 
appetite for facts. Second, the question of "what we are" has a mutual implication in 
Foucault's question of the present and the "history of the present", the investigation 
of what we are by recourse to a history of the present. The relationship between the 
practice of genealogy and the question of Enlightenment is identified by Gordon as 
polemic. Gordon comments: "the genealogical attitude is almost synonymous with 
mistrust of Enlightenment; genealogical narration is an inverse, a post-mortem, a 
satire of the Enlightenment's prospectuses of progress" (p. 25). 
According to Gordon's interpretation of Foucault, "knowledge" not only has a 
relation of mutual production with power, as in Dreyfus and Rabinow's 
understanding, but is also a matter that we need to inquiry into in order to obtain 
freedom of our subjectivity. That is because he regards power/knowledge as a 
mechanism that functions more to disencumber the domination of rationality than to 
evoke this domination. In his account, while Foucault announces that power is the 
combination of heterogeneous elements, and strategy is a multiple exertion, power is 
no longer the force to enhance unitary domination. Therefore, it is quite a narrow 
view to presume power serves only to eliminate; on the contrary, "exploitation" is the 
real thing it does. For Gordon, the nature of power is productive in Foucault's 
account; this opens up various possibilities for the constitution of the subjects of 
human beings. On the one hand, our subjects could be confined by the effects of 
power/knowledge and governmental rationality; but, on the other hand, this 
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confinement is not really so indissoluble, and power may be the positive force that 
can help people towards pursuing self-emancipation, self-improvement and 
self-realization. Likewise, the subject of the human being is not static or immobile. 
Rather than being as a unitary value and universal standard, it is itself as full of 
plasticity and full of possibility, as the characteristics of power/knowledge. This is 
Foucault's opposition to Kant's view of Enlightenment and rationality. In Gordon's 
account, Foucault's genealogical inquiry is not only an exploration of what we are, 
but, most importantly, also a rejection of what we are. According to this, Gordon 
provides a more positive account of power/knowledge than Dreyfus and Rabinow or 
Smart. For Gordon, the history of present does not aim to support people engaging in 
their current life, but to encourage people to keep distance from the process of certain 
kind of blind normalization and govermentality, which manifest the freedom in 
power/knowledge. This freedom, an ethical choice, is based on the possibility of 
conduct. In the next section, I shall show Jan Masschelein's elucidation of Foucault, 
and see how he considers educational research and educational theory by adopting 
Foucault's notions of power/knowledge and governmentality. 
4.4 Jan Masschelein 
Compared with other interpreters of Foucault discussed in this chapter, Masschelein's 
writing is more directly concerned with educational issues. He takes up Foucault's 
ideas, particularly relating to the notion of governmentality, in thinking about our 
present educational theory and practice. The correlative concepts such as 
limit-experience, e-ducative, de-subjectivation and de-govermentalisation that he 
employs are negative aspects in Foucault's account. But these concepts have nothing 
to do with negative effects in education; on the contrary, these negative ideas are 
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likely to evoke certain inspiration for further positive transformation. Masschelein's 
account of Foucault that I will address here includes three parts. First, I shall focus on 
his interpretation of limit-experience and e-ducative, which derive from Foucault's 
question of how to read and write an experience book, and of what effect this 
experience book would have on the subject. Second, I shall introduce his critique of 
contemporary critical educational theory which, in his opinion, is governed by the 
power of certain standard rationality, such as emancipation, autonomy and liberation. 
He tries to expose this form of governmentality and to show a "real" form of self 
government that we need in educational theory. Last, I shall describe Masschelein 
and Simons' reinterpretation of Foucault's "ontology of present" in our educational 
present. They redefine a meaning of truth that is different from traditional notions of 
knowledge production. In their argument, the mission of a truth-teller (or an 
educational researcher) is to arouse the critical act of an ethics of 
de-governmentalization. 
4.4.1 E-ducative practice 
In "Experience and the Limits of Governmentality" (2006) Masschelein first 
addresses Foucault's notion of critique. He highlights Foucault's idea that critique is 
"the art not to be governed in this way" (p. 561), and is a "project of 
desubjectivation" (ibid). This means that critique is not an act of judging the 
legitimacy of knowledge, or to subjugate the demands of reason. Rather, Masschelein 
cites Butler's interpretation of critique as "a practical refusal of a particular form of 
subjectivity, a kind of virtue" (ibid). It is an act of freeing ourselves from current 
conceptions about ourselves and our conduct, and an experiment to go beyond what 
we are; that is, to establish a new relationship with ourselves as subjects. As Gordon 
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also emphasised, Foucault's concern is not so much to discover what we are, but 
more importantly, to refuse what we are. For this purpose, Masschelein underlines 
Foucault's notion—"e-ducative". He elucidates the meaning of "e-ducative": "an 
e-ducative practice is a practice in which in a certain sense the subject is ruined or 
dies, a practice that involves acceptance of life up to death, up to annihilation" (p. 
563). Masschelein considers that this e-ducative implies a negative and critical 
practice that equates to Foucault's concern with "desubjectivation". By drawing on 
one of Foucault's interviews that relates to the writing of experience books, 
Masschelein then expounds the way that subjectivity can be refused. 
Masschelein explains that for Foucault, an experience book is not a book on or about 
experiences. Rather, the writing and reading of a book is itself an experience. In this 
sense, Foucault suggests that his books are more an experience for himself and 
readers than an establishment of a historical truth. Foucault thus calls himself not a 
theorist but an experimenter. This idea echoes with the point that Gordon highlights 
mentioned earlier, that Foucault's central concern is to "experiment with", rather than 
"engagement in". Masschelein considers that in Foucault's perspective "an 
experience is something that one comes out of transformed" (ibid). The purpose of 
Foucault's writing is a practice to change himself in order not to think the same thing 
as before. Masschelein identified Foucault's idea of experience as being influenced 
by the thinking of Nietzsche, Bataille and Blanchot, for whom "experience is trying 
to reach a certain point in life that is as close as possible to the "inlivable", that which 
can't be lived through (p. 564). For Masschelein, this "inlivable" is a project of 
desubjectivation and suggests the idea of a limit-experience. Such an experience 
serves to wrench the subject from itself, and achieves a transformation of the 
relationship we have with our own knowledge. Furthermore, Masschelein clarifies 
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that telling the truth in Foucault's experience books is not to establish truth that 
belongs to epistemological questions, but is an ethical issue that relates to the 
relationship with ourselves and with the world. Through experience, Foucault aims to 
construct himself, and to invite others to share an experience of what we are that 
allows a transformation of self. In this sense, for Masschelein, an experience book is 
not used by Foucault to teach anything. Instead, it is more like an invitation or public 
gesture. 
Masschelein also draws on Foucault's notion of fiction. Experience, for Foucault, is 
neither true nor false; it is a fiction that shows how one fabricates oneself. In 
Masschelein's view, this "fiction" can be regarded as "the articulation of the failure 
(or destruction) of the actual government through exposing its games of truth and 
power" (ibid). This articulation constitutes a truth beyond truth and a truth in the 
future, in which truth is seen as a continuous diagnosis of the way that regime of truth 
is constituted, as an examination of what we are. Masschelein clarifies that Foucault 
avoids using experience as a concept. Foucault resists the question: "what is 
experience?" because in it a concept is merely an act of defining or confining. For 
Foucault, Masschelein says, experience "delivers no substance and no foundation" (p. 
566), that is it does not refer to the soul, desire or consciousness, as something that 
we have. Masschelein then considers how these ideas of experience can be thought 
about in critical educational theory in the context of the learning society. Then he 
clarifies some ideas following Foucault as follows: 
First of all, an experience book is different from a truth book or a demonstration book 
within which the relationship between writers and readers are put into a 
pastoral-pedagogical regime. Foucault rejects the idea of teaching his readers 
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something or conveying lessons in his books. Hence, he claims that his books are all 
personal experiences and do not have that particular value. An experience book is 
written out from an attitude of "ex-position" (p. 568) which enables readers to 
liberate their gaze and thoughts and enables writers to see and think differently and 
then transform themselves. Masschelein quotes Foucault's description: it is a way of 
"writing-one/the —self, of self writing" (ibid). For Masschelein, this is a philosophical 
exercise in which the limits of subjectivity (and objectivity) are at stake. Writing is an 
activity "to expose oneself in order to allow for the possibility for 'seeing further', 
`thinking further' or 'thinking otherwise' to occur" (ibid). In addition, in this way, 
one puts oneself in confrontation with a knowledge that is foreign. Masschelein 
explains the meaning of "at stake". What is at stake is not to express what one 
thought before, but is "to lose one's face", that is, in a certain sense, one's 
subjectivity" (ibid). When Foucault pursues the theme of "having no face", it does not 
mean the subject of writing is less important. On the contrary, Masschelein explains, 
it is the demand to "withdraw subjectivity from the individualising action of the 
regime of power and truth" (ibid). Therefore, on the one hand, the writing of losing 
one's face refers to a desubjectivating writing, in which "one both undergoes and 
goes under, is dying" (ibid), in which readers and writers are exposed and are 
confronting each other as equals. On the other hand, this writing "does not offer us a 
liberating or emancipating gaze, but liberates our gaze" (p. 569). It inspires us to have 
a different gaze on the world, a gaze without being captured by a certain, fixed 
regime of truth. 
Hence, writing an experience book is an e-ducative practice that opens up the 
possibility to liberate our gaze. But Masschelein insists that two points need to be 
added here. Firstly, the direction to which one exposes oneself is not a universal 
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structure, but a possibility. Secondly, certain work is necessary to be performed. This 
work is to encounter an experience that cares for the world. For Masschelein, this 
procedure is "active to become passive" (p. 570). De-subjectivation and 
subjectivation (or we may say: "resubjectivation") take place at the same time. This 
e-ducative practice "is itself ex-posed and leads us outside" (ibid). We cannot find 
any entrance to get into because there is no map. It demands a state of care for the self 
to be reached. However, in Masschelein's view, it is too narrow to focus on one's 
singular self. Instead, this is an inquiry that relates not only to oneself, but also to 
others in a particular way, in a broader world. Masschelein claims that if one is 
attentive in such a way, one can tell truths. To sum up, for Masschelein, this writing 
and reading is a limit-experience, a negative experience. This experience is negative, 
he explains: because it "transforms in an irreversible way" (p. 571). But we should 
bear in mind Foucault's warning that we should not dramatize this limit-experience. 
Masschelein expounds further on this limit-experience. It is an attempt "to hand over 
oneself with one's own hands, to make oneself into a question" (ibid) in the 
"non-pastoral" or "non-Christian" context. Experience, in this sense, "is not 
something that simply happens, but always something which happens to 'us' (ibid). 
A limit-experience is an experience "that transforms us, which makes something in us 
die" (ibid). It cuts every bond with our past; does something irreversible to ourselves. 
This experience has no substance, no external criteria such as reason; it shows mainly 
the possibility to transgress oneself, "to detach oneself from being-governed" (p. 
572). This can chime with Foucault's understanding of "maturity" that Dreyfus and 
Rabinow address: our action and thinking cannot be grounded in universal theories of 
the individual subject. In Masschelein's perspective, care of the self "is not a care for 
one's identity, but related to what Foucault meant by 'losing one's face' (ibid). 
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4.4.2 How to conceive of critical educational theory? 
Masschelein employs Foucault's concepts of power and government to rethink 
critical educational theory in an essay "How to conceive of critical educational theory 
today?" (2004). In his perspective, the classical figure of critical educational theory in 
Germany proposes itself as the critical principle of Bildung which, following Levinas, 
posits the capacity to say "I"; and following Critical Theory, encourages the practice 
of self-reflection in dialogue. It is based on the principle of cultivating one to be able 
to determine oneself and to be rationally autonomous in a reflexive way. Actual 
social and educational reality is therefore regarded as a site of coercion, distortion, 
alienation and oppression. Masschelein argues that this critical educational theory has 
become the main creed in almost all educational thinking and practice, which 
subjugates the self to the claims of communicative reason. Emancipation and 
liberation, as the aim of critique, ensure the truth of education. In this respect, 
autonomy and critique are not only brought to bear against the existing social order, 
but also "have become parts of that order and power" (p. 355). 
Foucault's notion of power, for Masschelein, can offer a different view of this 
predominant critical theory and critical educational thought. Following Foucault, 
Masschelein disagrees that power is either the ability to enforce one's own will in a 
social relation, or the repressive force of determination of the will from others. On the 
contrary, he argues, power needs to be regarded as a productive technique and 
mechanism. He goes on to describe Foucault's concept of power. For Foucault, power 
is not a substance. Rather, it is only a certain type of relation between individuals. It 
relates to actions upon actions, upon the possibilities of actions. The idea of power 
relations, Masschelein explains, "implies free subjects for whom there opens up a 
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field of possibilities of responses and ways of behaving" (p. 358). Foucault describes 
power as "government" that is "conduct of conducts". To govern means to "structure 
the possible field of action of others" (Foucault cited in Masschelein, ibid). 
Governmentality, bring together the terms "government" and "mentality", according 
to which people conducting both themselves and others, is for Masschelein, an 
important aspect of understanding power relations. This process operates through 
every social institution including the state and schools. In Masschelein's view, power 
produces truth games which determine not only what the individual is and what 
his/her knowledge means, but also "how the individual relates to him/her self and to 
others" (ibid). Individuality, in this respect, is one of the effects of a specific modern 
power apparatus. Foucault calls this "the government of individualization" (p. 359). 
Through scientific and administrative procedures, government determines who one is. 
Masschelein attempts to draw on Foucault's ideas above to rethink the thought of 
critical education. More precisely, he would like to investigate critical theories as 
different forms of governmentality. In his view, the critical, self-reflective subject is 
"an effect and instrument of a Christian-spiritual discipline and a pastoral power 
relation" (p. 360). He argues, therefore, that autonomy, self-reflection and 
self-determination in critical educational theory "are not the realization of an idea of 
humanity, but just a particular form of self-government" (p. 362). We therefore need 
a "new" critical educational theory that describes the interrelationship between 
processes of power and processes of education. Foucault's ontology of the present, 
for Masschelein, can inspire a new critical educational theory that continues the 
imperatives of the Enlightenment. This Foucauldian critical theory details how 
concepts (such as autonomy, emancipation and freedom) are connected to the birth of 
the modern subject and are related to the government of individuals. It also reveals 
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contingent facts in history about how people govern others and themselves following 
particular truth games. Masschelein holds that a new critical educational theory could 
produce "a genealogical problematisation of the self-reflective, self-realising and 
self-determining critical subject" (p. 363), which is different from producing the 
ideology of autonomy. That is to say, we need a different critical self-reflection and 
autonomous behaviour to constitute a 'real' form of self government, a real 'ethos' 
as relation of the self to the self' (ibid). Power, in this sense, does not affect our 
individuality by the operation of repression or negation, but is a force to stimulate us 
to problematise ourselves. This is, not only in a practical sense, but also in an ethical 
sense. 
4.4.3 De-governmentalisation of education 
In "De-governmentalisation of education and the meaning of the public" Masschelein 
and Simons (2007) pose a question: "How do pedagogy and educational research 
contribute to the Enlightenment of power in educational processes?" (p. 1). In their 
view, Foucault's ontology of the present is one kind of educational research. The term 
"educational" has two meanings here: first, it is the object of research; second, it 
refers to a characteristic of research itself. In the latter sense, the educational meaning 
of research is not only for research, but also has an influence on the researcher 
herself. They specifically focus on the educational meaning of research for the 
researcher herself in this paper, as they see this as crucial for the "ontology of the 
educational present" (p. 2). Based on this concern, they raise another question: "How 
can people become truth-tellers on educational issues?" (p. 3) To answer this 
question, drawing on Foucault, two traditions are distinguished. First is the idea that 
knowledge is the claim of the truth. Namely, people endeavor to get the "true" 
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knowledge. Second is the tradition they term "existential-ethical-ascetic" (p. 3), 
which means that it requires a particular transformation of the self to access the truth. 
Masschelein and Simons argue that Foucault's ontology of the present manifests the 
second consideration, through which educational researchers become truth-tellers in a 
more critical way. For them, that is nothing to do with the production of true 
knowledge, but only with the transformation of the self. The relation that is focused 
on is no longer between knowledge and truth, but between ethics and truth. Ethics, 
they explain, "refers to the relation of the self to the self and how this relation is 
modified or transformed by the self in order to become an ethical subject, a subject of 
action" (p. 4). This is Foucault's "care of the self" in their view. Researchers obtain 
access to the truth in a relation of "care", rather than a relation of "knowing". 
Masschelein and Simons offer the concept of a "critical ontology of the educational 
present" (p. 5); in which, the form of reflexivity of the researcher does not refer to a 
judgemental attitude based on criteria of validity. Rather, it supposes an "attentive 
attitude" (ibid) to the educational present connected with the researcher herself, and 
to our current understanding of what we are. Curiosity, for Masschelein and Simons, 
is the proper attitude of this care of the self. It gazes on what is happening today in 
education and implies "a willingness to become a stranger in the familiar present" (p. 
6). 
They refer to Foucault's description of two attitudes to reflexivity. They are 
"limit-attitude" and "experimental attitude". The former is necessary to explore a 
possible transgression of the current limits. This limit-attitude needs to be combined 
with an experimental attitude so as to transform or modify one's mode of being. The 
critical ontology of the educational present, thus "involves an experimental relation of 
the self to the self" (p. 7). It is an attempt to disengage oneself from oneself. 
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Masschelein and Simons explain that Foucault refers to the critical ontology of the 
present as a kind of "essay" because it is a "transforming test of oneself in the play of 
truth" and "an exercise of the self through thinking" (p. 8). The care of the self can be 
part of an "ethics of de-govenunentalization" (ibid). This ethics, they explain, does 
not aim at withdrawing subjects from the world of education. Rather, in Foucault's 
words, it aims to "live the present otherwise" (ibid). Knowledge is required in this 
situation. But this knowledge has a particular function. For Masschelein and Simons, 
rather than as scientific theories of the subject or the present, this knowledge needs to 
be considered as a "reflexive ethical instrument" (ibid), as an experimental 
knowledge of the self. As in Foucault's claim, they emphasize, "knowledge is not 
made for understanding; it is made for cutting" (p. 9). The critical ontology of the 
present refers to a kind of truth-telling that cuts how we live the present. In 
Masschelein and Simons' view, it leads us outside, and out of position. Therefore, 
educational research is an "e-ducational research" for the researcher herself. 
Masschelein and Simons are concerned with the question of how the meaning of the 
public can be thought about in terms of Foucault's ontology of the present. For 
Foucault, Kant's text "What is Enlightenment?" is an ambiguous text. Masschelein 
and Simons note that it opens up a philosophical questioning of the present to 
ontology, but also immediately closes down what it opened up. They argue that to 
serve Enlightenment "is not to tell others what they should know, but to leave the 
others the freedom to make use of their own reason" (p. 10). Furthermore, to serve 
Enlightenment is also to take care of oneself, to take care that "one is present in what 
one says and writes, in speaking and writing truth" (ibid). As Walser points out: 
"what one is doing as a writer and a speaker is making the present public" (ibid). This 
is an attempt to expose oneself, to put oneself as being part of the present in public. 
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Actually, it is an action to put our present at stake. The other does not need to accept 
what I say, but she is invited to take part in the risk in order to take care of herself. 
While one speaks for others, simultaneously, one also speaks simultaneously with 
oneself. This speaking creates a public space—a space both for everyone and for 
no-one. Though generally, to speak publicly is to speak in one's own name, this is a 
speaking without name, without a universal position, and is a speaking out of 
position. 
For Masschelein, the aim of education is the transformation of the self. This is 
self-government without being governed. This concept seems analogous to Foucault's 
assertion of critique or maturity that Dreyfus and Rabinow address. There are two 
procedures in this process. On the one hand, one needs to realize the effect of 
power/knowledge in social and cultural contexts. On the other hand, one has to take 
action to distance oneself from certain intolerant and dominant rationality. Dreyfus 
and Rabinow's "diagnosis of our current situation" sheds light on the former; while 
Masschelein's "de-governmentalization" and "de-subjectivation" is close to the latter. 
But we should not make a clear distinction between these two tasks as they actually 
refer to the same aspect of Foucault's account. In Masschelein's view, the way 
towards maturity in not by accumulation, but by "paring away." Hence, the meaning 
of knowledge that he highlights is not only the science of governing people, but 
serves the function of cutting. This way shows the deconstructive sense in Foucault's 
thought. Power, for Masschelein, stands in a more positive position, which is less 
subjugation than production for problematising the self, and for self-transformation. 
This perspective is similar to that of Gordon discussed above. The departure from 
power/knowledge starts with the self. However, in Masschelein's view, the ethical 
relation within power/knowledge is not only between self and self, but also between 
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self and other, and between self and the world. Thus, the care of self should also 
include these three aspects. 
4.5 Judith Butler 
Foucault gave a lecture in 1978 entitled "What is Critique?". In this section, I offer a 
consideration of Butler's response to this text. From Butler's perspective, Foucault's 
notion of critique encompasses his main tenet of virtue, which relates to the act of 
self-formation and to the attitude of the subject in the face of the effects of 
power/knowledge in the politics of truth. Following "what is Enlightenment?", "What 
is Critique?" is another important question concerning the limits and also conversely, 
the possibility of power/knowledge. I set out Butler's interpretation of the essay 
below. 
Generally speaking, critique is regarded as a judgment in relation to, or often in terms 
of knowledge claims. For Butler, however, "critique" in Foucault's account is an 
ethical issue, a practice that goes beyond judgement. Foucault undertakes to question 
what is central to the activity of critique itself. In the article "What is critique? An 
essay on Foucault's virtue," Butler argues that critique is no longer a normative 
matter, a normative judgment, as Habermas put this. In Foucault's view, the notion of 
critique is not merely to be understood in these terms; his idea of self-making is 
central to the politics of desubjugation that he proposes. Desubjugation and 
self-making are not two separate procedures; on the contrary, they take place always 
at the same time. 
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The general notion of critique is defined by the various objects, that is, critique is 
dependent upon these objects. Butler claims that in Foucault's view, the primary task 
of critique is not a matter of the evaluation of whether such objects are good or not, 
but "to bring into relief the very framework of evaluation itself' (Butler, p. 4). This 
means that the purpose of critique is to examine how the relation of knowledge to 
power forecloses alternative possibilities of ordering, and to be conscious of how this 
power/knowledge confines the possibility of thinking otherwise. For Butler, the 
reason that Foucault illuminates the issue of critique again is to show the limits or 
"impasse" (p. 5) of these ways of knowing and to rethink the kind of practice that 
critique can be. Significantly, Foucault transfers the notion of critique from the limits 
of the epistemological field into the possibility of the ethical field. In this sense, the 
practice of virtue is counter to order or regulation. As a stylization of morality, 
radically, virtue is "a critical relation to those norms" (p. 6) in Butler's interpretation. 
She argues that it is "a non-prescriptive form of moral inquiry," namely, a moral 
experience (or a moral practice) without prescription, without rules and without 
juridical law. This moral experience is an experiment of self-transformation by virtue 
of a form of knowledge that is different from dominant knowledge. Our self or 
subject, in Foucault's view, is crafted within a certain kind of norm in the exercise of 
its power. We therefore need a knowledge that guides us to create a different kind of 
thinking, beyond the limits of these norms. In fact, Butler does not explain the 
implications of such knowledge. We may consider it by employing Gordon's account 
however: such knowledge can be obtained by exacting historical and political 
investigation, by asking the question of "what we are," which appeals to a "history of 
the present". Or if we consider this in terms of Masschelein and Simons's 
interpretation, this knowledge is a "reflexive ethical instrument," and rather than for 
understanding, it is made for "cutting". 
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Butler explains the term "critical" is to be taken to imply a rejection of the 
assumption that one must "comply with a given category" (p. 7), and to constitute an 
interrogatory relation to this category. She highlights that this point does not aim to 
put practice into a pre-given epistemological context, "but to establish critique as the 
very practice that exposes the limits of that epistemological horizon itself' (p. 7-8). 
This practice turns out, then, to the effect of self-transformation. Butler expounds 
further about how self-transformation links to "critique" and links to Foucault's 
notion of virtue. Virtue, for Foucault, is not an uncritical obedience to authority; 
rather, it is a resistance to authority. We may see this point in his treatment of 
Enlightenment. In Butler's thinking, Foucault's reading of Enlightenment serves not 
only to establish his continuity with its aims, but also to read "his own dilemmas back 
into the history of the Enlightenment itself' (p. 8). That is to say, even though 
Enlightenment itself is an emancipatory concept subjugated to knowledge of that 
time, it itself is also inevitably one part of this kind of knowledge. Foucault's 
rereading of Enlightenment is indeed a critical history, and it is a practice of critique 
itself. Rather than pinning down only a Kantian interrogation, as in Gordon's 
interpretation, Foucault's thinking of Enlightenment is as a permanent possibility of 
questioning—to question history and ourselves. In Butler's view, Foucauldian 
critique starts from "questioning the demand for absolute obedience and subjecting 
every governmental obligation imposed on subjects to a rational and reflective 
evaluation" (p. 9). His interest is in how a subject becomes involved in those reasons 
and in how one comes to form and reform them. This notion connects with a critical 
practice of self-transformation. Butler asks a question related to this: how can people 
transform themselves in the course of producing those reasons? She suggests that this 
is based on the ethical demand for one to accept or to refuse a rule. This ethical 
162 
demand comes from desire. Foucault's question "how not to be governed?" is 
therefore worked up by desire, which is the central impetus of critique. 
Butler's interpretation of Foucault's use of resistance differs from that of Smart. Not 
only seeing it as an "irreducible opposition", Butler also considers that resistance 
needs to be replaced by "virtue". Resistance is perhaps the demonstration of virtue, or 
an imperative act of virtue. In addition, this virtue is by the same token an "art". For 
Butler, as a practice of freedom, Foucault's "critique" cannot reduce to consent or 
voluntarism. A critical practice is not only an opposition to the governmental 
demand, but also an inquiry into how such a demand becomes legible and possible. 
Critique, however, may sometimes itself be based on governmental demands, as, for 
example, in the universal rationality of Kant in the thinking of Enlightenment, or, as 
Masschelein points out, in critical theorists' critique of educational theory. In Butler's 
view, therefore, it is essential for Foucault to frustrate the aspiration to certainty that 
orientates these more conventional forms of critique. Butler explains why this virtue 
is an "art?" If this interrogation of the order of truth is a right, this is because the 
subject gives himself that right. In Foucault's terms, this is the art of "voluntary 
insubordination" and of "reflected intractability". As Butler puts it, this art, or 
critique, cannot be determined in advance; actually, it must happen contingently. But 
something is at stake here, which is "the relation between the limits of ontology and 
epistemology", and this involves "the link between the limits of what I might become 
and the limits of what I might risk knowing" (p. 13). At the limits of what I can know, 
and at the moment that the desubjugation of the subject occurs, liberty then can takes 
place. For Butler, Foucault identifies the "rationalization" of the Frankfurt School as 
the governmentalizing effect on ontology. This form of rationalization unfolds the 
exercise of bio-power. Power, in Butler's view, dwells in "a domain of suspended 
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ontology" (p. 14). On the one hand, it sets the limits of what a subject can "be" and 
constrains the subject through the force of coercion. On the other hand, it goes 
beyond in that a subject no longer "is," and offers the possibility of resistance to 
coercion through the stylization of the self. In this sense, the ontology of the self is 
unstable, changeable, and is never fixed in one way. This is an "ontological 
suspension" (p. 17), in Butler's terms. 
For Butler, there are double tasks of critique (p. 14). The first is to show how 
knowledge and power constitute the system of ordering the world. The second is to 
find out the breaking points of the emergence of this system. This means not only to 
identify the field of intelligibility constituted by the nexus of power and knowledge, 
but also to track the place where the field meets its breaking point, to examine the 
contingent moments of its discontinuities, and to find out the sites where it fails to 
constitute the intelligibility. In other words, the task is to explore not only the field 
that is constituted, but also the limits of those conditions. Or, in Butler's opinion, 
another way to describe this is that "rationalization meets its limits in desubjugation" 
(p. 15). That is to say, desubjugation marks "the fragility and transformability of the 
epistemics of power" (ibid). Within this circumstance, critique, as "fiction" in 
Foucault's term, serves the function of resisting the totalization of the subject. What 
does Foucault means by "fiction"? Butler sees this as a substitution for what Foucault 
understands as "a historical-philosophical practice", or, in terms of genealogy, as the 
following of lines of connection between power/knowledge and its fragility, between 
rationalization and desubjugation. This is a practice that posits a critical distance on 
established authority, and also a practice that risks the subject at the limits of its 
order. The subject "is both crafted and crafting" (p. 19) under these circumstances. 
Butler draws upon the term "modes of subjection or subjectivation" from Foucault, 
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which means that a subject is both formed and self-forming. This self-forming, 
however, Butler reminds us, cannot take place without the politics of norms, or 
without subjectivation. That is, "there is no self-forming outside of the norms that 
orchestrate the possible formation of the subject" (p. 19). To put it more precisely, the 
self forms himself within forms. The virtue, in Foucault's account, therefore, means 
one forms oneself in disobedience and in desubjugation. 
Butler's essay reveals Masschelein's focus on the desubjugation and 
degovernmentality of educational practice and theory to be a philosophical practice of 
Foucault's concept of "critique". Butler shows that the second task of critique is to 
uncover the breaking point and the contingent moments of the discontinuities in the 
system of power/knowledge. From this, we may deduce that the system of 
power/knowledge is not self-contained or closed; instead, it has cracks, which show 
its limits and simultaneously provide the possibility for desubjugation. I consider, 
therefore, that desubjugation may start from this discontinuity where there is an outlet 
through which power/knowledge can leak. Desubjugation refers to an experiment of 
going outside through this crack. Outside its boundary, power/knowledge does not 
remain the same, just as the subject is no longer the same. It is no longer the original 
one that functions to constitute the intelligibility of truth, or the order of norm. 
Rather, power/knowledge becomes the motive force that makes self-transformation 
beyond normalization possible, or as Gordon puts this, makes transgression or 
refusing what we are possible. Critique, therefore, is the practice that seeks to find the 
crack and then to move from inside to outside. However, this crack is not a single, 
unidirectional exit. The pulling force that originates from power/knowledge may 
draw the subject back inside, inside the norm. Self-forming is thus a dynamic, an 
unstable process within which subject shifts between inside and outside, by virtue of 
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both thrust and traction. This shows the status of "agonism" that Foucault refers to, 
within which the ontology of self is then suspended, as Butler points out. But, why is 
agonism an essential condition in power relations? I suggest, first, that if there is no 
limit to power/knowledge, self-making (or desubjugation, degovernmentality) will be 
lost in a void. That is, the limit inspires the individual to do otherwise, to find another 
outlet for their subject. This is why Butler says: "there is no self-forming outside of 
the norms that orchestrate the possible formation of the subject" (ibid). We cannot 
have self-transformation, therefore, without looking at the limits of 
governmentalization. Self in this context is moving inside and between being formed 
and forming, that is, in the status of agonism. Second, like agonism, the 
power/knowledge relation is a continuous process. After breaking through the limits 
of power/knowledge, another new form of normalization will be constituted. 
Desubjugation is then needed again. Power/knowledge circulates in this way and is 
never static. 
Further questions arise here. If, as Butler claims, desire (this is the desire of not being 
governed) forms the central impetus of critique, is the origin of this desire is inherent 
or is aroused, that is, acquired in the social and political context? And further, how 
can we inspire this desire? At the end of her essay, Butler refers to Foucault's 
response to question from a member of the lecture audience about whether to resist 
governmentalization is "originary freedom". Foucault's response is very vague. He 
does not admit that resistance comes from originary freedom; though he does not 
exclude the possibility. If, as Butler emphasizes, there is no self-forming outside of 
the norm, then this desire will be elicited within the norm. The norm, as with 
discourse or power/knowledge, is established in the social network, in the political 
operation. I suggest, therefore, that the desire to reject being governed is not a 
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primary desire, or innate desire. If this is the case then one cannot have this desire 
(the desire to put oneself at stake, I deem that it is identical with resistance) without 
the limits of govermentalization, and the domination of power/knowledge. 
4.6 Thomas R. Flynn 
Flynn is interested in making a comparison between Sartre's and Foucault's 
perspectives on history. He claims that rather than the approach of historiography, 
Foucauldian history is historical nominalism, which underscores the contingency of 
events in history. He also suggests that Foucault is a philosophical historian instead of 
a traditional historian. In this section, I shall concentrate on Foucault's three 
approaches to history identified by Flynn, and on Foucauldian notions of 
"experience" and "freedom" in Flynn's interpretation. 
4.6.1 Foucault's three approaches to history 
Flynn identifies three correlative approaches to history in Foucault's work: history as 
archaeology, as genealogies of the present and as problematizations. For Flynn, 
Foucault's earlier works are "archaeologies" of madness, clinical medicine, and the 
human sciences, which serve to examine the "archive" (Flynn, 2006, p. 30). The 
archive in Flynn's explanation not only sets discourses, but also sets the conditions 
for "what counts as knowledge in a particular period" (ibid). In Flynn's view, the 
word "archive", therefore, refers to discursive practices. He suggests that the archive 
is not relevant to the language of discourse, but to "discourse itself as practice" (ibid). 
As a method, archaeology reveals both discursive and nondiscursive practices. A 
practice forms actions by its twofold character: "judicative" and "veridicative" (p. 
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31). This means that practices, on the one hand, establish norms, exclude and control. 
On the other hand, they render true/false discourses possible. Power/knowledge, for 
Flynn, is merely the elaboration of these judicative and veridicative dimensions of 
practice. Flynn considers that Foucault's early studies of archaeologies, inspired by 
George Cangiulhem, "tread the borderline of the scientific" (p. 32). He explains that 
these histories of science show epistemic breaks that display a change of discipline 
from the old pattern to the new one. For Flynn, "archaeology is both counter-history 
and social critique" (p. 33). It is counter-history because it assumes a contrapuntal 
relationship to traditional history. Rather than a negation, its conclusions are opened 
for more alternative accounts. In addition, archaeology is social critique: that is 
because it radicalizes facts of the contingency of people's biases. By way of this 
critique, a space for change is opened up. 
With regard to genealogies of the present, Flynn considers that genealogy concerns 
the descent of practices as a series of events. It stresses the jolts and surprises of 
history in order to maintain events in their proper dispersion. The problems that 
genealogy poses begin from the imposition of power upon bodies. Foucault's work on 
the practice of punishment and of sexuality is distinguished by this character. In 
Flynn's view "power relations underwrite all Foucault's genealogies" (p. 35). History 
is thus translated toward a "micro-physics of power". For Flynn, Foucault's 
genealogy shifts the model of historical understanding from Marxist science and 
ideology or from hermeneutical interpretation, to power-strategy and tactics (ibid). 
However, Foucault offers no definition of power, and describes it only as "action on 
the action of others". Flynn argues that Foucault is a historical nominalist who states 
that power does not exist concretely and, therefore, there are only individual relations 
of domination and control. Moreover, rather than in a pejorative sense, power should 
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be taken as a positive concept. Similar to Gorden's view of genealogy, Flynn notes 
that every exercise of power is accompanied by resistance which "opens a space for 
possibility and freedom in any context" (p. 36). For Flynn, the terms "transformation" 
and "displacement" are crucial junctures throughout Foucault's history. As Flynn 
explains, displacement is not a temporal, but a spatial term. In Discipline and Punish, 
for example, Foucault shows that before the 19th century, the body of the criminal is 
paid close attention to, as the public forms of punishment shown at the beginning of 
this book. Later, though, the body is confined in the name of discipline. This change 
is a "displacement". Rather than being subject to the vengeance of the sovereign, the 
individual's body is rendered a docile tool of economic productivity. This is the 
reformed technique of punishment. Bentham's Panopticon is the architectural 
emblem for this displacement of punishment. Power within it renders the prisoner 
perpetually visible, to the effect that "inmates became their own guards" (p. 38); 
namely, it effects governmentality. 
Flynn discusses Foucault's claim that his later work is a "problematization", in which 
the "truth game" is its central notion. This relates, for instance, to how a person 
regards himself as insane or sick. Not simply as discourse or as discursive practice, 
problematization is described as dimensions of "experience". For Flynn, the purpose 
of Foucault's investigation is to analyze "the cognitive and the normative relations of 
experience in modern Western society" (p. 38). This experience describes how an 
individual constitutes and recognizes himself as subject, that is, "subjectivation" in 
Foucault's term. To this end, for example, in Foucault's later work, he asks why 
sexual conduct became an object of moral solicitude, why this "problematization" 
occurred and how an individual constitutes a moral self in the discourses of truth 
games. Problematization means that we need to write a history of a "problem" rather 
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than of a "period" (p. 43). In sum, for Flynn, there is no whole picture in Foucauldian 
history, but "a multiplication of events" that Foucault terms a "polyhedron of 
intelligibility" in his spatial metaphors (p. 39). The task of history is to expose 
discursive and non-discursive practices in their plurality and contingency so as to 
complete an intelligibility that involves an otherwise heterogeneous collection of 
events. Flynn points out that Foucault's intention in writing histories is the 
articulation of the series of practices that reflect our current practices. It assigns 
indeed "the relevant transformations and displacements or charting the practice along 
an axis of power, knowledge, or "subjectivation" (p. 40). 
4.6.2 Freedom 
As discussed above, Dreyfus and Rabinow view Foucault's "history of the present" as 
a diagnosis of our current situation. In Flynn's view, this diagnosis concerns the 
nature of the present by following lines of fragility in the present, which opens up 
what Foucault calls "a space of concrete freedom" or of possible transformation 
(Flynn, 2005, pp. 103-104). This possible transformation is based on uses of freedom, 
which for Foucault had a particular meaning. Flynn cites an interview with Foucault: 
"I am simply saying: as soon as there is a power relation, there is the possibility of 
resistance. We are never trapped by power: we can always modify its grip in 
determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy" (p. 104). In other words, 
resistance unfolds the will of freedom, and it shows that the individual has possible 
ways to react against power within various strategies. This resistance could be both 
individual and collective. In this sense, freedom implies a "plurality of options" (p. 
162) and thereby reduces the constraints that come from relations of power. 
Furthermore, Flynn interprets freedom as the capacity for "reflective withdrawal" (p. 
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161), or this can be seen as a kind of "reflective freedom" (ibid). This is what 
Foucault calls "the ontological condition of ethics". Flynn considers this to be 
"practices of freedom" (p. 162). For Foucault, it is an act for an individual to turn her 
gaze upon herself. In the political use of freedom, for Flynn, this political use of 
freedom is another form of "governance" of self and it withdraws oneself from the 
domination. This opens up the possibility of self-transformation. 
4.6.3 Experience 
As shown, Flynn emphasizes that experience is an important term in Foucault's 
approach of problematization. Rather than discourse or discursive practice, 
experience is pivotal in Foucault's later work. But Flynn warns that Foucauldian 
experience should not be taken in a universal and univocal sense. Instead of 
constructing a system, Foucault attempts to construct a personal experience, 
especially with reference to "limit-experience" as discussed in Masschelein's work 
above. Flynn remarks, then, that experience assumes a critical and a political hue. 
Foucault wishes his "experience book" to change readers' relation to their world, 
namely, a self-transformation. History in a Foucauldian experience book, for Flynn, is 
no longer a "factual" history, but an invitation to share an experience of what we are, 
and enable a self-transformation (p. 228). 
In sum, in Flynn's view, the exploration of the practices of "judicative" and 
"veridicative" is necessary for understanding power/knowledge. That is, how norms 
are established and how the binary distinction is produced in discourses are attentive 
points in historical studies. In addition, "transformation" in time and "displacement" 
in the deployment of space are important perspectives from which to observe 
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historical events (or "experience"). According to Flynn's interpretation, a 
Foucauldian thinking of history is not as the factual history in a specific period, but as 
a counter-history, a social critique, and also an experience story. Rather than a 
universal truth, history shows the potency of the possible modification of our present. 
I consider experience in Foucault's later work to have two senses: one is the 
experience of subjectivation; the other is limit-experience. Both of them relate to the 
experience of self, or the experience of subject. Foucault's practice of 
problematization exposes how things get wrong in the experience of subjectivation, 
and then through a diagnosis of our current situation, makes limit-experience 
possible. At this point, an experience book (or we may say a historical book) 
functions to arouse an individual's freedom. This is the freedom of practice, of 
resistance against power/knowledge, of self-constitution, and of self not being the 
same. In a historical book, thus, the leading characters, and the verified events are no 
longer as important as that in traditional historical books. Rather than experience in 
the past, experience in the present is central to this kind of book, which directs to the 
future, and engages in inspiring a reflective freedom in order to encourage 
self-transformation. 
4.7 Gilles Deleuze 
In his book Foucault (2006), Deleuze develops his unique interpretation of Foucault's 
thinking and endows Foucault's notion of power, knowledge and subjectivity with 
new meanings. In this section, I will describe Deleuze's critique of several improper 
postulates related to Foucauldian concept of power. He argues that Foucault's 
thinking is not the philosophy of confinement. By virtue of the concept of "outside", 
Deleuze counters this wrong presupposition of confinement, and thereby opens up an 
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unlimited space of Foucault's thought. This "outside" is not only Foucault's outside, 
but also Deleuze's own outside, where the thinking of resistance and the movement 
of transformation exist. After this, I shall expound Deleuze's interpretation in terms 
of Foucault's notion of history and the relations between subject and power. These 
perspectives derive from Deleuze's interviews in Negotiations (1995). 
4.7.1 A critique of several postulates of power 
To clarify the meaning of power in Foucault's account, Deleuze addresses several 
inappropriate postulates of power and attempts to overturn these misunderstandings 
(Deleuze, 2006, pp.22-27). The first is the postulate of property, which is that power 
is a "property" won by class. Foucault's concept of power for Deleuze is less a 
property than a strategy; and thus is exercised rather than possessed. Power is the 
overall effect of its strategic positions. Smart believes that Foucault's concept of 
power is a "non-class" analysis. Deleuze adds that this Foucauldian new 
functionalism and functional analysis does not deny the existence of class and 
class-struggle, but merely illustrates it in a different way. Concretely, "power is not 
homogeneous but can be defined only by the particular points through which it 
passes" (p. 23). Rather than analogy, homology, or univocality—as found in the 
thinking that power belongs to a specific social class—power is a kind of possible 
continuity. The matters that exist within power are innumerable and unstable points 
of confrontation, each of which presents the risks of conflict, of struggles, and of a 
temporary inversion of power relations. 
The second point is the postulate of localization. This states that power is the power 
of the State and is located in the machinery of state. But, as Deleuze puts it, 
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Foucault's idea is not like that. For Deleuze, Foucault's perspective is that "the State 
itself appears as the overall effect or result of a series of interacting wheels or 
structures which are located at a completely different level, and which constitute a 
`microphysics of power' (ibid). State is the concrete configuration which is 
constituted by the operation of power. For instance, as an institution, police forces are 
organized in the form of a state apparatus and its mechanisms. Their operation is 
specifically implicated in the exercise of power and discipline. Foucault defines 
modem societies as "disciplinarian" societies in Discipline and Punish. Deleuze 
explains that this discipline is a type of power, a technology that traverses every kind 
of apparatus or institution and enables power and technology to function in a new 
way. We cannot identify this power with any one institution or apparatus precisely. 
Likewise, the birth of the prison does not lie in the juridico-political structure of a 
society, nor does it link to the evolution of law. In its role in the administration of 
punishment, prison also possesses autonomy itself and it reveals a disciplinary 
supplement that goes beyond the machinery of State. Deleuze argues that "Foucault's 
functionalism throws up a new topology which no longer locates the origin of power 
in a privileged place, and can no longer accept a limited localization" (p. 24). 
"Local," in Deleuze's interpretation, has two very different meanings: on the one 
hand, power is never global so it is local; on the other hand, power is not local or 
localized because it is diffuse. 
The third postulate is of subordination, which suggests that power embodied in the 
machinery of State would be subordinate both to a mode of production and to an 
infrastructure. As we have seen, the disciplinary mechanisms cannot be separated 
from the demographic upsurge in the eighteenth century, or the growth in economic 
production extracting useful force from the body. But, in Deleuze's view, power 
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cannot only be seen in terms of economic determination. For Foucault, relations of 
power are not outside other types of relationships, and are not in superstructural 
positions. They have a directly productive role. Deleuze argues that, in this respect, 
Foucault's functional microanalysis replaces the Marxist concept with a strict 
immanence where power and disciplinary techniques form multiple segments, and 
where human body and soul traverse. Foucauldian power, again, is a social space in 
Deleuze's view. It "is characterized by immanence of field without transcendent 
unification, continuity of line without global centralization, and contiguity of parts 
without distinct totalization" (ibid). That is to say, power is not the limited space or 
category which can be fixed, centralized and totalized. Far from being static, the 
space of power is opened, dispersed and dynamic. 
In the fourth postulate power is seen to have an essence or is an attribute. Deleuze 
argues, however, that power is simply operational in Foucault's account. Power has 
no essence. It is not an attribute but a relation. The power relation is the set of 
possible relations between forces, which passes through both the dominated forces 
and the dominating forces. Power invests the dominated, passes through them and 
with the help of them. Once the dominated struggle against power, they still need to 
commence with action by means of power. Rather than operating in a general sphere, 
a power-relation establishes itself wherever conflict or confrontation is to be found. It 
could be such as boundary disputes, quarrels between parents and children, domestic 
tiffs, and public squabbles. All of these, for Deleuze, are relations between forces. 
The fifth is the postulate of modality. By reprimanding, by tricking or persuading, by 
acting as police or as propaganda, power is exercised through the use of violence or 
ideology. But, Deleuze points out, even when power concerns the soul, it does not 
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come about through ideology; even when power weighs on the body, it does not 
necessarily separate through violence and repression. Violence does not express the 
power relation—the relations between force and force, an action upon an action. The 
relation between forces is a function of the type such as to incite, to provoke, to 
combine, to allocate, to classify, to compose, to normalize and so on. As Deleuze puts 
it: "power produces reality before it represses" (p. 25). Equally, "it produces truth 
before it ideologizes, abstracts or masks" (ibid). Foucault does not ignore repression 
and ideology. But, as Nietzsche had seen, Deleuze says, far from constituting the 
struggle between forces, they are "only the dust thrown up by such a contest" (p. 26). 
Legality is the sixth postulate, in which State power expresses itself in law. At this 
point, revolutionaries can only demand a different legality, which comes from 
winning power, and then installing a new machinery of State. Deleuze argues, 
however, that Foucault's insight makes use of the subtle correlation made between 
illegalisms and laws to replace the crude opposition of law and illegality. Law, in any 
case, is not contrasted worldwide with illegality. For Deleuze, power is not the 
property of the dominant class, but the strategy of that class in action. This point of 
Foucauldian power therefore breaks with Marxist assumptions, and breaks with 
complicity about the State. Local tactics and overall strategies in the battles in society 
are advanced not by totalizing but by relaying, connecting, converging and 
prolonging. 
4.7.2 Foucault is not a thinker of confinement 
Deleuze argues that it is wrong to regard Foucault as a thinker of confinement. 
Hospital and prison in Foucault's work also cannot be interpreted as this way. On the 
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contrary, they are open space or "highways" (p. 37) where speed or acceleration run 
unlimitedly. As a hard segmentarity and a free area, prison is the place where a whole 
network interweaves. It has flexible and mobile functions. Deleuze draws on Maurice 
Blanchot's interpretation of Foucault. In Blanchot's view, "confinement refers to an 
outside, and what is confined is precisely the outside" (ibid). For Deleuze, whether 
discursive or non-discursive, they neither enclose nor interiorize anything. Instead, 
"they are forms of exteriority through which either statements or visible things are 
dispersed" (ibid). Here, Deleuze points out there are three (or more) correlative 
agencies (ibid). First of all, there is the "outside" which exists as an unformed 
element of forces. Forces come from outside, and conversely, outside stirs up 
relations between forces and draws out their diagrams16 . Second, there is the 
"exterior"' 7—the area of concrete assemblages where relations between forces are 
realized. Lastly, there are "the forms of exteriority"I8 (ibid) which is the split or 
disjunction between two different forms that are exterior to each another and yet 
share the same assemblage. Confinement in Deleuze's account is only a transitory 
figure on the surface of the forms of exteriority. In any case, Deleuze stresses that 
"nothing in Foucault is really closed off' (p. 37). The evolution of forces and the 
diagram expand the history of forms. The force exists within a relation network from 
one point to another. The diagram from the outside includes the points that are 
relatively free or unbound. Creativity, resistance, struggle and change start from these 
16 Deleuze defines the meaning of diagram as follows: "it is the presentation of the relations between 
forces unique to a particular formation; it is the distribution of the power to affect and the power to be 
affected; it is the mixing of non-formalized pure functions unformed pure matter" (Deleuze, 2006, p. 
61). 
17 Deleuze considers that there is a need to differentiate the meaning between outside and exteriority. 
In his account, the exteriority is a form, such as two forms in knowledge—light (visibility) and 
language (statement) are exterior to one another. The outside, however, is not a form; it concerns force. 
Forces refer to an irreducible outside, and are interactive with each other at outside. The outside "is 
made up of distances that cannot be broken down through which one force acts upon another or is 
acted upon by another" (Deleuze, 2006, p. 72) 
18 "Prison" is one of the examples of "the forms of exteriority". It shares the same assemblage 
between two forms: the visibility of crime and the expression of penal law. These two forms are 
exterior to each other. This assemblage evolves "disciplinary" and the statements of "delinquency". 
177 
points. We may understand the whole picture, the succession of diagrams through 
these dynamic points that go beyond the discontinuities. To sum up, in Deleuze's 
view, Foucault is a cartographer. His writing is to struggle and resist, to become and 
to draw a map. 
Here, I would like to expound more about what Deleuze means by "outside" and 
about its relation with Foucauldian power. Outside, in Deleuze's sense, does not 
mean a real place that is occupied by forces. On the contrary, it is a provisional and 
unstable "non-place" (p. 71). Non-place is not a fixed place that is visible. In this 
"non-place", forces are not a formed substance, but are in a perpetual state of 
evolution. The diagram mentioned earlier is a "non-place" rather than a physical 
place. It is a place only of mutation. In this way, things are changing continuously; 
they are no longer perceived or articulated in the same way. The distance towards 
outside is too far to be measurable; however, the influence that comes from outside is 
so far-reaching (in this respect, it is also too near to be calculable). For Deleuze, the 
thinking of Foucault's works addresses itself to an outside that has no form, "which is 
swallowed up by the interstice between seeing and speaking" (p. 72). This thinking of 
outside is in a mixed-up state of agitation, modification and mutation. The force of 
self-constitution and self-transformation also comes from outside. Transformation 
effects outside and then come back to subject. As Deleuze puts it: "the outside is 
always an opening on to a future: nothing ends, since nothing has begun, but 
everything is transformed" (p. 74). In Deleuze's account, "a social field offers more 
resistance than strategies, and the thought of the outside is a thought of resistance" 
(ibid). The force operated outside is the force of resistance. That is, resistance effects 
change. Resistance, for Deleuze, is more like an affirmative power of life (this is 
"virtue" for Foucault). Once power takes life as its aim or object like this, resistance 
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to power has to put itself on the side of life, and turns life against power. Drawing on 
Nietzsche's idea, Deleuze points out that Foucauldian resistance "is the force of a life 
that is larger, more active, more affirmative and richer in possibilities" (p. 77). 
Deleuze elucidates the idea of outside in one of his interviews. He claims that "in 
Foucault we find the outside, the folding of the line Outside, and human reality as the 
being of the Outside" (Deleuze, 1995c, p. 112). In Deleuze's interpretation, 
knowledge and power for Foucault are not something extrinsic, they are always 
already in place. They produce the forces to break through the confinement of the 
subject and to reach the line Outside. Crossing over the line Outside, the dominant 
power/knowledge vanish, and the positive power of life appears. For Deleuze, 
Foucault brings out the relation between power/knowledge and outside in terms of the 
problem of living. Once crossing through the line Outside, ways of living become 
different. Power and knowledge are not limited any more. Deleuze raises further 
questions regarding this: "How far can we unfold the line without falling into a 
breathless void, into death, and how can we fold it, but without losing touch with it, 
to produce an inside copresent with the outside, corresponding to the outside?" (p. 
113) That is, when we reach the line Outside, how we can make sure that outside is a 
real outside, rather than another duplicated inside. The question is, whether we can 
have a pure outside without subjugation, without dominant governance. For Deleuze, 
rather than a substantial utopia, the outside is constituted (or is folded) by an ongoing 
practice. Or we may say, as mentioned earlier, outside is a "highway" where 
acceleration runs without hindrance. In Foucault's account, I consider that outside is 
the place where that attitude of "critique" is aroused unceasingly. Only this 
continuous interrogation of the self, of what we are can foster human as the being of 
the outside. 
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4.7.3 Foucauldian thinking of history 
In the Deleuzian view, although history is a method that Foucault uses, Foucault is 
not a historian at all. He invents a completely different relation to history. Traditional 
history, according to Foucault, is the matter that circumscribes us and sets limits. 
Deleuze explains the Foucauldian notion of history further: "it doesn't determine 
what we are, but what we're in the process of differing from; it doesn't fix our 
identity, but disperses it into our essential otherness" (Deleuze, 1995b, p. 95). That is 
to say, what we are and our identity is never to be fixed and is changeable in different 
contexts. This also presumes that subjectivity has various possible components. 
Foucault deals with historical series from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and 
from the Greeks and Christians in his last books. For Deleuze, this is not to find the 
way for ourselves to be Greeks or Christians, but to become something else. History 
is "what separates us from ourselves and what we have to go through and beyond in 
order to think what we are" (ibid). Namely, history could be the impetus to shape 
what we are, which helps us to go beyond our original self. For Deleuze, "Foucault's 
key historical principle is that any historical formation says all it can say and sees all 
it can see" (p. 96). In his discussion of madness, for example, he talks about it in what 
light of what can be seen, and in what utterances can be talked of. And then this 
allows us to ask ourselves today: what are we able to say today, and what are we able 
to see (ibid)? In Deleuze's view, we have to find visibilities in history by ourselves, 
and to break things open and to break words open in order to find what is uttered in 
them. This act that is articulated in history, as in Flynn's interpretation, is to reflect on 
our current practices. 
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4.7.4 Subject and power 
Apart from power and knowledge, for Deleuze, the subject is the third dimension of 
Foucault's thought. Foucault's concepts of power and knowledge indeed relate to the 
"subject". Why does Foucault need this third dimension? Deleuze explains that it is 
because the play of forces has become a line that Foucault attempts to cross and to go 
beyond. The subject is another way to unlock the impasse of the notion of power. It 
also invokes foci of resistance. The subject, Deleuze explains, does not mean a person 
or a form of identity in Foucault's account. Instead, it refers to "subjectification" as 
process and "Self' as a relation (a relation to oneself) (Deleuze, 1995a, p. 92) Thus, 
what Foucault talks about is a relation of force to itself (and to other forces), and a 
"fold" of force. The establishment of different ways of existing depends on how one 
folds the line of forces. It refers to the question of "doubling" the play of forces of a 
self-relation (Deleuze, 1995b, p. 98), namely, a reflexive force playing on the self. 
Power and knowledge, on the one hand, determine form, and constrain rules; but, on 
the other hand, they make existence a work of art to life. By way of this work of art, 
power can be resisted and knowledge can be evaded and then a new possibility of life 
is invented. This is what Nietzsche explored as the will to power. On the constitution 
of subject, Deleuze's thinking differs from the other secondary literature on Foucault 
that I have considered. He argues that "subjectification has little to do with any 
subject" (Deleuze, 1995a, p. 93) Instead, subjectification is an electric or magnetic 
field, which is the site of "an individuation taking place through intensities" (ibid). In 
other words, intensity is the effect which issues from the process of subjectification in 
order to transform an individual. Deleuze considers that intensity is synonymous with 
what Foucault calls "passion" (ibid)—a passion to our individual life. Together with 
power and knowledge, they constitute a way of living, and a way of modern 
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philosophies. Deleuze claims then that "there is no subject, but a production of 
subjectivity" (Deleuze, 1995c, p. 113). This means that subjectivity is not something 
that is "ready-made". On the contrary, it is always in the making (or becoming) and it 
has to be produced while working with knowledge and power. This process of 
production forces us to frame new questions that have not been framed before. In 
Deleuze's point, subjectification is the process of folding the line outside. In this 
respect, it is "an artistic activity distinct from, and lying outside, knowledge and 
power" (p. 114). 
When Deleuze shows that power is not localizable, and it is located in a 
heterogeneous and open social space, I consider, that this refers to his idea that power 
exists within a "non-place" and refers to "outside". It seems then that outside, as a 
space for mutation and continual evolution, is a territory that extends infinitely and 
has no boundary. It is not in opposition to inside, but goes beyond the dichotomy 
between inside and outside. Though Blanchot says: "what is confined is precisely the 
outside," this does not mean outside is the place deemed to be confined, but that there 
is an irreducible relation between power and outside. Butler claims that the second 
task of critique is to uncover the breaking points and the contingent moments of the 
discontinuities in the system of power/knowledge. I suggest that the space beyond 
these breaking points and contingent moments is the Deleuzian "outside". An outside 
is the place in which power/knowledge is changed from domination to activation and 
constitutes a confrontation to an assumed inert life. My question here is: since the 
relations of power come from and are stirred up at outside, are the forces of power 
generated by the will of subject or does it take place by the interplay between subject 
and the relations with other contingent events (such as by seeing and by speaking)? 
Perhaps, the latter would be possible if there is, as Deleuze mentioned previously, a 
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"doubling" play of forces. This "doubling" indicates a reflexive process that goes 
back and forth between subject and historical events. This doubling play of forces is 
exercised not only by the subject, but also by the convergence between subject and 
power/knowledge. I consider that Flynn's point of "reflective withdrawal" or 
"reflective freedom" is the display of doubling play. It is also "the ontological 
condition of ethics" in Foucault's thinking. 
As in the interpretations of Gordon, Masschelein or Butler, power/knowledge is 
double-sided. On the one hand, it causes the confinement of subject; but, on the other 
hand, it is also the solution for the former situation. It seems to me, Foucault tries the 
act of keeping distance—"de-subjectification" (it is also the "ironic" gesture in the 
interpretation of Dreyfus and Rabinow)—to solve the problem that power/knowledge 
causes, or to resist the effect of power. Deleuze, however, shows his own way to 
consider this question. While he says: "there is no subject, but a production of 
subjectivity" (Deleuze, 1995c, p. 113), it refers to two aspects. First, this 
"production" has two possibilities: on the one hand, the subject could be produced 
docilely; on the other hand, there is a "self-production" inspired by resistance. I think 
Deleuze does concentrate on the latter. Second, subjects cannot be fixed and located; 
namely the production of subjectivity is an ongoing process. Our being is therefore a 
"becoming". Deleuze in fact chooses the movement of a continual mutation or 
incessant evolution to constitute a "grown-up" subject (or I should say a 
"growing-up" subject; the formation of subject is progressive tense in this sense). 
This movement is both "de-subjectification" and "re-subjectification" that breaks 
through the confinement of power/knowledge, and is a "fold" of force to serve the 
purpose of resistance. It takes place at outside, and thereby maps "intensity" by forces 
(or even by power). Within outside, the constraint caused by power/knowledge 
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dissolves by means of ceaseless movement. And resistance, in this respect, is an act to 
reject the idea of remaining the same self. 
4.8 The change of my thinking of power/knowledge 
In the process of reading from Foucault's two main works on power/knowledge, as 
well as interviews, essays and secondary literature, my thinking about 
power/knowledge has been changed. This change has two main aspects: first, my 
focus has moved from power/knowledge itself to the issue of the subject. Through the 
interpretations of the secondary literature, I realize that the concept of 
power/knowledge cannot be separated from human subjects. That is, the three notions, 
power, knowledge and subject should be seen as interactive; as Deleuze suggests, 
power, knowledge and human subject are three dimensions of Foucault's thought. 
Second, my concentration has been moved from the negative effects of 
power/knowledge (the tactics that govern human subjects by such as normalization or 
examination) to the positive functions of it (such as critique or resistance in 
Foucault's term). As suggested, the effect of power/knowledge has its double sides. 
On the one hand, it causes the domination of modern rationality by disciplinary 
power or pastoral power, which is manifested in Discipline and Punish. On the other 
hand, an act of critique, of de-subjectivation, of de-governmentization or of 
limit-experience can also be aroused by a new form of power/knowledge, which is 
underscored especially in Foucault's later work. After reading the secondary 
literature, I consider that it is better to shed further light on the latter than the former. 
Then, an attitude of resistance can be adopted in order to face the problem that arose 
from power/knowledge. I shall address these ideas below. 
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Indeed, power/knowledge is an important theme in Foucault's thought and penetrates 
all of his work. His primary concern, however, is not the essence of power/knowledge 
or the method of analyzing power/knowledge. Power/knowledge is merely an 
perspective to see how a subject fits into a certain games of truth. As Foucault claims: 
power and knowledge "are only an analytical grid" (Foucault, 2007, p. 60) Or in 
Masschelein's interpretation, knowledge is a "reflexive ethical instrument" 
(Masschelein and Simons, 2007, p. 8), which is an experimental knowledge for the 
self. Instead of power/knowledge, the subject and the self are the focuses in 
Foucault's thought to which power/knowledge is the route. We could say, therefore, 
that a relation with power/knowledge is also a relation with self, with a subject (or we 
can think of it more broadly: with collective subjects). Foucault's purpose with 
reference to power/knowledge is to explore how human beings are made subjects in 
history and in Western culture. Though the main concept in my thesis is 
power/knowledge, it would be wrong for me to inquire only into the meaning of this 
notion. The subject that power is exercised over and its interaction with 
power/knowledge are also significant for in this topic. 
Furthermore, even though disciplinary power or bio-power controls our behaviour 
and the way of thinking, Foucault does not assert that people are compelled 
unavoidably to be obedient subjects. Rather, the issue which permeates his thought is 
the possibility of how human beings can be transformative subjects. Power, in his 
view, is not only a coercive structure, but also "matrices of transformations" 
(Foucault, 1990, p. 99), through which one's subject could have various formations 
(not merely a singular pattern) and various possibilities. In this sense, rather than 
being decided by norms or universal reason, one should take responsibility to decide 
what she is by herself. This responsibility is the threshold of the act of critique and 
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self-transformation. If power, as Foucault claims, is productive, I would say, the 
effect that it produces is not only political and economic utility, but also a new 
subject—a subject who need not submit to the process of normalization, 
governmentalization and subjectivation; and a subject who dares to engage in the 
process of self-making. Deleuze shows that the process of the latter means an 
individual subject is a "becoming". The constitution of the subject is unceasing and 
never has its ending. This is also what Foucault calls "a possible crossing-over" 
(Foucault, 1997, p. 315)—crossing over dominant thinking, and crossing over an 
unchangeable subject. Here, Foucault has never mentioned what kind of subject one 
should be. That is because his task is only to remind his readers of making 
power/knowledge problematic. As to the issue of how to constitute as an individual 
subject, he hands this task over to his readers. That is to say, everyone has to take 
care of himself/herself; no one can take up this imperative mission except oneself. 
In Foucault's account, resistance is an essential concept in considering 
power/knowledge. The existence of resistance implies the possibility that an 
individual can achieve freedom in the process of self-formation; and it also shows 
that it is possible to refuse what we are and to accomplish the aim of "how not to be 
governed" (Foucault, 2007, p.44). This freedom is Flynn's so called "reflective 
freedom" and also "reflective withdrawal", which is not an inherent freedom to be 
endowed with, but only can be obtained only by practice. This practice is "critique", 
"limit-experience" and "de-subjectivation" in Foucault's terms. Rather than liberating 
subjects from repressive power, this practice is to liberate the subject by way of the 
positive effect of power and knowledge. This is the form of power/knowledge that we 
need, in order to transgress the limits which we impose on ourselves. 
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Chapter 5 Critiques of curriculum theories 
This chapter turns again to the curriculum theorists examined in Chapter 2 and 
reconsiders their mobilization of the Foucauldian idea of power/knowledge. In 
Chapters 3 and 4 I have sought to examine Foucault's elaboration of this idea and the 
secondary literature that this has generated, with a view to becoming clearer about the 
meaning of the term and its range of applicability. It is with this more robust 
understanding of power/knowledge that I now reconsider those curriculum theorists. 
Following this I shall then consider the curriculum theorists, examining one by one 
the ways in which their readings of power/knowledge come closer to Foucault's 
intent. In certain respects I believe that the readings of power/knowledge offered by 
these theorists are tainted by neo-marxism or critical theory. This is apparent not only 
in Cherryholmes' work, but also in that of Giroux and Ball, reflecting the more 
dominant way of thinking about critical educational research. For me, the work of 
Popkewitz's use of Foucault contributes to a more profound thinking about 
curriculum. I will therefore only point to how this is so, rather than offer a critique of 
his idea. After general evaluation of these four curriculum theorists, I draw on 
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Deleuze's metaphors of the tree and the rhizome to develop another critique of their 
theories. I shall argue that their reception of Foucault contributes to a tree-like 
perspective of looking at the concept of power/knowledge, which, in my view, 
narrows the scope for considering this theme in education. Instead of an arborescent 
mode of thought, it is better to see power/knowledge in a rhizomatic way. I seek to 
develop this approach to the interpretation of power/knowledge and to offer my own 
perspective on Foucault's concept. 
5.1 An evaluation of the adoption of power/knowledge in curriculum theories 
5.1.1 Cherryholmes 
In this section, I will concentrate on two aspects of Cherryholmes' reception of the 
idea of power/knowledge. First, I will show how Cherryholmes' standpoint diverges 
from Foucault's in his analysis of discourse practice in the curriculum, in which 
power is dominated by the elements of authority, ideology and instrumental reason. 
Second, I shall argue that Cherryholmes' analysis fails to responds to Foucault's idea 
of a history of the present. Both of these are due to the implication of power 
/knowledge being seen in a dominant way by Cherryholmes. 
Power/knowledge as a feature of dominant social structure 
Cherryholmes has offered several examples in his analysis in order to claim that 
education can be seen as a discursive practice. His idea of power/knowledge, however, 
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can be put into the category of "juridico-discursive"19 that Foucault opposes. In his 
critique of "construct validity", though, on the one hand, Cherryholmes underscores 
Foucault's assertion that power is productive; on the other hand, he addresses the 
point that researchers produce knowledge via the process of legitimization. In his 
view, research serves the function of political domination and social reproduction. 
Power produces both the speech of construct validity and its silence. He thereby 
draws the conclusion that speakers have limited control in this power/knowledge 
nexus. The "truth", he presupposes, is that educational research is constituted by 
certain ideologies, interests and powers embedded in and transmitted by language. 
Rather than productive power, in fact, truth is formed by a dominant power for that 
narrows of the meaning of discourse in this respect. Take the adoption of textbooks 
for example: he considers that power achieves the effect of efficiency, control, 
instrumentalism and utilitarianism in these texts, and ideological bias is unavoidable 
in them. Knowledge, for Cherryholmes, is an instrument to legitimize or contest 
existing power relations (Cherryholmes, 1983, p. 343). He presumes a dominant 
structure in our society that expands into educational arenas. Educational researches, 
teacher education, the aim of education and the adoption of textbooks are all affected 
under and by this structure. According to this he supposes that Foucault's notion of 
power is generated from a "macro-level" social structure, when actually this is not the 
case.20 I consider that Cherryholmes interprets Foucault's idea according to his own 
political goals in line with critical theory. He therefore assumes that instrumental 
rationality is the vehicle of domination in the adoption and production of textbooks. 
He also assumes that educational research methods accompany the development of 
19 I have addressed this Foucauldian notion in Chapter 3. 
20 On the contrary, Foucault claims that his concept of power is a "micro-physics of power" (Foucault, 
1991a, p. 139). 
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science or positivism, which makes possible a technological mastery over our 
thinking about educating. 
In Smart's view, rather than critical theory, Foucault's critique of modern rationality 
and his rejection of global and systematizing forms of theory derive from Nietzsche's 
idea of genealogy (Smart, 1983, p. 135). Smart argues that the critique in the work of 
the critical theorists is a "critique of ideology" generated from the Enlightenment, 
which signifies "a process of reflection on humanly produced illusions, distortions, 
and systems of constraint" (ibid). However, Foucault's genealogical analysis for 
Smart shows a different approach of critique. Foucault attempts to open up a different 
route to diagnose the constitution of "regimes of truth" in Western society, and to 
disrupt those forms of power/knowledge that serve a dominant rationality. His 
analysis is actually beyond good and evil, in Nietzsche's phrase, and beyond 
oppression and exploitation. Smart explains this idea further: 
The objective of Foucault's analysis is not the construction or preservation of a 
particular "truth" within theory, or a formulation of the process by which theory might 
be realized in practice, or an elevation of theory as the final refuge of resistance. Rather, 
the object has been an analysis of the interrelationship between the formation of 
domains and objects and their articulation within discourse itself subject to rules and 
procedures of verification and falsification, and the effects of this complex relationship 
"in the real". (p. 136) 
For Smart, Foucault's concern is how truth is seen as the truth in discourses, how 
power governs ourselves and our relationships with others by means of the 
production of truth, and how productive technologies of power make up a particular 
rationality. This intention is clearly seen in Foucault's essay "The subject and 
power". He would like to uncover how human beings are made subjects through the 
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effects of power/knowledge and through specific reasons which power/knowledge 
generates. Cherryholmes' analysis of power and knowledge is different from this, as 
education is regarded as a discursive practice that imposes the dominant ideology or 
specific interests of ruling groups. 
Foucault sees discourse itself as practice. This is the point that Cherryholmes adopts 
from Foucault's earlier work. Cherryholmes' idea of discourse, however, is far from 
developed along Foucauldian lines. According to Flynn's interpretation, in Foucault's 
approach of archaeology, power/knowledge is the elaboration of "judicative" and 
"veridicative" dimensions of practice (Flynn, 2006, p. 31). This means 
power/knowledge reveals the way that norms are established and are applied, and the 
way that true/false distinction is judged and that its discourse is made possible. The 
historic examination of this approach cannot be simplified by using ideology to 
answer all questions. Rather than opening on to alternative accounts of discourses, 
Cherryholmes' work merely imposes negation on every educational practice. His 
analysis fails to explore how people's biases have been constituted in history 
contingently, and then to show the epistemic limits in our educational practices in 
order to open up alternative ways of seeing things. Actually, his perspective of 
looking at power/knowledge is itself caught into an epistemic limit. 
The history of the present 
As Gordon argues, Foucault's philosophical challenge to history is not to survey the 
reality of the past, but to interrogate the rationality of the "present" (Gordon, 1980, p. 
242). For Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault's "the history of the present" starts from a 
"diagnosis" of the current situation through an examination of a meticulous ritual of 
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power or a political technology of the body. This diagnosis is an ironic attitude to our 
current situation (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 119). Nevertheless, I cannot get any 
hint of this point from Cherryholmes' analysis. In Cherryholmes' critique of 
Popkewitz's example, he claims that teacher education is controlled by the 
"knowledge" of scientific measurements. The method of scientific measurements 
follows certain scientific or political rationality associated with governmental 
technologies. It is an alliance with the recognized scientific views concerning the 
individual. I consider that following Foucault, the target that the diagnosis of "the 
history of the present" struggles against is not the dominant economic structure, but 
the dominant rationality—the governance of pedagogy, the governance of politics, 
and the governance of economics behind that structure. This dominant rationality, 
again, cannot be reduced merely to the composition of ideology, as Cherryholmes 
suggests. Mark Olssen (2003) argues: "A political rationality is not simply an 
ideology but a worked-out discourse containing theories and ideas that emerge in 
response to concrete problems within a determinate historical period" 2' (p. 196). The 
concrete problem here is not the dominance of ideology (though it could be part of 
dominant rationality), but the governance of a certain inertia or rationality which not 
only functions to solve social problems in terms of technologies of power, but also 
dominates thinking and behaviour of individuals in modern society and in our current 
schooling. This governance is not always bad, but is dangerous in Foucault's view. 
Another misleading aspect of Cherryholmes' analysis of educational history in the 
light of power/knowledge is the way he considers power: he claims that it is a 
repressive force to confine the production of knowledge, as in the example of 
21 This idea echoes with Flynn's interpretation of Foucault's idea of history in his later work, in which 
history is seen as the practice of "problematization" (Flynn, 2006, p. 38). 
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textbook adoption. As I have elaborated above, power relations in Foucault's account 
are a set of actions acts upon other actions, which can bring about many possible 
actions. The characteristic of power is more multiple, and cannot be narrowly seen as 
merely serving domination or oppression. In Flynn's analysis, power is also more 
optimistic than pessimistic. He claims that the diagnosis in "the history of the 
present" concerns the nature of the present by following lines of fragility in the 
present, which opens up what Foucault calls "a space of concrete freedom" or of 
possible transformation (Flynn, 2005, pp. 103-104). Our present in this sense has 
never been confined or fixed. It is, instead, waiting for a turning point to challenge 
what it is and what it was. Writing history, therefore, is not a task to inform readers to 
fit themselves into presumptive roles in this history. On the contrary, history should 
be a fable to inspire its readers to think about the possibility of changing themselves 
in a positive way. Rather than setting limits, history should open up a field of 
possibility. 
Cherryholmes raises a good example to consider the historical development of social 
studies education. He attempts to explore how the utterances of three traditions of 
social studies curriculum22 are produced by power relations. His analysis, however, 
concentrates merely on ideological commitments, and on the consequence of 
inclusion and exclusion. Foucault's concept can, I suggest, be used to think about this 
issue in another way. The emergence of these three approaches has to be seen in their 
historical and political context. In the tradition of "citizenship transmission", the 
United States had a need to gain national cohesion in that era (in the 1940s, after 
World War Two). The social studies curriculum thus became a route to confer 
22 
 These three traditions were addressed by Robert. D. Barr, James L. Barth, and S. Samuel Shermis 
(1977) in their essay entitled "Defining the social studies". 
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national value and identity onto all prospective citizens. The purpose behind this 
curriculum was to constitute a common consensus so as to enhance national 
development in politics and the economy. The regime of truth in education, or we 
may say, the truth of education was that it is the way of providing students with the 
"proper" notion of citizenship. 
Concerning the second tradition, "the social science disciplines", social studies were 
taught in terms of the methods of social sciences. This tradition was linked to the 
trend of the New Social Studies in the 1960s in America. This curriculum focused on 
cultivating each student as a social scientist. Its historical background was related to 
the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, which brought to light a lot of educational 
problems and thus informed mood of educational reform in America. The military 
and scientific competition between United States and Soviet Russia led to the result 
that the production of the knowledge of science and social science were suddenly 
given far more priority in education. Accordingly, scientific and systematic methods 
were introduced in each subject in which social studies was included. The United 
States yearned to catch up with Soviet Russia in the national level competition by 
means of training students as scientists or social scientists through the school 
curriculum. The aim of learning the knowledge and the method of social science 
hence became the "truth" in social studies education. 
The third tradition began in the 1970s, when skill development and values 
clarification were at the heart of the aim of curricula. During the 1970s, the American 
government endeavoured to promote the value of equality and to narrow the gap 
between different ethnic groups and between different cultures. Students' ability for 
self-decision and self-development had become more important to serve this purpose. 
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Social studies education became a way of responding to this concern to make students 
into active social participants. Social skills like communication skills and critical 
thinking had become central to educational training in the classroom. According to 
this genealogical analysis, we may see that social studies education was regarded as 
an avenue to deal with social and political problems. It is also the nexus through 
which power/knowledge is manipulated so as to respond to these problems. 
"Bio-power", in Foucault's terms, was evidenced in the development of these three 
approaches. The three traditions display three kinds of historical formation in each 
era. Knowledge in social studies is the combination of visible and articulable 
elements that are embedded in each historical formulation. I wonder to what extent 
these three traditions refer to our present; and whether we have a new way of seeing 
and a new way of saying after them. In other words, apart from law-abiding citizens, 
social scientists and social problem solvers, what else can students be? 
Flynn asserts that Foucault seeks to write a history of a "problem" rather than of a 
"period" (2006, p. 43). "Problematization" is therefore an important task in writing a 
Foucauldian history. At the heart of "problematization" is an investigation of "truth 
games", which are encompassed by power/knowledge. This is an attempt to explore 
dimensions of experience in discursive practices—an experience about how an 
individual constitutes and recognizes himself as both object and subject in modem 
Western society. In Flynn's view, Foucault shifts his genealogical critique for 
historical understanding from Marxist science and ideology or from hermeneutical 
text and interpretation, to power-strategy and tactics (p. 35). Then, the question 
becomes "How to make the history of the development of social studies problematic 
in this respect?" Its philosophical practice is not like Cherryholmes' criticism of the 
domination of ideology, but a diagnosis towards modern rationality in education. 
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With regard to a social studies curriculum, there is, first, a need to survey how "truth 
games" were played in each tradition. After that, the task is not that we have to 
envisage another, fourth tradition and then engage ourselves in the consideration of a 
better approach—an approach without repression and hegemony. The key point of 
"the history of the present" in Foucault's later work is a task of distancing ourselves 
from a certain dominant rationality. Rather than those three established educational 
purposes and three arranged subjectivities for children, I suggest the following 
questions: Can we have alternative ideas of the aim of study? Can students have 
freedom to decide what they would like to be in the future? Can social studies go 
beyond immobile purposes, which stood behind those three traditions? Foucault's 
genealogical inquiry, in my view, does not seek the answer of what the social studies 
curriculum should be. Instead, it is an interrogation towards the possibility of thinking 
what social studies should not be. This thinking refers to the question that 
Cherryholmes himself raises: "How can people gain control of their discourses and 
practices instead of being controlled by them?" (1988, p. 36). It associates with 
Foucault's endeavour of seeking to reject what we are. This is also a practice of 
resistance for gaining more freedom in education. 
5.1.2 Giroux 
In this part, I shall critique Giroux's misemployment of power/knowledge by 
focussing on two points. First, Giroux's idea of power is as a kind of 
dual-dimensional and unidirectional power. On the contrary, however, Foucault's 
notion of power is dynamic, dispersive and polymorphous, and cannot be "fixed" in 
Giroux's way. Second, Giroux has a different way of seeing the "value-of-reason" 
from Foucault. He offers a singular thinking of universal truth in his emancipatory 
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practice of education. Foucault, however, is a pluralist with regard to reason and 
truth. 
Dual-dimensional, unidirectional power vs. Dynamic, polymorphous power 
Giroux provides a critique of the unidimensional power (that is, power is exercised 
only for repression) of Marxism, in which knowledge is analyzed for its distortions. 
He extends the idea of power to be dual-dimensional whose purpose is both 
reproduction and transformation. In Giroux's view, on one hand, curriculum is 
dominated by cultural reproduction or neo-conservative ideology, which is the 
negative dimension of power. On the other hand, power needs to be used in service of 
the ideals of justice and democracy, towards a more positive function, the positive 
dimension of power to which Giroux pays special attention. Power, in this 
perspective, is distinguished by its two poles. One is for repression; the other is for 
emancipation. Its direction of movement is from the repressive side to the 
emancipatory. This unidirectional procedure might be called empowerment. Here, I 
try to generalize Giroux's viewpoint on power as follows: 
negative dimension 	 positive dimension 
domination 	 empower 	 resistance 
repression 	 emancipation 
reproduction 	 transformation 
Though Giroux does not take the view that power is merely employed for repression 
in education, his assumptions are still that teachers and students lack power and that 
they are oppressed by power. Otherwise, why do they need to be empowered? There 
is a causal relation behind his supposition. Because power is oppressing, we need 
liberation as a solution. He thus argues that, rather than a dominant instrument, 
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curriculum needs to be seen as a form of cultural politics that gives students an active 
voice in order to change their subordinated situation, which lacks cultural capital. 
This is the positive perspective of power that he derives from Foucault's concept. 
However, the purpose of Foucault's study of power is different from this. Foucault 
never intended to liberate prisoners or emancipate sexuality through Discipline and 
Punish and History of Sexuality. I have shown this very clearly in Chapter 3. As 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) point out: 
...it is important to realize that he ( Foucault) does not see sexual identity or sexual 
liberation as inherently free from or necessarily opposed to domination within our 
society. He has frequently been misunderstood on this point... (p. 169) 
It is inappropriate to fix Foucauldian power/knowledge in a particular function or to 
portray it with a specific purpose. The notion of power can better be seen in terms of 
a relationship rather than as a matter of substance. For Foucault, power is inherent 
within social networks rather than being constituted somehow above society as a 
supplementary structure. In Giroux's concept, this supplementary structure is a binary 
structure. There is a distinction between repression and emancipation, and they are 
irreconcilable. Foucault's view of power, as Gordon claims, "is not an omnipotent 
causal principle or shaping spirit but a perspective concept" (Gordon, 1980, p. 245). 
Power is everywhere; it is always already there. One can never be outside power, but 
this does not mean one is trapped or condemned to defeat. In contrast to Giroux's 
account of dual-dimensional and unidirectional power, my argument is that power for 
Foucault is dynamic and polymorphous. 
First of all, Foucault asserts that "power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor 
recovered, but rather exercised, and that it only exists in action" (Foucault, 1980c, p. 
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89). In this way, power is neither a property nor a means of maintaining and 
reproducing economic relations; it is above all a relation of force. Power is exercised 
from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations. 
There is no absolute and stable power. This means that we cannot say who owns 
power or who lacks power. Power is operated in a complicated and dynamic network 
in which many dispersive points are spread. These dispersive points could converge 
together on an immense force for a new transformation. For Giroux, curriculum 
should be designed for empowering the subject who lacks power. Power is something 
that can be given to the oppressed. A disadvantaged minority can be given more 
freedom and more autonomy. But Foucault regards power as machinery that no one 
owns. For instance, in the mechanism of the Panopticon, no matter who stands inside 
the central tower, power still can be exercised and maintained with the same effect. 
The key point is not the ownership of power, but the effective tactic that is used in 
this building and its effect on subjects. Second, rather than monotonous power, what 
Foucault is interested in are "the polymorphous techniques of power." (Foucault, 
1990, p. 11) Power is exercised through various strategies and tactics. It is revealed in 
not only refusal, blockage, and invalidation, but also incitement, intensification and 
resistance. For example, instead of prohibition, pleasure plays an important role in the 
production of truth in confession in Foucault's view. Giroux's idea of power 
oversimplifies the way that power is exercised and the effect that power causes in the 
real situation. It is inadequate for capturing the productive aspect of power. Because 
Giroux takes a different standpoint on power from Foucault, the way he looks at the 
concepts of reason and of truth are also foreign to the Foucaudian approach. I shall 
discuss this next. 
Foucault is a pluralist 
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In the Marxist tradition, and also in the work of critical theorists, there is a claim of a 
paramount rationality—a liberating reason. Giroux's curriculum theory basically 
follows this step in his praxis of education. As Nigel Blake and Jan Masschelein 
(2003) identify, Giroux takes up the notions of the early Frankfurt School in his work, 
such as the analyses of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. Giroux's notion of "the 
language of possibility" more or less reflects the idea of liberating reason, in which 
the purpose of education is to emancipate marginalized groups. This possibility in his 
terms, however, is only one possibility in the view of Blake and Masschelein. Rather 
than opening the way of possibility, in fact, it closes off the plural possibilities of 
education. In other words, apart from liberation, there is nothing else for curriculum 
to aim at. The truth in education that he presumes is also a universal claim. Giroux's 
claim indeed maintains a set of modernist values and commitments, though his work 
is generally put into a postmodern category. Obviously, his assertion is monistic in 
attitude. But Foucault is a pluralist23 through and through. 
In one of Foucault's lectures, he explains the main task of his genealogical project 
like this: 
What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, 
disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory 
which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and 
some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects. (Foucault, 1980c, p. 
83) 
23 Foucault claims himself as a pluralist in an interview entitled "Politics and the study of discourse" 
(Foucault, 1991c). This role highlights that his idea is foreign to a sovereign, unique and constraining 
form. 
200 
This project is associated with his idea of "an insurrection of subjugated knowledges" 
(p. 81). Foucault would like to struggle against any theory that makes claims for itself 
as universal truth. For instance, the historical contents have been buried and disguised 
in global theories such as scientific discourse or Marxist discourse. For Foucault, 
these systematic discourses are dangerous because they present a dominant power 
that closes different possibilities and then becomes a ruling rationality. I consider that 
Giroux's curriculum theory belongs to one of these "totalitarian" theories from which 
Foucault attempts to keep his distance. As Smart puts it: 
...in Foucault's work there is no absolute "value-of-reason". The thrust of Foucault's 
work is not to subvert one notion of rationality, as capitalistic, instrumental, and 
technical, with another, "higher" form which is socialist, intrinsically emancipatory, and 
enlightening, but to analyse rationalities, in particular how relations of power are 
rationalized. (Smart, 1983, p. 137) 
Foucault intends to diagnose the danger of rationalization in our current situation, but 
this does not mean that he attempts to provide a universal prescription or solution for 
our present. His pluralism is not the way to uphold a banner of truth in order to 
subvert other truths, as Giroux or Cherryholmes does. Rather, its plurality shows 
alternative ways of thinking, of living by examining the constitution of human 
beings' subjectivity, and by exposing the governance of specific rationalities to our 
subjects. This presents another route of emancipation, to which Giroux's theory is 
alien. Rather than striving for social equality and empowerment, Foucault endeavours 
to break away from the limits that are imposed on the development of subjectivity. 
This is not a resistance to the emancipation of subjugated others, as in Giroux's claim, 
but to inspire a self-emancipation, self-realization and self-transformation24. Hence, 
24 See Gordon, Masschelein and Butler's interpretation of Foucault that I addressed in chapter 4. 
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with reference to the role of intellectuals, we can also see a different perspective 
between Foucault and Giroux. Giroux ideally regards teachers as transformative 
intellectuals who carry a responsibility for social transformation. Foucault, however, 
disagrees with the idea that intellectuals are agents for serving in a particular theory 
or truth. In an interview with Deleuze, he sees the role of intellectuals like this: 
The intellectual's role is no longer to place himself "somewhat ahead and to the side" in 
order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the 
forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of 
"knowledge," "truth," "consciousness," and "discourse". (Foucault, 1977, pp. 207-208) 
Instead of claiming a liberating truth or an emancipatory discourse, in Foucault's 
view, an intellectual should struggle against the instrumental purpose of all totalizing 
truths. Theory in this sense does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice; it is 
practice itself (p. 208). This practice is not to "awaken consciousness" in Marxist 
terms, but to struggle to uncover and undermine dominant power in knowledge. 
5.1.3 Ball 
Ball's work takes up more of Foucault's earlier thought than of his later work, in his 
analysis of educational policy. In addition, he situates the ideas of neo-Marxism as in 
line with Foucault. This more or less follows on the heels of the emergence of the 
British "new sociology" in 1970s. At first, I shall argue that the analysis regarding 
power/knowledge should be liberated from the perspective of sovereignty. Second, 
instead of regarding discourse as a hindrance as in Ball's account, I consider that the 
character of discourse in Foucault's account is dispersive and transformative. 
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The head of the king has still not been cut off 25 
Drawing on Foucault's concept, Ball manifests the multiple features of 
power/knowledge and its effect on subjects in his work. The conclusions he draws, 
however, are always incorporated into the category of control, oppression and 
domination. It is the analytics of power within juridical law, in which power is either 
spoken of in terms of the promise of liberation or anchored in the understanding that 
we are trapped in its prohibition. This kind of perspective is very similar to that of 
Cherryholmes and Giroux. For instance, for Ball, educational policy is associated 
with the "authoritative allocation of values" that reveals power and control. 
Therefore, "we need to ask whose values are validated in policy, and whose are not?" 
(Ball, 1990c, p. 3). Ideological shifts and economic structure are elements that have 
great influence on the discourse of educational policy. Foucault, however, distances 
himself from the notion of power in Marxist accounts and seeks to construct an 
analysis of power without the vision of juridical law or sovereignty. As in the 
emphasis of Olssen, Foucault's criticisms of the Marxist concept of power relate to its 
determined presupposition of "totalism" (Olssen, 2006, p. 67), in which power is 
exercised according to a singular rule through the whole social body. In Olssen's 
view, Marxist historical materialism is based on a structuralist project that explains 
the whole by exploring the interrelations between its component parts. Foucault's 
historical materialism, however, is opposed to this Marxist approach. History for him 
is determined in terms of the event. This event is not predictable and fixed, but "was 
characterized by incompleteness, indeterminacy, complexity, and chance" (p. 68). 
25 This title derives from Foucault's description. See Foucault (1990, p. 89). 
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I see that Ball tries to expose the regimes of truth in the discourse of dividing 
practices, of management and school effectiveness and of educational policy. He 
gives many examples of disciplinary power in his analysis of management and 
effectiveness. He also shows how they limit the possible ways of thinking and 
speaking, and how educationists are subjected to them, as seen in Chapter 2. 
Nevertheless, he himself is limited by the structuralist thinking and speaking of 
sovereign power and the sovereignty of this concept. The critique he offers does not 
show the spirit of anti-discipline, but rather represents exactly an academic discipline 
as we can usually see it in the analysis of the sociology of education. In one lecture, 
Foucault says: 
If one wants to look for a non-disciplinary form of power, or rather, to struggle 
against disciplines and disciplinary power, it is not towards the ancient right of 
sovereignty that one should turn, but towards the possibility of a new form of 
right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time 
liberated from the principle of sovereignty. It is at this point that we once more 
come up against the notion of repression". (Foucault, 1980c, p. 108) 
That is to say, the principle of sovereignty itself is also the discipline against which 
we need to struggle if we intend to break the confinement of the notion of domination 
and repression in education. Ball's analysis of curriculum reform and educational 
policy, however, is limited to the dominant effect of power/knowledge of which he 
himself is unaware. This analysis ignores the complexity of those educational events 
and sees the domination in educational policies in a narrow way. Ball does raise a 
good point in line with Foucault's thinking. He points out: "education works not only 
to render its students as subjects of power, it also constitutes them, or some of them, 
as powerful subjects" (p. 5). Following this, however, his analysis uncovers only the 
fact that educational discourses are full of control, cause loss of autonomy and lack of 
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personal development. Ball emphasizes that: "We do not speak the discourse. The 
discourse speaks us" (1990c, p. 18). The idea that "the discourse speaks us", however, 
does not mean that people are controlled by discourses in education, as Ball's 
interpretation in the examples of educational policies suggests. How can we consider 
the concept of discourse and refer it to a "powerful subject"? I shall elaborate this in 
the next part. 
Discourse is dispersive and transformative 
Unlike Ball's analysis of educational discourses, I consider that discourse in 
Foucault's view cannot be regarded as being only repressive, or being totalizing in a 
singular way. In his critique of the Victorian repression of sexuality, Foucault denies 
the hypothesis that the discourse of sexuality is prohibited after the seventeenth 
century. Rather, these discourses are proliferating and increasing. They show their 
multiplicity in different aspects, by different ways in the Western society, such as its 
embodiment in the internal discourse of the institution and in the implantation of 
perversion. For Foucault, a discursive field does not display a single trajectory, or a 
totalizing frontier. It is a space for opening, a space of dispersion and of 
transformation. Foucault says: "Each discourse undergoes constant change as new 
utterances are added to it" (1991c, p. 54). New languages continuously plunge us into 
their inception. There is the existence of a set of rules of formation for all its scattered 
objects, for all its unconnected operations, for all its incompatible concepts and for all 
its theoretical options that are mutually exclusive. In Foucault's view, it is "an 
individualized discursive formation" (ibid) to define such a set of rules. Each 
discursive formation is neither decided in advance, nor does it appear after 
examination. Its formation depends on relations among other types of discourse and 
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in the non-discursive context in which it functions, such as institutions, social 
relations and economic and political conjuncture. As the episteme of a period, for 
Foucault, it "is not a general developmental stage of reason, it is a complex 
relationship of successive displacements" (p. 55). Because of its successive 
displacements, a juridical principle or a constraining form does not correspond to 
Foucault's understanding of discourse. Domination or empowerment cannot be a 
particular structure of history. The history of a discourse, however, reveals the 
transformation in its specificity—a constituted change, a "becoming" (p. 56). There 
are discontinuities between each displacement. Following this discontinuity, a 
mutation appears and shows another stage of discourse and transformation. Each one 
is different from the next, and from the last. On the basis of this, relations of 
power/knowledge are therefore seen as "matrices of transformations",26 which show 
rules of continual variations in Foucault's account. The task that he undertakes is to 
detect "the changes which affect its objects, operations, concepts, theoretical options" 
(ibid) within a given discursive formation. Foucault wonders how these changes 
decide the boundaries defining the field of possible objects, the new mode of 
functioning of language with reference to objects, and the new form of localization 
and circulation of discourse within society. For Foucault, discourse deploys a free and 
unrestricted domain in which speech and writing may vary the functioning of a 
system by an opposite and different position. So the status of resistance or "agonism" 
consequently arises. The analysis of history is thus "a descriptive analysis of the 
different transformations effectuated" (p. 58). 
Regarding discourse, Foucault's notion does not show that there are inert discourses 
on the one hand, and an "all–powerful subject" (ibid) which manipulates them, 
26 See Foucault (1990, p. 99). This idea I have shown in chapter 3. 
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overturns them and renews them on the other hand, as Ball suggests. Rather, he 
would like to reveal the conditions that discoursing subjects create in their discursive 
field. They have their possibilities of displacements and their possibilities of 
functional mutation with discourse. So although, as Ball points out, we do not speak 
discourse, the discourse speaks us; this does not mean that subjects are dominated by 
discourse. Nor does it mean that discourse is a place into which subjectivity irrupts. 
Rather, discourse is a field in which there exist "differentiated subject-positions and 
subject-functions" (ibid). Subjectivity in discourse, as Butler claims, "is both crafted 
and crafting"27. Subjectivity is both object and subject in the discursive field. While 
Foucault claims that discourse is a place of transformation and mutation; it also 
supposes the possibility that this transformation can both impose on and also be 
originated by subjects themselves. Subjects might be elements to upset the system or 
to cause another discontinuity, and its effect can come back to motivate a possible 
self-formation of subjects or to have a potential influence on others. That is the reason 
why Foucault assumes that subjects are free in the exercise of power28. If they are not 
free, the system of discourse cannot be dynamic. The emergence of self-creation is 
also impossible in this situation. While the linguistic system is changing, at the same 
time, the identity of the subjects is also changing. In the interpretation of Foucault's 
concept of critique, Butler shows two main tasks of critique: one is the examination 
of the constitution of the system of order; the other is the exploration of the 
contingent moment of its discontinuities. I consider that these two tasks are ways that 
enable "powerful subjects", in Ball's term. Powerful subjects do not gain power from 
the movement of social empowerment, as Marxists suggest. Instead, they inject the 
force of power into their life by searching each discontinuity in the order and 
27 
 This idea I have addressed in chapter 4. See Butler (2002). 
28 
 See Foucault (1983, pp. 221-222) in chapter 3. Freedom is an important element in the exercise of 
power. 
207 
functioning of discourse (or we may say it is an action of breaking the current order) 
in order to have another transformation at a different stage. 
Foucault's idea of political practice is similar to the two tasks that Butler addresses. 
On the one hand, he undertakes to expose and to establish the limits in the history of 
thought; on the other hand, he seeks to reveal another turning point for 
transformation—another new role of the speaking subjects in discourse. Establishing 
limits is a practice of disclosing the limited practical domains, the limited rules of 
formation, and the limited conditions of existence in discourse so as to release their 
blockage derived from and imposed on subjectivity29. In addition, it is also a practice 
"to challenge the idea of a sovereign subject" (p. 61) which constitutes dominant 
meanings and then transcribes them in discourse. 
With reference to the example of discourse in educational policy that Ball is 
concerned with, I consider that new educational policy transforms the previous mode 
of educational discourse, and shows a new system of the administrative and political 
discipline of teachers and students. Drawing on Foucault's notion, a political practice 
of education is to question its mode of existence and its functioning as a science in 
the name of curriculum reform and educational improvement. This discourse is not 
isolated, but part of a system of correlations with other practices. Conceiving of 
another universal operation to substitute it cannot be the solution for the problems of 
this discourse. Instead, a new transformation will occur only when the rules of a 
system can be changed. It is a change of thinking by virtue of the continual 
modification of subjects. In doing so, a discursive field is not a place full of oppressed 
29 This idea can be seen in Foucault's concept such as "limit-attitude" or "limit-experience". To 
establish the limits is not to set up confinement, but has an opposite sense. 
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utterance. It itself should be regarded as a critical practice, an open domain in which 
subjects strive for their own rules of formation on the basis of their freedom. 
Subjectivity is thus not only the status of being static or passively moved; but is also a 
process of becoming—a self-creation. 
5.1.4 Popkewitz 
In my reading of Popkewitz's work, his adoption of power/knowledge shows a 
different approach from the thinking of Cherryholmes, Giroux and Ball. I do not 
intend to provide a critique of his account here because I consider that his 
employment of power/knowledge shows a useful model for curriculum theories. I 
shall give several examples in support of this and then extend his thinking of 
curriculum in terms of my understanding of Foucault's concept at the end of this 
chapter. 
Popkewitz claims two perspectives for analyzing power: one is "power as 
sovereignty"; the other is "power as deployment"30. I consider that the analysis of 
Cherryholmes, Giroux and Ball are closer to the former; and the thought of Foucault 
and Popkewitz belong to the latter, in which power is productive, fluid and 
multidimensional. Subjects in this sense are no longer put into stable categories. 
Popkewitz calls it "the decentering of the subject"—a decentering towards a 
multiplicity of subjects. This idea is very similar to Masschelein and Simons' 
assertion, "e-ducation" (Masschelein and Simons, 2007) which I have discussed in 
chapter 4. It associates with Foucault's claim that "knowledge is not made for 
understanding; it is made for cutting" (Foucault, cited in Masschelein and Simons, 
3° See Chapter 2. 
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2007). In other words, we need a knowledge of self to cut how we live the present in 
order to prevent ourselves from living in the same way (or we may say "a rejection of 
what we are" in Foucault's terms). Finally, as Popkewitz suggests, our thinking of 
power should turn from the limitation of the constitution of subjects to the positive 
production of multiple forms of subjectivity. Popkewitz's idea of social 
epistemology, in my view, is not an "epistemology" that explores what is truth and 
what is knowledge in our society, but exposes "regimes of truth" in curriculum or 
education. It is relevant to how truths are formed and how they govern our thinking of 
what we are. This idea is not only an epistemology; it is also a critical ontology of the 
present, and of educational subjects. 
Popkewitz provides an in-depth critique of traditional curriculum theories in terms of 
Foucauldian thought. He sees curriculum as an issue of governing, as seen in his 
reinterpretation of Spencer's question: "What knowledge is of most worth?". 
Normally, curriculum theorists would follow this question by asking: "What 
knowledge is of most worth in our present?" But in terms of Foucault's idea, as 
Popkewitz suggests, this kind of question uncovers problem-solving rationalities of 
science. It shows that our normative thinking of educational purpose is governed by 
the rationality of maintaining subsistence by virtue of curriculum implementation. 
This rationality is connected with Foucault's notion of "bio-power"31 in which power 
is exercised for investing in life and in national existence. The maintenance of 
national existence becomes the first value-premise and universal truth in education. 
However, it is dangerous because it displays the only way on which education can 
proceed. 
31 I have discussed this notion in chapter 3. 
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Popkewitz's critique of a hidden curriculum tradition is actually a critique of a 
neo-Marxist perspective on curriculum prevalent in curriculum theories. His critique 
breaks the cycle of prohibition, the logic of censorship and the uniformity of the 
apparatus in Foucault's terms. I consider that if curriculum is not "hidden" with the 
effect of furtively destroying equality by way of reproduction and oppression, that is, 
if curriculum is not only part of explanatory frameworks of social regulation, as 
Popkewitz criticizes, how can we conceive of what curriculum theory is through the 
notion of power/knowledge? To answer this question, I shall draw on Deleuze's 
thinking in his tree and rhizome metaphors. This is for the purpose, not only of 
providing another way of criticizing the use of Foucault found in Cherryholmes, 
Giroux or Ball, but also of considering power/knowledge in a rhizomatic way and 
then developing another approach to curriculum theory following Popkewitz. 
5.2 The tree and the rhizome 
In the "Introduction" of A thousand plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (2004) suggest 
that there are three kinds of writing: root-book, radicle-system (fascicular root) and 
the rhizome. In the root-book, a tree is the image of the world. This book imitates and 
reflects our real world. Hence, one (the world) then becomes two (the real world and 
its representation). One is the subject, the other is the object. This world is the subject, 
and the root-book is the object that represents the world. There is a "binary logic" (p. 
5) that exists in the spiritual reality of the root-tree. Chomsky and his grammatical 
trees is one of these examples, for Deleuze and Guattari, which assumes a principal 
unity and fails to reach an understanding of multiplicity. This principal unity presents 
the pivotal taproot of the tree. A taproot can support the second, third or fourth roots, 
but these roots attach themselves to the same centre, to the same order. The second 
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figure of the book that Deleuze and Guattari use is a "radicle-system" or "fascicular 
root" (p. 6). Its root type is not one but multiple. Comparing with the first figure, it is 
more like a comprehensive secret unity or an extensive totality. The direction of its 
expansion is linear, or it may display a circular or cyclic dimension. In the view of 
Deleuze and Guattari, this fascicular system does not break with the dualism between 
a subject and an object, a natural reality and a spiritual reality (pp. 6-7). Though it 
becomes more multiple, this kind of book still retains the same image of the world, 
but only changes it from "root-cosmos" to "radicle-chaosmos" (p. 7). The third 
system of the book is the rhizome. The rhizome is a subterranean stem. Deleuze and 
Guattari give several examples; for instance, bulbs and tubers are rhizomes among 
plants; rats and burrows represent rhizomes among animals. For them, rhizomatic 
roots differ from tree roots and radicles. They characterise the rhizome as follows. 
The first and the second principles of the rhizome are: connection and heterogeneity. 
The rhizome is organic but not fixed in an order or pattern. It is an open system in 
which the node of the rhizome connects to anything other. Regarding heterogeneity, 
take language for example. The rhizome metaphor symbolizes a heterogeneous reality 
of language. There are no linguistic universals in it, only a throng of dialects, patois, 
slang, and specialized languages (p. 8). As a rhizome, language has never closed itself 
up; it produces a power within political multiplicity without domination. For Deleuze 
and Guattari, the rhizome can be a form of power, an abstract machine associated 
with various fields such as art, sciences, political struggles....and so on. The second 
feature of the rhizome is its multiplicity. Deleuze and Guattari explain that a 
multiplicity does not mean tree-like pseudo-multiplicities. Instead, it is rhizomatic; it 
is unlimitedly changing in nature. Rather than points or positions, as those found in a 
structure, there are only lines in the rhizome serving towards proliferation. 
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Multiplicities, in the view of Deleuze and Guattari, always connect with other 
multiplicities, and with accelerations and transformations. Multiplicities are always 
relative to outside by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization. 
Because of deteritorialization, multiplicities accompany reterritorialization and gain 
more territory for their exercise32. Therefore, a book of the rhizome is a "war 
machine-book" (p. 10), which is asignifying and asubjective, and fights against the 
"State apparatus-book"—deterritorializes the hegemonic idea of State apparatus. The 
fourth principle of the rhizome is that of asignifying rupture. The rhizome can be 
broken at a given node, and it will start up again by following an old line or creating a 
new line. Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity so it can be organized, 
stratified, and territorialized. The rhizome also contains lines of deterritorialization 
down which it can run away. There is no constant dichotomy or dualism in the 
rhizome, because everything is always changing. Deleuze and Guattari argue that in 
the rhizome, dichotomy is "only the products of an active and temporary selection, 
which must be renewed" (p. 10). A rhizomatic book is not an image of the world like 
a tree-book; rather, it has an aparallel evolution33 with the world. I consider that 
human subjects are the media to advance this aparallel evolution between a book and 
this world. According to Deleuze and Guattari, there is a procedure of becoming or 
relay between a book and a world in the rhizome—the book deterritorializes the 
world; the world reterritorializes the book, which in turn deterritorializes itself in the 
world (p. 12). In this process, a book is a becoming-book, and a world is a 
32 Deleuze and Guattari offer an example about the interaction of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization. The wasp transports the pollen of the orchid. The orchid deterritorializes by the 
movements of the wasp. And the wasp reterritorializes the orchid as a reproductive apparatus to 
improve its proliferation. These two heterogeneous elements therefore form a rhizome by both 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. 
33 Aparallel evolution means two matters of evolution are not models or copies of each other, but form 
a rhizome together with and through other procedures or other media. Take the baboon and the cat for 
example, they do not have a direct relationship with each other, but they form a rhizome together 
through the infection with viruses. See Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 11). 
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becoming-world. They do not revert to any former procedure. The fifth and sixth 
principles of the rhizome are: cartography and decalcomania. The rhizome does not 
correspond to a reproducible principle of tracing. Deleuze and Guattari explain the 
idea of tracing. In their view, tree logic is the logic of tracing and reproduction. The 
way of tracing is laid out along a genetic axis within a structure. Its aim is the 
description of de facto states; is also the exposition of hidden memory and language 
which are ignored. To use the metaphor of the rhizome, however, is to make a map. 
The map is an experimentation in contact with the real. It constructs the unconscious 
and removes the blockages. Deleuze and Guattari explain that "the map is open and 
connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to 
constant modification" (p. 13). It can be dismantled, recombined and reversed by an 
individual, group, or social formation. A map has multiple entryways, but tracing 
always comes back to the same, to the same root. Behind the presupposition of 
tracing, a standard model is created. Tracing stabilizes, structuralizes the rhizome and 
assumes that the rhizome reproduces something else. Tracing, however, reproduces 
itself only. The continuous repeat of tracing finally falls into an impasse, a blockage 
within the same taproot. But the rhizome is moved and produced by desire without 
hindrances. For Deleuze and Guattari, the tree and the rhizome are not two opposed 
models. It is possible for root division or tree branch to burgeon into the rhizome, 
which occurs not by a universal consequence in theoretical analyses, but "by a 
pragmatics composing multiplicities or aggregates of intensities" (p. 16). In this way, 
the tree or the root can extricate themselves from tracing, from a dominant power, and 
then in turn form the rhizome. 
A tree operates as a transcendent model and tracing; a rhizome operates as an 
immanent process that overturns the model and outlines a map (p. 22). For Deleuze 
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and Guattari, the mode of the rhizome is a construction of collapsing, "a process that 
is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again" (ibid). Their 
critique of dualism does not serve the aim of creating another dualism by the rhizome. 
Instead, they would like to challenge all transcendent models in order to undo the 
domination of dualism. The feature of the rhizome is that it connects any point to any 
other point. It therefore brings into play different "regimes of signs" (p. 23), or even 
goes into a non-sign state. The specific meaning of sign is no longer important in the 
rhizome. The rhizome is composed of dimensions—dimensions in motion. This 
motion has neither beginning nor end, has neither starting nor finishing, but "always a 
middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills" (ibid). This "middle" is 
the starting point of being mobile, dynamic and dispersive. Through the "middle", 
dimensions are always being changed, and in this way it undergoes metamorphoses. 
A rhizome-book, for Deleuze and Guattari, is written in the name of an outside. 
Normally, a tree-book or a fascicular-book presents three kinds of field: a field of 
reality (the world), a field of representation (the book), and a field of subjectivity (the 
author). However, there is no image, no signification, and no subjectivity at the 
outside34. Deleuze and Guattari employ the term "flow" to express the movement of 
the rhizome outside. For them, it is not at all important whether the flows are "One or 
multiple"; rather, they are the points that we pass. There is an assemblage of desire, 
of enunciation, through which "one inside the other and both plugged into an 
immense outside that is a multiplicity in any case" (p. 26). This outside is not another 
transcendent "model" that refers to the God, but an open field without boundary, an 
assemblage without limitation where speed or acceleration run. 
5.2.1 Tree-like or rhizomatic notion of power/knowledge? 
34 This "outside" is the same with the outside of Deleuze that I have elaborated in Chapter 4. 
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I draw on the idea of the tree and the rhizome from Deleuze and Guattari here 
because I consider that there are also tree modes and rhizomatic modes in the 
employment of power/knowledge. In my view, the use of Foucault in the work of 
Cherryholmes, Giroux and Ball are typical examples of the former, and that of 
Popkewitz closer to the latter. I shall argue that, rather than a root-tree model, a 
rhizomatic notion of power/knowledge is necessary in the thinking of curriculum 
theory. 
Cherryholmes, Giroux and Ball all seem to have a pre-established supposition of the 
concept of power/knowledge. This means that the concept is used to reveal a 
hegemonic mechanism to control subjugated groups and to reproduce the inequality 
of the status quo. There is a dualism in their presupposition. For them, the reality is 
that this world (also education or curriculum) is controlled by sovereign domination. 
Their theories of power/knowledge are, therefore, the representation or reflection of 
this reality. I consider that these curriculum theorists have been greatly influenced by 
neo-Marxist or critical theory tree-like modes of thinking. They graft an attached 
branch of these trees on to the field of curriculum in order to show the unique truth 
that power is oppressive, and further, that power should also be used for the purpose 
of dismantling this oppression. In this respect, we can also think that the idea of that 
"curriculum is oppressive" belongs to one of the fascicular roots that extend from the 
same taproot—the root of sovereign power. In other words, the idea of sovereign 
power is reproduced in various academic subjects, one of which is curriculum theory. 
I also think that the way that those curriculum theorists construct their notion of 
power and knowledge is one kind of "tracing" in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari. 
Cherryholmes makes a tracing of hegemonic power and dominant knowledge in 
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educational research, in the adoption of textbooks, and also in the social studies 
curriculum. Giroux makes a tracing of the critical theory root in American curriculum 
implementation and schooling. Ball traces a neo-Marxist root in educational policies 
in the UK. These tracings delineate a common and constant outline of the thinking of 
power/knowledge. The educational objects that are the focus of their tracing might be 
different, but the consequences remain the same. They attempt to expose the 
underside (or shadow) of education by appealing to persistent tracing. These tracings 
in fact change nothing in curricula. They finally come back to the same root, and 
narrow the idea of power/knowledge into the same perspective. Since nothing has 
been changed, their undertaking of reproducing the identical notion of 
power/knowledge is only a futile effort, like the repetitive work that Sisyphus does in 
Greek mythology. 
To break the unyielding, dominant idea of power, the sovereign power, Foucault 
claims that we should "cut off the head of the king" (1990, p. 89). Likewise, 
concerning these arbitrary interpretations of power/knowledge, I suppose, we may cut 
off the trunk of the tree (the Marxist tree or critical theory tree) through our research 
practices. It is possible to consider power/knowledge in another way—a more 
rhizomatic way without tracing, without the reproduction of a central order in order to 
break through the impasse of thinking in this notion. In the adoption of Foucault by 
Cherryholmes, Giroux and Ball, power/knowledge is a concept as root or as the 
ramification of root. Each outlet of power/knowledge has been blocked by a 
ready-made tracing. Far from this monotone perspective, however, the character of 
Foucault's notion of power/knowledge is more proliferating than limited, more 
rhizomatic than tree-like or radicle type. It is misleading to change rhizomatic 
power/knowledge into the mode of roots or radicles. The idea of power/knowledge is 
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not a totality; it also cannot be understood as totalization. Foucault does not intend to 
show us a pre-established form of knowledge and a dominant concept of power. If, as 
Deleuze claims, Foucault is not a thinker of confinement35, his idea should not be 
considered in a confined way. 
For Deleuze, there is a process of mutation in the rhizome. I suppose that it is similar 
to the process of the constitution of subjects in Foucault's view. In the effect of 
power/knowledge, subjects are not destined to be confined. Though there is a process 
of both objectivation and subjectivation, we can still seek for the possibility of 
"de-subjectivation" and then towards a motion of "resubjectivation". This means that 
we can either follow the original movement or turn to form a new shoot in the 
rhizome. Self and subject are always renewing by virtue of this process, which is not 
only a way of collapsing but also a way of constructing—a construction through 
collapse, a resubjectivation through desubjectivation. Thus, at Deleuze's outside, the 
question of "Who am I?" is no longer important because there is no concept of 
transcendent self in the rhizome, but a process of the production of subjectivity36. 
Power/knowledge makes a transformative self possible in the flow. Subjects are 
changing and growing without a universal definition. This is the reason why Deleuze 
argues that Foucault's idea of power cannot be localized. For Foucault, power is 
exercised in a complicated and dynamic network in which many dispersive points are 
spread. Rather than being localized, these dispersive points could converge together 
on an immense force for a new transformation, in which there is a new bifurcation of 
rhizome growths. Concerning the idea of history, Foucault shows its feature of 
discontinuity instead of continuity. Popkewitz interprets this as: "historical change is 
35 See Deleuze (2006), p. 36. 
36 See Deleuze (1995c), p. 113. 
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viewed as one of the breaks in the structuring of knowledge rather than as an 
evolutionary process of universal progress" (2001, p. 164). I consider that we may 
regard this "discontinuity" or "break" as the node of the rhizome37, through which a 
new force of life germinates, and a new formation of history starts. Rather than 
tree-roots, power/knowledge develops and grows in a rhizomatic "pattern", to 
constitute a new history and a new subject. Power/knowledge can not be embedded 
into a closure. Rather, it is exercised within an "open system"38 that is full of 
multiplicity and new potentialities of life. 
5.3 What is curriculum theory? 
Since it is inappropriate to regard power/knowledge as a tree-like mode, I ask: "How 
can we conceive of curriculum theory in terms of rhizomatic power/knowledge?" 
Following the tradition of critical theory and Marxism (or Neo-Marxism), many 
contemporary curriculum theories invest the project of unmasking social control and 
dominant ideology in curricula, and attempt to solve these problems. In this way, 
certain questions are raised such as Apple's "Whose knowledge is of most worth?"39, 
and Ball's "Whose values are validated in policy, and whose are not?" (Ball, 1990c, 
p. 3). Owing to the intervention of dominant groups, curriculum is seen as a political 
instrument for oppression and destruction, which is seen as being hidden. The idea of 
a hidden curriculum in Popkewitz's critique is one of these examples. Though 
Popkewitz claims that against hidden curriculum traditions, we need to consider 
curriculum as the channel of cultural practice and of cultural production; he does not 
37 In my view, the "breaking points" or "contingent moments" that Butler (2002) refers to can also be 
seen as nodes of a rhizome. 
38 In an interview, Deleuze claims that what he and Guattari call a rhizome is precisely one example of 
an "open system" (Deleuze, 1995d, p. 32). 
39 The question is put in the preface of Apple's book Ideology and Curriculum (1990), which I have 
referred to in chapter 1. 
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develop this idea very much. To supplement this idea, therefore, I shall first explore 
the reason why curriculum is not hidden and is not for serving certain a priori social 
structures. This argument mainly draws on Deleuze's interpretation of Foucault in his 
book Foucault with reference to the notion of statement and visibility. Second I shall 
suggest that curriculum theory should be considered as practice (both cultural and 
political) in terms of power/knowledge. 
In Deleuze's interpretation, statements in Foucault's view are never hidden (2006, p. 
46). He argues: 
One might think sometimes that statements are often hidden, because they are disguised, 
withheld or even repressed. But beyond the fact that this implies a false conception of 
Power, it holds only if we stick to words, phrases and propositions. (ibid) 
The opinion that statements are not hidden is seen in Foucault's disagreement with 
the hypothesis that there is a repression of sexuality in the Victorian age. For 
Deleuze, this hypothesis refers to a false conception of power and knowledge. Its 
falsehood derives from the obstinacy of people sticking to specific usage of language, 
as in the proposition shown above that the discourse of sexuality was repressed. 
Inertia in language is massive in this situation. Deleuze considers that the insistence 
on these texts and propositions derives from the problem that our sense remains on 
the level of an empirical exercise, so that it is difficult to articulate something beyond 
that in invisible areas of our motivation and thought. However, following Foucault, 
Deleuze highlights that the historical formation at that age teems with statements of 
sexuality in various occasions and by different interlocutors. Sexual discourses in fact 
proliferate. They are not consigned to a shadow existence, but rather refer to an 
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infinite field. In Deleuze's view, Foucault's historical principle is that "everything is 
always said in every age" (p. 47). Discourse displays itself nakedly without 
concealment. Nothing is hidden behind the curtain. Nothing is either behind or 
beneath these statements. But rather than being fixed, they vary depending on the 
systems or conditions in different historical strata. Not only statements, for Deleuze, 
but also visibilities are never hidden though they are not immediately seen. 
Statements and visibilities are always there to be said and to be seen if we can reach 
their conditions. The problem is, how to reach these conditions in order to say what 
we can say, to see what we can see? 
I consider that statements—words, texts, phrases, propositions, and 
visibilities—material substances, physical surroundings to which people adhere the 
presupposition of what they are, are so-called "truth". We try to expose more texts 
and more physical environments to come into view, into our perception, so that we 
can know what exists in this world, which is comprehensively thought of as being 
true. However, no matter how we exhaust our energy and our time to do this, 
statements and visibilities in this sense are unavoidably limited. Our perspective is 
always narrow, blinkered. There is always something hidden on which light cannot be 
shed. The matter that we regard as truth is biased and limited. For Deleuze, Foucault 
uses a different way to consider his idea of statements and visibilities. In Foucault's 
view, "visibilities are neither the acts of a seeing subject nor the data of a visual 
meaning" (p. 50). For instance, if we see prison as merely a physical building, its 
function would be merely reduced to a symbol of confinement. The discourse or the 
function of a prison is far, however, more than that, or even goes beyond that. 
Deleuze argues that Foucault's visibilities are not defined by physical sight, and 
statements are not defined by texts and propositions. Instead, they are "complexes of 
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actions and passions, actions and reaction, multisensorial complexes, which emerge 
into the light of day"4° (ibid). In Deleuze's interpretation of Foucault, the way of 
seeing and of saying is not really to see and to say empirically. On the contrary, they 
are by virtue of being blind and of being mute. To be blind is not that we give up our 
perception to see, or close our eyes to this world, but that we should not persist in 
something we have seen, and then regard that as the whole of this world. Likewise, to 
be mute is not that we reject speaking, but that it is arrogant to suppose that speaking 
can cover infinite language because utterance in words is always limited to, and by, 
words. For Deleuze, as well as for Foucault, we are not able to see the "real" truth 
with our eyes and speak the "real" truth with our mouths. Rather than sight and 
articulation, only actions or passions can reach the condition of visibilities and 
statements and open them up. Actions or passions are both blind and mute, but they 
can make the visibility visible, and make the statement articulable. In this respect, 
everything is neither hidden nor secret. Its splendour is achieved by a different 
concept of statements and visibilities. It is a function of transgression to betray those 
secrets. It makes statements blossom and proliferate, and also makes visibilities 
highlight everything. Nevertheless, what does Deleuze mean by actions or passions in 
this sense? How can we initiate this function of transgression to make us able to see, 
and to make us able to say? 
For Deleuze, the way of knowing how to articulate and of knowing how to see is 
Foucault's so-called "knowledge". Power is the impetus to inspire us to leap into a 
different dimension of forms of statements and visibilities, namely, a different 
dimension of knowledge. Instead of exploring the truth, knowledge is rather 
40 Deleuze in fact uses this phrase only explains what are visibilities. I consider that statements can be 
regarded as this same way. 
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employed to unmask "games of truth" or "regimes of truth" so as to transgress the 
sovereign truth that we take for granted, and to transgress the dominant way of seeing 
and speaking. This does not mean that Foucault endeavours to struggle against every 
truth; or that he asserts that there is no truth in the world, as in the account of 
relativism. But he would like to expose the danger of obeying certain sovereign 
truths, which is another truth he intends to highlight. Not only having an influence on 
our perspective, this sovereign truth and dominant way of knowing also constitutes a 
dominated subject. A transformative being must draw support from the force of 
power/knowledge that derives from passion—a passion to create different meanings 
of life. This passion is synonymous with intensity in Deleuze's terms and with desire 
in Butler's terms41. As the positive effect of power/knowledge, this passion motivates 
us "to break things open and to break words open" (Deleuze, 1995a, p. 83). It creates 
a "social space42" to allow us to think otherwise, to be ourselves otherwise. It is also 
an action to question ourselves what we are able to see and what we are able to say in 
order to see something further beyond our sight and to say something further beyond 
our usual ways of using words. In this sense, curriculum is not hidden any more. On 
the contrary, by way of the practice of power/knowledge that derives from the 
passion (or desire) of subjects, curriculum should be regarded as being more positive 
and productive. I suppose that the cultural practice and cultural production in 
Popkewitz's account can be thought of in such a way. Yet, this practice or production 
is not only cultural, but also political and ethical. It is a political and ethical practice 
to rebel against the sovereign "truth" that imposes on curriculum theories, and also on 
our thinking of them. 
41 See Chapter 4 regarding Butler. Deleuze and Guattari also mention "desire" in their discussion of 
the rhizome. 
42 Deleuze says: "The thing called power is characterized by immanence of field without transcendent 
unification, continuity of line without global centralization, and contiguity of parts without distinct 
totalization: it is a social space" (2006, p. 24). 
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To end this chapter, I shall elaborate an important issue: "What is curriculum theory 
based on power/knowledge?" If curriculum theory is not for the sake of exposing 
something hidden, what is it for? For Deleuze, a theory is like "a box of tools" 
(Deleuze in Foucault, 1977, p. 208) that has nothing to do with the signifier, but being 
useful and functional. A box of tools does not function as bricks43 to construct a fort 
of theory. It is like a pair of glasses, in Deleuze's metaphor, directed to the outside in 
order to see the broader view outside. A theory, therefore, is "an instrument for 
multiplication, and it also multiplies itself' (ibid). In other words, a theory functions 
to revolt against the oppression of a single and global form so as to make possible 
multiple perspectives of our visibility and statement. A theory also reaches its 
multiplicity, reaches its richness in this way. I consider that Foucault's views 
concerning theory chime with this idea. As mentioned earlier, instead of serving to 
apply practice, Foucault regards theory itself as a practice. We may think that of it as 
the practice of making use of "a box of tools" in Deleuze's terms, and a practice to 
"liberate our gaze", as Masschelein suggests44. In the same way, we may also see 
curriculum theory as a practice. In this practice, power/knowledge is productive, can 
be rhizomatic in connection with a continuous process of production for 
self-emancipation, self-improvement and self-realization. This practice opens a field 
of possibility. On the one hand, individuals are an effect of power/knowledge; on the 
other hand, individuals are also the agents of power/knowledge. While Foucault 
claims that "agonism" is a permanent political task (1983, p. 222), it means that rather 
than only being constituted, individuals have freedom to struggle against the form of 
43 In the translator's foreword of A Thousand Plateaus, Brian Massumi refers to this idea of "brick". 
44 I have mentioned about this idea in Chapter 4. 
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this constitution. There is a continuous process and an evolving practice in this 
struggle. 
In the implementation of curriculum, though teachers or students are under 
surveillance; they consciously or unconsciously follow certain disciplinary orders, 
certain ways of governance in schools, such as a timetable or syllabus. A curriculum 
theory should also function to open up another practice based on freedom, based on 
the spirit of resistance, of being unwilling to be governed. A curriculum theory is not 
applied to construct a universal operation for transformation, but creates experience in 
order to develop a knowledge of self, an attitude of problematization to break the 
confinement of dominant power/knowledge, and "to challenge the idea of a sovereign 
subject" (Foucault, 1991c, p, 61)—a transcendental subject. For Foucault, this is the 
best way to cross over and to go beyond the limits of power/knowledge. The concept 
of "emancipation", "transformation" or "empowerment" in curriculum theory can be 
reconsidered in this sense. The practice of emancipation ought to be undertaken from 
our own subject, rather than from subjugated groups or something else. However, we 
need to bear in mind that this practice of transgression cannot guarantee a good result. 
Following regular rules, being normalized is dangerous in Foucault's view. But, the 
attempt to transgress these rules is also dangerous. We are not able to have a clear 
idea of the destination when we are in this revolutionary, destructive and 
reconstructive mode. This journey could be fruitful or injurious. It is the same with 
Foucault's caution that productive power can produce a harmful outcome. The way 
that cancer cells grow is also by way of a rhizomatic mode. Nevertheless, even if 
breaking normalization is to take a risk, in any case, power, desire or passion is 
needed to constitute a transformative being, to "perfect" an energetic life—a full 
commitment, a wholehearted engagement of ourselves. Here, I would like to refer to a 
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poem in order to respond to this idea. It was written by Chu His (1130-1200AD): a 
Chinese Neo-Confucian philosopher. This poem speaks about: 
The half-acre pond is as clear as an opened mirror. 
The reflection of sun and cloud shimmers on its surface. 
Why is this pond so clear without being turbid? 
Because there is always a fresh input from its source. 
In Chu His's account, the reason why the pond is clear is because it is an open field 
into which fresh water continuously pours. If its entry and outlet are blocked, and the 
flow is stagnant, this pond would become a surrounded pond—a designated area that 
is closed up. It would then collect sediment from the exteriority and gain 
contaminants. By contrast, under the water of the pond, as Chu His illustrates, 
everything is clearly seen45. Chu His writes this poem to imply that study is an 
ongoing process through which ourselves or our mind become as clear as a pond. 
Following this idea, our subjectivity should not be like a static pond, but a 
continuously refreshed pond. The subject as a static pond is a pre-given entity, which 
is seized on by the exercise of power/knowledge, and is enclosed by the dominant 
rationality. The subject as a refreshed pond, however, is always renewed by the 
desire, the passion derived from power/knowledge in order to reach the multiplicity 
of life. As an educational practice and also as a political practice, a curriculum theory 
might be employed to break all inert rationality that confines ways of thinking and 
ways of behaving in education. This is a practice for removing the blockages of a 
closed pond in order to become an opened pond into which the force of 
45 This idea of clear pond can refer to Deleuze's idea of "statements" and "visibility". In Deleuze's 
interpretation of Foucault's idea of language, because of a continuous supply of passion of life, both 
statements and visibilities are not hidden, as I mentioned earlier. This is the same idea with that 
flowing water make a pond limpid and visible. Therefore, nothing remains hidden under the water of 
the pond, also behind discourses. 
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power/knowledge is flowing. In this way, our subjectivity is as clear as the pond 
without being tainted by any dominant rationality or other totalitarian truth. 
I return to the question that I asked in Chapter One: Should curriculum theory be 
preoccupied with "understanding", as Pinar et al. suggest? My answer is "no". If we 
employ Foucault's ideas to think about curriculum, it does not mean that we need 
merely to understand his concepts such as discourse, power/knowledge, genealogy or 
governmentality, and then trace their meanings in the context of curriculum. By 
drawing on Foucault, I suggest that curriculum theory is not something to be 
understood; instead, it is itself a practice—both a political and an ethical practice. Or 
we may say that curriculum theory is "a box of tools" in Deleuze's terms. Curriculum 
theory has nothing to do with understanding, or with accomplishing certain expected 
curriculum aims, but it functions as the practice of self to break through the limits in 
our education. In this sense, the meaning of curriculum theory is not given; it is 
created by individuals, and always in the making 
Following the above evaluation of these curriculum theorists, I shall in the next 
chapter raise two issues with regard to curriculum theory: the first is globalization and 
the import of critical pedagogy; and second, I raise the question of what is 'critical' in 
critical ethnography. My aim is to think about these issues differently in terms of 
Foucault's thought, and see them in a more practical sense, as discussed above. I am 
conscious in what follows that some aspects of my criticisms in this chapter go 
beyond or perhaps against Foucault's idea of critique. In other words, sometimes I 
simply pass judgement on the theorists in question in terms of the accuracy or 
cogency of their interpretations. In Chapter 6, I want also to acknowledge the form 
that a more Foucauldian critique would take, and so I shall endeavour to add 
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comments along these lines too. These remarks will lay the way for a fuller 
elaboration of a Foucauldian stance. 
Chapter 6 Towards a more robust use of Foucault's concept 
of power/knowledge in curriculum theory: Two 
examples 
After offering critiques of the curriculum theories I addressed in Chapter 2, I now 
give two examples that aim to show a more robust approach towards employing 
Foucault's concept of power/knowledge in curriculum theory (also in general 
educational theory). The first example that I shall discuss is globalization and the 
import of critical pedagogy. Within this discussion, I try to extend my critique of 
Giroux given in Chapter 5 and to expose the regime of truth that informs the import 
of his critical pedagogy. Foucault's notion of "limit attitude" is drawn on in relation 
to this issue. The second example is related to a question: "What is 'critical' in 
critical ethnography?". My question is inspired by my reading of Ball's work with 
regard to the concept of critical ethnography. Unlike Ball's adoption of Foucault in 
this topic, I shall borrow the concept of "critique" from Foucault in order to question 
the mainstream understanding of critical ethnography and to reconsider the meaning 
of "critical" in this methodology. 
6.1 Globalization and the import of critical pedagogy 
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6.1.1 Introduction 
Critical pedagogy is a prevalent educational theory that emerged in the 1980s in 
America. It is based on a combination of ideas from the Frankfurt School, Antonio 
Gramsci and Paulo Freire (Lather, 2001b, p.184). Many educationists whose work is 
orientated towards social justice are indebted to this perspective. Critical pedagogy 
has been discussed not only in American domestic circles, but also in non-Western 
countries. I consider globalization to be the driving force in this spreading. In the 
form of academic commodities, several countries accept it by means of international 
publications, in books and journals, and through international students who are 
studying or have studied in the United States. My approach does not focus mainly on 
critical pedagogy as such, but undertakes to make this intellectual exportation 
problematic. This spread of ideas raises several questions: What kinds of rationalities 
does this academic "import" follow? What kinds of consequences result? Is this 
imported theory of great "import" for those importing countries? Is it efficacious to 
utilize a ready-made foreign educational theory so as to improve local educational 
practices? Without doubt, America—the exporter—is dominant over those importing 
countries in this circumstance. Its intellectual influence expands across the world. 
Anglo-American ideas have their particular merit. However, it is dangerous for any 
country to adopt an uncritical, unreflective acceptance of any external theory. 
Being a citizen of one of these importing countries, Taiwan, I have seen the tendency 
for critical pedagogy to become an orthodox norm when people refer to critical 
education or critical teaching. In the light of this, I aim to take a diagnostic position, 
an ironic stance, towards this event. In an interview entitled "Questions of method", 
Foucault claims that the main purpose of his investigations is to "see how men govern 
229 
(themselves and others) by the production of truth" (Foucault, 1991d, p. 79). This 
production of truth does not equate with the production of true utterances; rather, it is 
the establishment of domains through which truth is constituted, and in which the 
practices of truth and falsity establish their self-reinforcing categories. Following 
Foucault's idea, I shall examine the production of truth in the importing of critical 
pedagogy into my country and investigate how Taiwanese educational thinking 
comes to be governed by this version of truth. There are two aspects to my 
exploration regarding truth. First, what is truth in critical pedagogy? Second, how is 
truth established in the importation of critical pedagogy? Both of them are 
interconnected. On the basis of this diagnosis, I will argue that instead of absolute 
acceptance, Foucault's assertion of a "limit attitude" is another idea that we can take 
up in order to address this kind of intellectual governance; in other words, we need a 
practice of critique in order to struggle against the particular forms of disciplinary 
power that globalization enables. This must be a mature attitude both of examining 
what we are and of rejecting what we are. 
6.1.2 Critical pedagogy as a prominent discourse 
Over the past decade, the discourse of critical pedagogy has been taken up by many 
Taiwanese educationists. If one keys in the words "critical" with "education" in an 
academic search engine, the titles of papers one finds are very consistent. Most of 
them refer to the thought of American critical pedagogy, including the theories of 
Henry A. Giroux or Paulo Freire. If we ask what the definition is of educational 
praxis, we find in these papers the answer: to empower marginalized groups in the 
educational arena, or to liberate disadvantaged students in the classroom. Regarding 
the question of the role of teachers, the consistent answer is: an educator should be a 
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transformative intellectual. Critical educational discourse is therefore treated as if 
there is only one route to be taken in education. As a rhetorical style, critical 
pedagogy has become the norm in talking about the issue of social justice in 
education and in developing an educational movement of empowerment. It 
normalizes educational forms and standardizes critical educational discourse in 
Taiwan. It has become a popular commodity, which is heavily consumed by many 
lecturers in departments of education. The ideal of critical pedagogy seems very 
attractive to any educationists who attempt to change unfair situations in education. It 
presents optimism that gives us confidence that we can cope with problems of our 
present schooling. Oddly, however, this foreign educational theory permeates a 
territory that is far removed from its historical development, and it does this by virtue 
of the exercise of power and the production of truths. I shall analyze this later. But 
before this, I will show both internal and external problems in the import of critical 
pedagogy. 
6.1.3 The problems in the importation of critical pedagogy 
I shall address the problems in the importation of critical pedagogy in terms of two 
points. One is internal to the theory itself; the other is external, which derives from 
the inappropriate transplantation of this theory. 
Internal problems 
Though critical pedagogy is a widespread educational discourse, it is never a 
"perfect" theory. This theory itself harbours several internal problems, which cannot 
be solved. It is dangerous to discuss it and use it without noticing its problems. 
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Critical pedagogy had already triggered much debate in America over the past two 
decades, which even spread to countries outside the U.S.A. These debates all point 
towards defects in the theory. For instance, it tends to be paternalistic. Elizabeth 
Ellsworth (1989) and Patti Lather (2001b) show that exponents of critical pedagogy 
see the world from a position of white, middle-class males, and thus the theory is 
marked by a masculine prescriptive attitude46. Furthermore, this discourse advocates 
emancipatory education in an abstract, universalistic language, and it asserts an 
instrumental concept of educational praxis. The problem here is that it seeks to 
perfect a future human order and overemphasizes the importance of an ideology of 
effectiveness. As the critiques of Blake and Masschelein show, American critical 
pedagogy has never interrogated the very concept of educational praxis itself, but 
merely invested it with an instrumental purpose, which operates along an axis from 
repression to liberation. Education thus becomes the realization and execution of this 
ideal. This means that advocates of critical pedagogy themselves get trapped in an 
instrumental logic that is similar to that of the very system that it deplores: the 
capitalist system (Blake and Masschelein, 2003, p. 50). 
Ilan Gur-Ze'ev (1998) also addresses several key paradoxes in the theory of critical 
pedagogy. In his view, Freire seeks a dialogue that can challenge the silencing 
hegemonic aspects of education, through which there will be equal, open, and critical 
intersubjectivity between students and teachers, and between students and their 
world. The aim of Freire's critical pedagogy is to enable marginalized groups to 
recognize, identify and name things in the world. However, this could be interpreted, 
46 Patti Lather calls critical pedagogy as a "boy thing" (Lather, 2001b, p. 184). This "boy thing" has 
another implication, that critical pedagogy produces truth through an abstract and universal rhetoric. 
This rhetoric is contrary to the deconstructive pedagogy based on poststructuralism, which she calls a 
"girl thing". 
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in his liberatory thinking, as violence in the form of a normalizing of human beings 
and making them more productive in the realm of self-evidence. For Gur-Ze'ev, the 
danger in Freire's project is that its self-evident knowledge of the oppressed over that 
of the oppressors is noncritical and automatic. Regarding Giroux, though he distances 
himself from the concept of emancipation in the projects of Enlightenment and 
critical theory, and turns to underscore instead the concept of "the other" and 
"difference", as Gur-Ze' ev puts it, he is accurate in exposing some of the harmful 
characteristics of the Enlightenment, such as: "its positive utopianism, its hasty 
optimism, and its arrogance as to the possibility of liberating the repressed and 
constituting a better world within current reality" (p. 474). On the one hand, Giroux 
takes up postmodern thinking on plurality and inconsistency. On the other hand, 
contradictorily, he still insists on a form of universal reason—the possibility of 
emancipation. For Gur-Ze'ev, Giroux's notion of "the language of possibility" is 
itself a nave optimism and a positive utopianism. The route of this positive 
utopianism is, however, at odds with his epistemic assumptions. Moreover, Giroux 
fails to find a solution to cope with the conflict between the authority of 
"self-evident" knowledge and the interests of individual students in repressed 
collectives (ibid). Violent potentialities may arise in the dialogue between teachers 
and students, as Ellsworth's critique of her teaching experience in a university shows 
(Ellsworth, 1989). In brief, the task that theorists of critical pedagogy need to engage 
in is perhaps to reconsider the solution to the question of how to move away from an 
optimistic utopianism—an opiate thinking of education—and to come back to the 
reality of schooling. Or as Blake and Masschelein suggest, it is to develop "a 
noninstrumental concept of action", to conceive of "a critical pedagogy without 
foundation" (Blake and Masschelein, 2003, p. 54). 
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External problems 
Foreign educational theory could be a helpful resource in that it enables people to 
draw on the experience of other countries in order to consider domestic issues. 
Nevertheless, it is always risky to employ such ideas uncritically. American critical 
pedagogy is specifically conceived of as dealing with educational problems in 
America or Brazil. For instance, Michael Apple, Henry A. Giroux or Peter McLaren 
engages in exposing the unjust and undemocratic mechanisms in America and their 
association with educational systems. In Brazil, Paulo Freire endeavors to awaken the 
consciousness of oppressed people in order to help them to empower themselves. The 
issues with which this theory is concerned are current crises of racial, gender or class 
inequality in their territory. Taiwan, however, has a different historical and social 
context from those countries. Though racial, gender and class inequality exist in 
Taiwanese society, social problems show themselves in a local character that is 
different from America or Brazil. For example, it is evident in the nature of poverty 
gap that has arisen from unbalanced economic development between cities and rural 
areas. Furthermore, the issue of national identity occupies a crucial role in political 
debates, which is unusual in other countries. 
In my previous empirical study (Wang, 2006), I found that Taiwanese teachers have 
rarely thought about the issues of inequality in education. Even more, very few 
educators would see pedagogy as a political or social movement or see themselves as 
committed to subverting the situation of domination and oppression in schooling. 
Most of them prefer being faithful to their duties. They make an effort everyday to 
teach their students well in the classroom and to help them to increase their 
achievement in order that they may occupy a good socio-economic position in the 
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future. This is their normal way of treating (or empowering) disadvantaged students47, 
namely, aiming to change their social status through education. We may take a view 
that the liberatory consciousness of Taiwanese teachers simply has not been raised. 
Conversely, we can also explain that liberation is less important in their conception of 
educational practice; or they have another self-definition of liberation. Social equality 
may be an important dream for America. However, this does not mean that it is also 
the dream of the Taiwanese. In this sense, it may not be feasible to realize "the 
language of possibility", as Giroux put this, because it has never been considered as 
the hope of educators in Taiwanese context. Another example is that most educational 
theorists agree with the findings that textbooks are not ideology-free and that the 
hidden curriculum has the potential effect of oppression. But, I do not think that they 
are the primary and urgent issues facing education in Taiwan. They are really not the 
root of disorder in the Taiwanese educational system. For these reasons, we should be 
suspicious of leaping into this American "positive utopianism". 
6.1.4 The "truth" in the importation of critical pedagogy 
In order to examine what "truth" is in the importation of critical pedagogy, I draw on 
Foucault's account of "truth". In Foucault's view, truth is established by means of 
multiple forms of constraint, and it also induces successive effects of power. He 
explains the composition of truth as follows: 
Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
47 
 For instance, aboriginal students or the student whose mother comes from a foreign country (who is 
termed an "immigrant bride"). 
235 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the 
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault, 1980d, p. 
131) 
In each social body, truth is circulated by apparatuses of education and is subject to 
"constant economic and political incitement" (ibid). Truth, for Foucault, has nothing 
to do with empirical truth or with judgements of right and wrong. Nor does he 
attempt to pursue a universal epistemological truth or to destroy existing truth. 
Rather, he seeks to diagnose how an individual fits into a truth game and how people 
are governed under the regime of truth in which distinctions between what is true and 
what is false are drawn. It refers to the exploration of "what we are". As Dreyfus and 
Rabinow claim, Foucault has never intended "to denounce power per se nor to 
propound truth but to use his analysis to shed light on the specific dangers that each 
specific type of power/knowledge produces" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986, p. 116). 
Before clarifying what "truth" informs the phenomenon of academic importation and 
its operation within a particular power/knowledge complex, let me address first the 
question of truth in critical pedagogy itself in order to make the regime of truth that I 
shall expose clearer. In critical pedagogy, "truth" refers to the imperative to empower 
marginalized groups, and it entails that we succeed in liberating individuals and 
collectives by virtue of emancipatory movements. This main tenet is indeed a unitary 
truth by which other aims of education are excluded, because outside emancipation 
there is no educational purpose. There is an implicit knowledge that the society is 
progressive when teachers and students become liberatory agents. So it comes to be 
claimed that education ought to be organized in the light of this goal. Power is 
manipulated in order to promote emancipatory praxis so as to empower minorities. 
Both "dialogue" in Freire's account and the "voice" in Giroux's belong to this praxis. 
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Truth in this sense serves to solve social and political problems in America. Critical 
pedagogy thus becomes a new kind of "governmentality" (Blake and Masschelein, 
2003, p. 54). 
In an essay entitled "How to conceive of critical educational theory today" 
(Masschelein, 2004), Masschelein shows that classical concept in the critical 
principle of Bildung promotes the individual as a self-reflective, self-determining and 
rationally autonomous subject. Educational reality in this perspective is regarded as a 
site of coercion, alienation, oppression, negation or distortion. The task of education 
is, therefore, to create opportunities to live a critical, emancipatory and autonomous 
life. For instance, in the thinking of Habermas, critical educational theory is offered 
by the model of emancipatory practices as "self-reflection in dialogue" (p. 354). The 
truth in such educational practices therefore is that children need to be equipped with 
communicative competence in order to participate in dialogue. For Masschelein, this 
is a way of subjugating oneself to the claims of communicative reason and of 
recognizing oneself to be part of a universal humanity. Masschelein claims that rather 
than revolting against the existing social order and power, ironically, the notion of 
autonomy and critique have become parts of that order or power. Drawing on 
Foucault's analysis of power relations, he explains, first of all, that the notion of an 
autonomous, critical life is shaped historically. It constitutes a particular relation to 
oneself and a specific work of the self on the self. Second, this autonomous, 
self-determining subject refers to a nexus of power relations through which the form 
of subjectivity becomes both an effect and an instrument. It is "an effect and 
instrument of a Christian-spiritual discipline and a pastoral power relation" (p. 360). 
Thus, self-determination and self-reflection are not the realization of humanist ideals, 
but merely a form of self-government. In this respect, power is exercised through the 
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intensification of self-reflexivity, rather than through the negation or oppression of 
individuality. The point I attempt to highlight here is that critical pedagogy is part of 
the critical educational theory that Masschelein criticises. It is not only an attempt to 
rescue educational practices through emancipation; it is also a way of governing our 
thinking and attitudes in pedagogy. 
With the importation of critical pedagogy into Taiwan, another similar truth is 
formed. This truth becomes: "By way of the importation of critical pedagogy, we can 
succeed in emancipating subjugated teachers and students, and in helping them to 
become self-autonomous and self-determining subjects." Teaching then plays the role 
of transforming our society towards a more democratic and egalitarian utopia. The 
truth here is constituted and enabled by the trend of globalization, through which 
American local theories become international and then affect Taiwanese educational 
discourses. In this regime of truth, power tends to exclude other possibilities of 
critical teaching or critical education. Power also excludes other possibilities of what 
a teacher or a student might be or become. Take Giroux's idea, for example. He 
asserts that we need not only a "language of critique", but also a "language of 
possibility" in education. That is to say, it is not enough to expose only the current 
situation of domination in schools by a language of critique; we need but also 
liberatory practices to empower both teachers and students for social reconstruction 
(Giroux, 1992). This "language of possibility", however, has only one 
possibility—that is, to end up as the only alternative possibility of thought in our local 
educational discourse. I do not disagree with the positive ideal and the humanist 
concern of critical pedagogy. However, the danger is that in the name of liberation it 
ends up governing our thinking; and we accept this unitary discourse as the whole of 
education. 
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6.1.5 Sustaining a "limit attitude" to critical pedagogy 
Since it is hazardous to adopt the concept of critical pedagogy unproblematically, 
how can we question it? What kind of attitude could we adopt in facing this 
discourse? To answer these questions, I shall refer to Foucault's critique of Kant's 
notion of Enlightenment. In one of Foucault's essays "What is Enlightenment?" 
(Foucault, 1997b), he considers that Kant regards Enlightenment as a process in 
which human beings traverse from "immaturity" to "maturity". This process is both 
personal and collective. Foucault explains, for Kant, that "immaturity" means the 
situation that we "accept someone else's authority to lead us in areas where the use of 
reason is called for" (p. 305). For instance, a book takes the place of our own 
thinking, and a doctor's prescription decides what our diet is to be. In Kant's account, 
men can reach the aim of maturity by making use of reason, and without following 
authority. This is the reason for the sake of reason itself. The Enlightenment in Kant's 
thought, for Foucault, needs to be seen as a reflection not only on history, but also on 
modernity, and on our present. Even more, we need a form of relationship that is 
established not only with modernity, but also with ourselves. In Foucault's view, 
however, Kant's assertion—one should constitute oneself as an autonomous subject 
by following reason—is historically determined by the Enlightenment. It is 
unavoidably limited by its necessary and certain reasons of that historical time. As 
Masschelein and Simons put it, Kant's idea of Enlightenment opens up a 
philosophical questioning of the present to ontology—an ontology of the self—but 
also immediately closes down what it opened up (Masschelein and Simons, 2007). 
Kant's claim about Enlightenment, rather than emancipating subjects, becomes a 
restriction, a means of confining our use of reason and constraining what human 
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beings can be. Its consequence is far apart from Kant's ideal of maturity and from the 
idea of the individual as an autonomous subject. 
On the basis of this deficiency, Foucault claims that we need a philosophical ethos 
that connects with a critique of our utterances, thinking and behavior through "a 
historical ontology of ourselves" (315). This philosophical ethos may be 
characterized as a limit-attitude (ibid). In the first place, this limit-attitude is not a 
gesture of rejection, but a move beyond the outside-inside alternative, or a shift to be 
at the frontiers. In Foucault's point, it is "to transform the critique conducted in the 
form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible 
crossing-over" (ibid). In his analysis of Kant's notion, he attempts to reflect upon its 
limit as such. This limit exposes the constraining of knowledge —connaissance48 --that 
is, scientific reason and State reason in Kant's epoch limit his concept of 
Enlightenment. For Foucault, we need a practical critique to break through the narrow 
limitation of looking at things by a single, universal, and obligatory perspective. This 
critique is not like Kant's critique, which is based on arbitrary, transcendental values, 
but is a historical, genealogical investigation into the contingent events that have led 
us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects. It reaches towards 
the undefined work of our freedom—the freedom to decide what we are, and to be 
ourselves. Second, this limit attitude must be experimental. On the one hand, it opens 
up a realm of historical inquiry; on the other, it opens up the space in which change of 
the self becomes possible. The historical ontology of ourselves hence turns away 
48 Connaissance is a French word meaning "knowledge" in English. It is the knowledge to multiply 
the knowable objects, to manifest their intelligibility, and to understand their rationality. An inquiring 
subject remains fixed while he is in the process of it. Another French term, savoir, upon which 
Foucault mainly concentrates, is different from the meaning of connaissance, though both of their 
English translations are "knowledge". For Foucault, savoir is a process through which one engages 
both in constructing the object and in modifying the subject. The knowing of the object relates to the 
knowing of our own subject. See Foucault (2002), p. 256. 
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from all global projects. This critical attitude helps us to go beyond limits, which is an 
action to be "carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings" (p. 316). Third, 
because of the abandonment of complete and definitive knowledge, the theoretical 
and practical experience we have is always limited. Rather than limiting possibility, 
on the contrary, the limit in this limit attitude enables us to keep a distance from our 
historical constraints and conditioning, from the effects of power/knowledge that bear 
on our bodies, through which self-transformation or a new birth of self is possible. 
Consequently, as Foucault puts it: "we are always in the position of beginning again" 
(p. 317). In doing this, Foucault claims an attitude of problematization, which is to be 
understood as "the way to analyze questions of general import in their historically 
unique form" (p. 318). This is also an inquiry into the way that power is exercised in 
establishing truth in relation to ourselves, and into how our experience is constituted 
by determinate and contingent historical figures. Problematization is relevant to the 
dimensions of experience in the interpretation of Thomas R. Flynn. For him, 
Foucault's investigation of problematization analyzes "the cognitive and the 
normative relations of experience in modern Western society" (Flynn, 2006, p. 38). 
This experience describes how an individual constitutes and recognizes himself as a 
subject—namely, the process of subjectivation, in Foucault's terms. For example, in 
Foucault's later work, he asks why sexual conduct became an object of moral 
solicitude. This problematization enables us to see how an individual constitutes a 
moral self in the discourses of truth games. 
In sum, following Kant's reflection on the Enlightenment, Foucault claims that we 
should engage in a critical interrogation of the present and of ourselves. However, 
this critical ontology of ourselves cannot be considered as a theory or doctrine, in the 
way that Kant saw it. Rather, Foucault suggests: 
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...it must be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique 
of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits imposed 
on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. (p. 319) 
How can an individual be an autonomous subject after all? In Foucault's account, it is 
not possible to achieve this purpose by following along behind Kant's affirmation of 
reason, nor can it be accomplished by pursuing the universal value of critical theory 
or the positive utopianism of critical pedagogy. Rather, one needs a critical practice, a 
"limit attitude" that enables us to struggle against our current limits and to seek in a 
different way to live in the present. Rather than requiring a theory or a doctrine, an 
autonomous subject has her own freedom to reject what they are (Foucault, 1983, p. 
216) or to decide what they will be by themselves. In the case of the import of critical 
pedagogy, as in the case of the Enlightenment, there are relations between power, 
truth and subjects. Power is productive in this importation. Critical pedagogy has 
become a norm. We subjectify ourselves in a process of normalization in terms of 
both intellectual imitation and a Western liberating ideal. In fact, this functions as a 
kind of "immunity" that reinforces the power that is imposed on us. It is also 
immature to wait for a guru or a messiah to guide us towards a utopia through 
education. There is rationality behind this immature expectation. For a long time, 
especially after World War Two, Taiwan relied on Western scientific technologies 
and economic, social and political institutions to enhance its internal development. 
This imitation has become a symbol of advance, which is in reality less difficult than 
conducting an innovation of our own. This conduct indeed helps Taiwan free itself 
from poverty and become prosperous in many respects. The movement of 
globalization enhances the ease with which, not only commodities flow, but also 
thought and ideas are fast exchanged among different countries. The importation of 
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academic discourses is informed by the need to improve the current educational 
situation. However, the dominant knowledge here is the belief that Western 
"advanced" educational theories are omnipotent. This powerful thinking then denies 
the opportunity to examine foreign ideas critically and to elaborate a mature attitude 
of adopting them. Following Foucault's critique of Kant's idea of Enlightenment, I 
suggest that we can hold a "limit-attitude" or a problematizing attitude in order to 
explore how truth is constituted in our use of critical pedagogy. We can distance 
ourselves from dependence on an uncritical adoption, and disconnect ourselves from 
the intensification of these academic power relations. Then we may be able to 
reconsider local educational discourses and to resolve domestic educational problems 
otherwise, by which a "crossing-over" of both educational innovation and our 
thinking of it is made possible. This critical practice is not only personal. It could also 
be a group or collective practice, or it could be that of a country as a whole. The 
subject that Foucault is concerned with can be both an individual subject and 
collective subjects. 
6.1.6 The "import" of critical pedagogy 
As I mentioned above, the uncritical implantation of theory has come to govern our 
thinking. While we are indebted to critical pedagogy, a mature attitude would be to 
distance ourselves from the dominant way of using it. Then, we may ask a further 
question: What is the import or significance of critical pedagogy? How can we look 
at this theory with the benefit of a limit attitude? Adopting a limit attitude does not 
mean that we should repudiate or reject this theory. Critical pedagogy has its 
contribution to make in terms of a self-examination of the educational status quo in 
America. However, this does not imply that we should have the same expectations of 
243 
it in our own educational present. A limit attitude warns us of the risks we run if we 
adopt this theory as a prescription to treat our educational maladies without being 
self-critical and ready to problematize what we do; and it inspires our practices to 
interrogate the truth-dogma that is constituted by power relations. While we believe 
that the thought of critical pedagogy can liberate us, ironically, we are dominated by 
the truth it asserts and are governed by both the totalitarian thinking of this 
intellectual trend and the universal mode of applying it as seen in the Taiwanese 
context. It is not problematic to refer to academic resources from all over the world. 
Our stance should be open-minded in order to be able to accept multiple ways of 
thinking. However, a question can be considered: "How can we use those theories 
rather than being used by them?". It is helpful to draw on Foucault's notion of 
"critique" here. He defines "critique" as: "the art of not being governed like that and 
at that cost" (Foucault, 2007, p. 45). A limit attitude is a critical practice that shows 
how not to be governed in this way, by these means. Through this, more space will be 
spared in order to accommodate multiple pedagogical discourses and educational 
ideals. Therefore, our dream with reference to the role of teachers may not be that 
they become "transformative intellectuals", as Giroux advocates. It could be that what 
is needed is another kind of "transformative intellectual", defined differently from 
those in Giroux's account. Or, dismantling this frame, we may be able to envisage a 
role for teachers in another way, which can help to trigger a new self-transformation 
of our society. Therefore, the importance of critical pedagogy does not lie in our 
dependence on this theory, but is decided by a mature and critical attitude towards the 
adoption of it. 
6.1.7 Conclusion 
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The importation of critical pedagogy is not merely an issue of making use of foreign 
theories, but an issue that has to do with relationships between power, truth and 
subjects. Educational practices should not be regarded as normalizing practices. 
Though we are fascinated by the emancipating ideal of critical pedagogy, it is unwise 
to embrace it without critical reflection. The employment of foreign theories should 
have the effect of emancipating our thinking, rather than of limiting it. Also, the 
action of this employment itself cannot be conducted in a limited way, as in a 
comprehensive acceptance. As Masschelein claims, instead of appealing to a 
liberating or emancipating gaze, what is essential is to "liberate our gaze" 
(Masschelein, 2006, p. 569). Foucault's conception may help us to hold a limit 
attitude in facing theories that are imported through the process of globalization. On 
the one hand, a limit attitude is a practice for us to challenge limits in the thinking of 
critical pedagogy and to distance ourselves from the governance of power in 
globalization. On the other hand, this problematic attitude offers possibilities for us to 
reconsider what we are and what our education should be. It transforms how we think 
about education and how we practice pedagogy. 
6.2 What is "critical" in critical ethnography? 
6.2.1 Introduction 
What is "critical" in critical ethnography? How does this "critical" element or this 
"critique" help us to enrich our thinking about critical ethnography? These questions 
have fascinated me since I read Stephen J. Ball's Education reform: A critical and 
post-structural approach (1994). Ball integrates the methods of critical policy 
analysis, post-structuralism and critical ethnography into his research on educational 
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policy and curriculum reform in the UK. He employs an ethnographical methodology 
in order to generate critical perspectives on the impact of policy in local settings. For 
Ball, ethnography "provides access to 'situated' discourses and 'specific tactics' and 
`precise and tenuous' power relations operating in local settings" (p. 2). On the one 
hand, it counters the trend of rational scientism or psycho-humanism; on the other 
hand, it opens up the possibility of considering diverse participating voices of 
currently marginalized or oppressed social groups. Ball explains that a tradition of 
critical ethnography was central to the US Chicago School. In the UK, it has become 
prominent as a result of Paul Willis' 1976 work Learning to Labour, in which 
educational ethnography is oriented towards the exploration of "resistance" and the 
interplay of domination and resistance. Ball sees a valuable connection between 
ethnography and Foucault's genealogy. He points out: 
I see a possible role for ethnography (as sets of cultural texts) in relation to theorization, 
similar to the role played by historical texts in Foucault's genealogical method. In other 
words, there is a methodological affinity between ethnography and genealogy49. There 
are also important parallels between critical policy research and Foucauldian sociology. 
(P. 3) 
Ball considers that Foucault's genealogical approach "interrupts the taken-for-granted 
and isolates the contingent power relations which make it possible for particular 
assertions to operate as absolute truths" (ibid). In this sense, genealogy enables an 
"insurrection of subjugated knowledges" (ibid). For Ball, this means that through 
genealogy, it is possible to provide a conduit for submerged voices that are obscured 
49 
 Tamboukou and Ball (2003) develop these theoretical affinities more in their later work. They 
generalize them into 7 points: 1. Interrogate the validity and universal authority of scientific 
knowledge; 2. Adopt a context-bound critical perspective; 3.Transgress closed theoretical and 
methodological systems; 4. Point to the limits of dominant power/knowledge regimes; 5. Recover 
excluded subjects and silenced voices; 6. Highlight the centrality of the body in sociohistorical 
analyses; 7. Restore the political dimension of research. 
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and marginalized by specific power/knowledge arrangements. Likewise, in Ball's 
view, ethnography is also a way of engaging in critical interpretations that are 
realized via local memories and marginalized voices. It is connected with the play of 
power/knowledge relations in local and specific settings, as are found, for example, in 
curriculum, management, leadership, choice and competition. 
I agree with Ball's assertion that it is possible to undertake genealogical research 
within critical ethnography; and vice versa, we can also conduct ethnographical 
research by means of a genealogical perspective. However, it is essential to clarify 
several concepts here. First, does the "critical" in critical ethnography equate with the 
notion of "critique" in Foucault's account? Second, both genealogy and critical 
ethnography show their opposition to the systematic, universal knowledge of science. 
Nevertheless, my question is: Does the 'insurrection of subjugated knowledge' in 
these two approaches have the same meaning? What kind of "knowledge" is 
subjugated after all? Is this only to be realized in local and marginalized voices, as in 
Ball's thinking, or could it have another significance? Third, Ball refers to the 
concept of "resistance" in critical ethnography, which involves a confrontation with 
the dominant order in order to change the inequitable situation of oppressed groups. I 
also question whether this is the only meaning that "resistance" can take. All of these 
questions derive from my reading of Foucault. I shall argue that we cannot draw on 
Foucault's thinking in critical ethnography without reconsidering these basic 
concepts. Otherwise, we will lose the opportunity of transforming our stable 
presuppositions within critical ethnography, and so of thinking through this 
methodology in a fresh way. To achieve this purpose I shall, first, delineate the 
conventional notion of critical ethnography. My discussion of this includes several 
aspects. For instance: what is critical ethnography for? Against what kinds of 
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domination is it struggling? What kinds of resistance does it attempt to arouse? And 
what kinds of subjugated knowledge is it concerned with? Through the examination 
of these questions, I find that recent trends in critical ethnography have been 
governed in particular ways. This itself could be a target of critique in Foucault's 
account. Second, I shall analyse Foucault's concept of "critique" in order to think 
about critical ethnography in a different way. This will involve a different approach 
to the word "critical" from the way that conventional critical ethnographers typically 
understand this term. My concern is not only with critique, but also with the related 
concepts of "domination" and "resistance". Following the discussion of these, I shall 
consider a story of critical ethnography that can be regarded as a "fiction" in 
Foucault's terms. Instead of an illusionary story or piece of research intended to 
persuade its readers by truth, this "fiction" is a historical-philosophical practice, a 
movement between rationalization and desubjugation. Through writing and reading 
fiction, the purpose of critical ethnography is no longer an emancipating praxis for 
confronting existing mechanisms of oppression, but rather an ethical practice 
dedicated towards a "critical ethnography of the self'. I suggest that the self could 
also be an ethnographic field to be explored critically, with a view to achieving a new 
relation in our knowledge of ourselves and in order to transform our ways of thinking 
about ourselves. 
6.2.2 Conventional notions of critical ethnography 
Critical ethnography is in fact a hybrid idea in methodological terms, and it cannot be 
traced back to a singular origin. In the view of Patti Lather (2001a), critical 
ethnography is rooted in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, the sociolinguistics of 
Basil Bernstein and British Cultural Studies of the Birmingham School, which focus 
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on local knowledge and on the illumination of the operation of power in culturally 
specific contexts linked to socially reproductive processes. Focusing on the 
perspectives of feminisms, post-colonialisms and critical race theories, Lather 
considers that critical ethnography reworks the Marxist project that aims at exposing 
the construction of consent and the naturalization of inequalities. By breaking with 
the limits of the conventional methodologies of symbolic interactionism and 
phenomenology, critical ethnography turns its interest, in Lather's view, towards and 
aligns itself with oppressed groups. Joe L. Kincheloe and Peter McLaren (2000) 
suggest what "critical" means in critical research. For them, critical research is 
embedded in the context of empowering individuals. This sense of "critical" is then 
combined with the struggle against injustice in a particular society. Critical research 
shows its "transformative endeavor unembarrassed by the label political and unafraid 
to consummate a relationship with emancipatory consciousness" (p. 291). Drawing 
on Marxist traditions, they claim that, beyond questions of method, ethnography 
needs to be understood in terms of the critical assessment of reading and writing 
practices. This practice is "a transformative praxis that leads to the alleviation of 
suffering and the overcoming of oppression" (p. 303). Kincheloe and McLaren claim 
that an insurgent research of this kind can ask questions such as: "Whose interests are 
served through institutional arrangements?" and "Where do our frames of reference 
come from?" The "subjugated knowledge" in critical research is therefore, they claim, 
a knowledge imposed on minority groups by the interests of their oppressors and a 
knowledge made for controlling people by certain dominant ideologies. Since the 
1970s, critical ethnography has been greatly influenced by neo-Marxism, Frankfurt 
School Critical Theory and feminist social theory. As Phil Francis Carspecken (1996, 
p. 7) puts it, the purposes of doing critical ethnography are always related to political 
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struggles against inequality and injustice, for the exposure of the oppression of 
disadvantaged groups, and for cultural and social criticism. 
Next, I shall discuss Foucault's notion of "critique" and then see whether it stands in 
line with this "orthodox" critical ethnography. 
6.2.3 What is "critique" (or what is it to be critical)? 
In a lecture entitled "What is Critique", Foucault (2007) elaborates what he means by 
"critique". He considers that critique is an attitude, a means and a "virtue" that is 
directed towards the truth. To develop this idea, Foucault uncovers a triple 
relationship to the "truth" in the salvation-oriented operations of Christian pastoral 
thinking. First, truth is understood as dogma; second, it implies a special and 
individualizing knowledge of individuals; and finally, it deploys a technique 
comprising general rules—for example, particular forms of knowledge, methods of 
examination, and practices of confessions. I think that the idea of "subjugated 
knowledge" in Foucault's account derives from these kinds of dogma, of knowledge 
of individuals and of techniques of governance. Truth may be governed in certain 
fixed ways by virtue of these kinds of knowledge, and this is the constraint that 
Foucault would like to break. He holds the opinion that the "art of governing men" 
started in the 15th century, before the Reformation. The process of 
governmentalization5° expanded not only to different objects—children, families, 
armies—and to different fields—pedagogy, politics and economics—but also deep 
into the individual's own body and mind. Nevertheless, the question that interests 
50 4 4Governmentalization" is related to another of Foucault's terms, "governmentality". It refers to a 
process in which human beings govern their own mentality through the exercise of power/knowledge. 
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Foucault is not merely the process of governmentalization itself, but "how not to be 
governed?" (p. 44). For him, the critical attitude, which is a virtue as well, starts by 
asking an important question: "How not to be governed like that, by that, in the name 
of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such 
procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them" (ibid). This attitude is not a 
complete rejection of governmentalization. Rather, he explains, it is an attitude that 
one is "both partner and adversary to the arts of governing" (ibid). On the one hand, 
in Foucault's view, governance is an essential tactic that works in the process of the 
constitution of modern state, which serves to enhance economic prosperity and social 
welfare. On the other hand, governance is harmful in the way that it unifies the 
development of human subjects, and it closes off alternative perspectives of looking 
at the nature of human beings. For the negative effect of the latter, we therefore need 
an act of limiting these arts of governing and of transforming them. Foucault's 
definition of critique, following this, can be underlined with the words: "the art of not 
being governed like that and at that cost" (ibid). 
Foucault then examines three historical anchoring points of critique. The first 
anchoring point is related to religion. In this, critique, or the question of how not to be 
governed, involved seeking out what was authentic in Scripture and questioning what 
sort of truth it was that the Scriptures represented. In the second anchoring point, the 
question of how not to be governed involves a not wanting to accept unjust laws or 
illegitimate sovereignty. This is basically a legal issue. I consider that most concepts 
of critique in conventional critical ethnography fit this understanding of the term. The 
third anchoring point is that critique is a confrontation with the authority that controls 
our subjectivity. This is the critique that Foucault would like to underscore—the 
freedom to want not to be governed. He claims that "critique is the movement by 
251 
which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and 
question power on its discourses of truth" (p. 47). Foucault continues: 
...critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability. 
Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the subject in the context of what 
we could call, in a word, the politics of truth (ibid). 
Critique, for Foucault, is the politics of truth, or we may say that it is a political 
investigation into regimes of truth. It is an act that dares to challenge and transform 
the limits of subjugation of the subject. 
6.2.4 A critique "of' critical ethnography and "within" critical ethnography 
Foucault's idea of critique prompts me to reconsider what is "critical" in critical 
ethnography; and it also leads me to rethink the nature of the alliance between critical 
ethnography and Foucault's philosophy. In the first place, critical ethnography itself 
could be a target of critique. According to those central points of this methodology 
that I have addressed above, it is obvious that critical ethnography is governed in 
particular ways and by a dominant truth, which is validated in certain coherent 
systems of knowledge. Its critical gesture is made with the intention of confronting 
inequality and oppression. The purpose of consciousness-raising and transformative 
praxis has become the norm in the discourse of this methodology. Several terms such 
as "empowerment", "liberation" or "autonomy" have then been incorporated into its 
normative language. These emancipatory concepts are still part of the subjugated 
knowledge and governmental rationality, and they constrain researchers from 
thinking outside these terms. In the name of emancipation, ironically, the invariable 
assumption has been that there is a specific route to be taken, a taken-for-granted 
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order that cannot be liberated. If, as Ball puts it, the critical aspect of critical 
ethnography is the "insurrection of subjugated knowledge", then the normative 
thinking of critical ethnography itself is a subjugated knowledge. It is this too that 
stands in need of insurrection. 
Since critical ethnography is governed by its own regime of truth, I suggest that 
Foucault's notion of critique can be applied in order to rethink ethnography in another 
wider "critical" way. This is the second aspect of the implication of this concept that I 
attempt to demonstrate. Olssen (2006) explains that Foucault's conception of critique 
is different from that of Marxism or the Frankfurt School. Rather than realizing a 
rational society or dreaming of a future utopia, Foucault's critique is designed more 
pragmatically to reveal "the contemporary limits of the necessary" (p. 130). 
Following Foucault, I consider that what is "critical" in critical ethnography can be 
regarded in terms of a practice of breaking through the contemporary limits of the 
necessary, of an attitude of "how not to be governed like that and at that cost". It can 
be seen as a virtue—a desire51 of "voluntary insubordination" or of "reflected 
intractability". Research then becomes the ethical possibility of transforming the 
limits of subjugation; it becomes an investment in the desubjugation of the subject. 
As Butler's interpretation of Foucault's notion of critique suggests, this practice 
offers a way of transferring the confinement of the epistemological field into the 
possibility of the ethical field (Butler, 2002). Critique, therefore, is an ethical practice 
committed to raising a critical attitude to those norms, to the established order, or to 
the limits of the epistemological horizon. Namely, it is an examination related to how 
knowledge forecloses the possibility of any alternative ordering and how 
power/knowledge confines the possibility of thinking otherwise. Domination, for 
51 From the viewpoint of Butler, an ethical practice of critique comes from desire. 
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conventional critical ethnography, comes mainly from the unjust operation of 
sovereign power and from ideological oppression, as in Neo-Marxist terms; or 
perhaps it is seen, as critical theorists suggest, as nothing other than the workings of 
instrumental rationality. In Foucault's view, however, domination refers to the limits 
of knowledge—the knowledge that is confined through certain dominant forms of 
rationality and that is constituted through the manipulation of power/knowledge. 
Hence, a practice of resistance cannot be a matter of an unyielding attitude dedicated 
to breaking the advantages of privileged groups; it must instead be a revolt against 
governmental demands in order to release knowledge within a concrete strategic field, 
and in order to liberate subjects from their unwitting subjugation. On the one hand, 
our thinking and behaviour are governed by normalizing knowledge—the dominant 
knowledge of individuals; on the other, we need another kind of knowledge to 
support resistance against this. This is the knowledge of "what we are", and it is to be 
achieved by means of an investigation of a history and politics of the present. As 
Masschelein and Simons suggest, knowledge can be seen as a "reflexive ethical 
instrument" (Masschelein and Simons, 2007) that is made not for understanding, but 
for "cutting". This "cutting" is a rejection of the obedience of governmental 
obligation and also a rejection of "the inertia of power which was maintaining itself 
indefinitely" (Foucault, 2007, p. 54). Through the construction of this knowledge of 
cutting, we can see the limits of our history and then cut through the seemingly 
inevitable ways that we have come to look at ourselves. It is this that makes the 
transformation of the self possible. 
In the next part, I shall try to conceive of the way that this kind of knowledge might 
emerge in critical ethnography and shall suggest ways of drawing on Foucauldian 
critique in the reading and writing of ethnographic research. 
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6.2.5 Writing and reading critical ethnography as a "fiction" 
With the purposes of critique in mind, I suggest that critical ethnography can be 
written and read as "fiction", in the sense that the term is used by Foucault. For an 
example of this notion, I shall once again refer to Foucault's critical viewpoint 
regarding the Enlightenment. In Kant's view, Enlightenment requires that one has the 
courage to recognize and to break the limits of knowledge. Foucault argues, however, 
that Kant's formulation of this thought has never been far from obedience to the 
sovereignty of knowledge. The sovereignty of knowledge in this sense is to be 
understood in terms of state-type power or scientific reason as this was manifest in 
Kant's age. Kant was enmeshed in the great process of society's governmentalization, 
in ways of which he was himself unaware. Positing a different approach from Kant, 
Foucault envisages that the concept of Enlightenment can be seen as a 
historical-philosophical practice. In this practice, one can fabricate one's own history 
through "fiction" (p. 56). This fiction is not the same as untruth or fantasy; rather, it 
aims to show the structure of rationality and the mechanisms of subjugation. The 
truth that Foucault suggests in this fiction displaces what historians are concerned 
with. It is not the truth constituted by a universal principle. This truth is based on 
desubjectification, through attention to its history, and on the liberation of historical 
contents, by examining the effect of power. Hence, we can see Enlightenment as a 
matrix in which a network involving power, truth and the subject inspire a certain 
possibility of self-transformation, a network in which a confrontation exists between 
the art of being governed and that of not being governed. Foucault elucidates further 
how this historical-philosophical practice is to be conducted. It is more a 
philosophical ethos, a thinking, an attitude, than a feasible way of behaving. In 
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Foucault's view, Kant's critique of Enlightenment, as the understanding of the 18th 
century philosopher, is raised in terms of knowledge [connaissance], which starts 
with "what was the historical destiny of knowledge at the time of the constitution of 
modem science" (p. 58). This Kantian investigation links to the legitimacy and 
domination of historical modes of knowing in terms of scientific knowledge. 
Foucault, however, claims that Enlightenment must be related "not to the problem of 
knowledge, but to that of power" (p. 59). Foucault calls this as "an examination of 
`eventualization'" (ibid). The event of Enlightenment creates an opportunity for us to 
consider the contents of knowledge in terms of their diversity and heterogeneity, and 
to view them in the context of effects of power that are interwoven with a system of 
knowledge. Instead of finding out what is true or false, scientific or ideological, 
legitimate or abusive, as the study of conventional critical ethnography attempts, what 
we can do is to examine the interplay between mechanisms of coercion and elements 
of knowledge [savoir]. And then there is the possibility of a breakthrough in the 
limits of our own savoir, which can take us beyond the frame of our current thinking. 
Foucault's conception of the Enlightenment is an example of his so-called "fiction". 
It is not only the Enlightenment but also any event in our own history or in our 
current situation in the ethnographic field could be the material of a fiction. Writing 
and reading a fiction is an eventualization, through which a nexus of power, truth and 
subject is uncovered. Butler attempts to explain the meaning of this fiction. For her, 
in terms of genealogy, fiction is constituted between power/knowledge and its 
fragility, between rationalization and desubjugation. There are double tasks here in 
Butler's view: the first is to show how current knowledge and power constitute the 
system of ordering this world. The second is to detect the breaking points, the 
contingent moments of this system. Therefore, through both the writing and reading 
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of fiction, researchers and readers may gain a critical distance on established 
authority and also instigate a practice that risks the subject at the limits of its order. 
These limits may be limits of both epistemology and ontology. In this process, 
according to Butler, the subject "is both crafted and crafting" (Butler, 2002, p. 19). In 
her view, the ontology of the self is unstable in the reading and writing of fiction. She 
calls this an "ontological suspension" (p. 17) in which human beings are always in the 
process of self-transformation. In the interpretation of Masschelein, fiction in 
Foucault's terms can be regarded as "the articulation of the failure (or destruction) of 
the actual government through exposing its games of truth and power" (Masschelein, 
2006, p. 564). For him, truth in this fiction is not a truth in reality. Instead, it is a truth 
outside a regime of truth, so it is merely a fiction. I consider this fiction is also an 
ironic fiction because its ironic gesture mocks at the collapse of governance and of 
dominant power/knowledge. In Masschelein's view, reading and writing a fiction is a 
limit-experience in Foucault's terms. It is an experience that shows the possibility of 
transgressing oneself, of detaching oneself from being-governed (p. 572). 
6.2.6 A critical ethnography of the self 
I try to address the question: "How can an ethnographer write a 'fiction52 ' in her 
study?" It seems to me that there are no instructions to guide us as to how to do this 
step by step. What we are concerned with is less a concrete research method than a 
philosophical ethos, an attitude or a historical-philosophical practice, as Foucault 
claims. However, several ideas may contribute to the methodology of critical 
ethnography here. First, the aim of an ethnographer is not to engage in the direct 
52 This "fiction" refers to the notion of fiction as Foucault uses it, not to the idea common in 
qualitative research of writing fiction. 
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pursuit of truth but, on the contrary, to consider the way of detaching oneself from 
that truth (or authority). The truth shown in her research is a different kind of truth, 
and this is not based on a specific rationality: its purpose is rather to delineate the 
order of this world through the observation of each event that happens in the field. On 
the strength of this the researcher can go further with a view to gaining a "critical 
distance" from that order, as Butler suggests. Second, while an ethnographer 
constitutes her field work as a research object, she herself is a subject who knows that 
both the field and her relation to it are so constructed. Namely, she constitutes herself 
as a subject through this exploration. Her subject is not fixed in the process, but 
rather, as Butler claims, is both crafted and crafting. We might say that doing critical 
ethnography creates the occasion for the ethnographer to change herself. This will 
involve a transformation of the relationship she has with her own knowledge—a 
knowledge of herself, a knowledge of others, and a knowledge of this world. This 
self-transformation makes possible a critique, a desubjectivation and an ethics of 
"de-governmentalization" (Masschelein and Simons, 2007). It is possible, I think, to 
relate a familiar attitude of anthropologists to this idea. This is that the anthropologist 
should bring curiosity with her into the field in such a way as to make familiar 
matters unfamiliar. The idea of the "familiar" suggests our fixed habits and ways of 
thinking. It can be seen as the limits of our own knowledge and, hence, as crucially to 
our way of governing ourselves. The action of making what is familiar unfamiliar 
might be seen as a practice of critique, a practice to prevent ourselves from being the 
same. Through this defamiliarization, a critical distance is made possible. Everything 
becomes new for ethnographers—with a new beginning and a new self-making. 
Third, I would like to suggest that it is not only the field of study as constructed in 
anthropological terms but also our selves and our knowledge that should be the 
concern of critical ethnography. This means that there are actually two fields in a 
258 
critical ethnographical study. A critical attitude concentrates both on the events and 
on the self. If we think of critical ethnography broadly, it can be a form of 
philosophical practice: "a critical ethnography of the self'  53 . In this research, 
everyone could be an ethnographer. Critical ethnography becomes a research of the 
self, a way of exploring oneself, through which one diagnoses the daily life of inertia, 
and defamiliarizes oneself with one's surroundings in order to distance oneself from 
the dominant rationality. Truth, in this exploration, is not related to noting everyday 
experience at all, as the way a real ethnographer does. Rather, for a researcher of the 
self, truth is shown in "a willingness to become a stranger in the familiar present" 
(Masschelein and Simons, 2007). A stranger, as a critical subject, attempts to apply 
an alternative vision to look at his familiar present (the "field" in "a critical 
ethnography of the self') by means of an attitude of insubordination, of disobedience. 
An experiment with a new way of living is then made possible in the present, and also 
in the future. 
This critical ethnography of the self could also extend to the readers of this fiction. 
Reading is another action of research. Critique thus becomes a collective practice. For 
Foucault, not being governed can be both an individual and a collective attitude 
(Foucault, 2007, p. 67). In this critical ethnography of the self, this "self' may be a 
singular self or a collective self. In one of Foucault's interviews, he claims that his 
books do not have particular value in themselves. He sees them rather as invitations 
or public gestures (Foucault, 2002, p. 245). Likewise, we may think, the purpose of 
writing a fiction is not to convince readers, but rather to offer them the opportunity to 
reflect on themselves through this story. This reflection is related to their experience 
53 I am indebted to Maarten Simons for this idea. 
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of both objectivation and subjectivation. Though this fiction might be a local and 
personal story, it can welcome the participation of others; it can become public. 
6.2.7 Conclusion 
Instead of confronting those forms of oppression that arise from hegemony and 
ideology, Foucault's idea of critique contributes an alternative approach to critical 
ethnography. Without presupposing truth or rationality, we may see that critical 
ethnography might offer, to borrow Butler's words, "a non-prescriptive form of moral 
inquiry" (Butler, 2002, p. 6) that engenders a moral practice without prescription, 
without rules and without juridical law. Rather than liberating oppressed social 
groups and individuals, critique is an ethical practice aimed at emancipating ourselves 
from the dominant forms of power imposed on our own knowledge. This knowledge 
does not refer to the intention of knowing something or of arousing specific 
consciousness, but is what Foucault terms "the care of the self'. Writing and reading 
an ethnographic story, according to this idea, becomes the writing and reading of a 
"fiction", in such a way as to display the tension between governmentalization and 
desubjugation, and to reveal the possibility of transgressing one's limits and of 
transforming oneself. Not only a local site, but also the "self' can be an 
ethnographical field to be explored critically within critical ethnography. 
In this chapter, two examples have been offered as illustrations in order to bring 
Foucault's thought to bear on my own thought in relation to curriculum issues. I shall, 
in the next chapter, offer some brief concluding remarks regarding on the thesis as a 
whole. These will serve as a retrospective on what I have been doing in this thesis, 
and it will acknowledge those limitations of my study that I am aware of. 
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Chapter 7 Concluding remarks 
In this thesis I have attempted to examine the use of the idea of power/knowledge in 
the work of four leading curriculum theorists. My purpose has been two-fold: first, to 
consider critically their adoption of this Foucauldian idea; second, to attempt to 
realize in my own work a kind of critical practice consonant with that idea. I have 
tried to show the extent to which each of these theorists is in or out of tune with that 
idea, and finally to offer two examples of my own to work in relation to problems in 
curriculum theory. 
I am well aware that this project is vulnerable to certain dangers. In the first place, I 
have tried to avoid presenting myself as an exponent of Foucauldian orthodoxy: the 
very idea of an orthodoxy grates with the deconstructive nature of Foucault's thought 
and practice. Nevertheless, it remains the case that nothing much can be said about 
Foucault or done with his work unless we have certain notions of what constitutes 
richer or poorer adoptions of his thought. Clearly I believe that my own interpretation 
is borne out by a close reading of his text and of the leading secondary literature on 
his work; in this respect I follow conventional academic good practice. But this is not 
to imply a canonical reading, something that the very nature of power/knowledge (as 
capillary rather than as sovereign) is intended to undermine. It is considered instead 
to be a way of going beyond the sovereign mode of the adoption of Foucault in 
curriculum theories, and of doing this in the light of the groundwork of Foucault's 
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thought. In the field of curriculum studies, most work has been dominated by the 
prominence of Marxism or neo-Marxism. Even though a Foucauldian perspective is 
drawn on in this field, the conception of knowledge within the idea of 
power/knowledge is typically characterized by what I think of as a kind of 
(neo-)Marxism or critical theory. This is a conception that I have set out to break 
through in terms of power/knowledge. 
In the second, I have not set out entirely to reject the work of the theorists in question, 
which in various respects I find valuable—that of Popkewitz, in particular. My 
purpose has been more specific: to consider the distortions effected in the adoption of 
Foucault's idea. Popkewitz's work, in my view, has touched the core of Foucault's 
thought, and it offers a new approach to thinking of curriculum issues, compared with 
other curriculum theorists in my critique. What we need is the new explorations like 
this enabled by employing philosophical perspectives, rather than merely using 
philosophy as an instrument to prove presupposed ideas. 
In the third, it should be clear that the project involves a subtle line of argument. Such 
is the nature of power/knowledge, and such is the nature of the misinterpretation, that 
the problem does not lead us to knock-down arguments. The very point of Foucault's 
work, as is the case with that of other poststructuralists, is altogether more subtle. It is 
to reveal the operations of language at a level that is less easily disclosed than the 
logical stages of clear-cut premises and tidy conclusions. 
I am aware of limitations in this study in certain respects. First, the idea of 
power/knowledge recurs in the various stages of Foucault's work, and it is modified 
in the process. Yet this modification is sometimes overstated, and it is often theorized 
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in an overly systematic way. My own view, as stated at the start of Chapter 3, is that 
these changes should not be exaggerated and that it is more fruitful to explore the 
intertwining of different threads in Foucault's thought. In any case, because of the 
constraints of word-length, it has not been possible for me to argue this here, and so 
in some sense it has been beyond the scope of this study to do justice to these 
changes. The route I adopt in this thesis is to follow the main account in Foucault's 
primary work with regard to this concept. My belief is that my own understanding of 
this term perhaps more closely approaches Foucault's later viewpoint than his earlier 
one. 
Second, my reading of the curriculum theorists in question is highly selective. My 
purpose was to examine the specific question of their take-up of the idea of 
power/knowledge. I do not attempt any more global assessment of their respective 
considerable contributions to curriculum theory, for this also would have been 
beyond the scope of the thesis. Hence, I am aware that I may be thought not to be 
doing them sufficient justice. But I would also like to reinforce the stronger point 
made in the introduction to Chapter 2. This is that the motivation for writing this 
thesis comes in part from my sense of the ways that Foucault has commonly been 
misappropriated in educational research, particularly through his being read in 
neo-Marxist terms, with power/knowledge understood in terms of sovereign power. It 
would have been easy for me to identify serious misreadings of this kind, for these 
are prevalent enough. Instead, and in order to test out my ideas more rigorously, I 
have chosen to concentrate on leading curriculum theorists who write in a particularly 
Foucauldian vein. If I have been able to make case in relation to the most 
sophisticated exponents of such views, it has been all the more valuable and 
academically robust. 
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Third, there is the pervasive problem of language. I am a native Chinese speaker 
writing in English about a philosopher who wrote in French! Inevitably, some 
meanings are lost in this process. Is there a chance that something is gained too? My 
hope is that my different cultural background, and the linguistic resources this has, 
can in its own way feed into this study to beneficial effect. 
Finally, I would like to say that this thesis has been a development from my earlier 
work in a way that has been a kind of experiment for me and, at the same time, an 
important experience. It has built on my earlier work in a particularly pertinent way. 
In 2005, I completed a PhD at National Kaohsiung Normal University on the topic 
"The implementation of 'Grade 1-9 Curriculum' in a primary school—Perspectives 
of Critical Pedagogy". This was a qualitative empirical study of an ethnographic kind 
into new curriculum reform in Taiwan, carried out in a primary school. During the 
time that I was working on this I was committed to certain theoretical assumptions, 
but gradually I became less confident of these. It was the way that I was coming to 
question these that led me to seek the opportunity to pursue study of a more 
philosophical kind into the theories in question. Through this philosophical 
exploration, I became aware that my own understanding of the ideas of power and 
knowledge in curriculum had also been dominated by neo-Marxist assumptions. 
The thinking behind the two examples that I have raised in Chapter Six constitutes in 
fact my own limit attitude: in Foucault's terms. I have attempted to expose my 
philosophical attitude and stance through making these available to the reader. This 
very process has taken me beyond any previous understanding of them that I may 
have had. That is, through reading Foucault, my limit-experience has been induced in 
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facing the issues of looking at the import of critical pedagogy in my country and of 
doing curriculum studies by way of an ethnographical approach. This 
limit-experience, drawn by this study, offers me an opportunity to transgress the 
limits of my previous work, and also to wrench myself from the sovereign concept 
that has been imposed upon curriculum studies. 
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